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THE CONSTITUTIONS OF WEST GERMANY AND
THE UNITED STATES: A COMPARATIVE STUDYt
Paul G. Kauper*

T

Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany (hereinafter referred to as the Basic Law)1 invites attention and
study for several reasons. Constitution-making has been a significant political development on the world scale since World War II.
HE

• Professor of Law, University of Michigan.-Ed.
The author acknowledges his indebtedness to Mr. Jiirgen Krumland, Referendar,
Diisseldorf, Germany, for his valuable assistance in the preparation of this article.
t The subject is treated under the following principal headings beginning at the pages
indicated.
I. Basic Principles, p. 1094.
II. Political Freedom, p. 1097.
III. Basic Rights, p. 1102.
IV. The Federal Principle, p. 1138.
V. Separation of Powers, p. 1157.
VI. The Federal Constitutional Court, p. 1162.
VII. The Amending Process, p. 1182.
1 Use of the English term "Basic Law" in reference to the Constitution of West Ger•
many is derived directly from the official German term Grundgesetz. This term is used
rather than the term Verfassung (Constitution), since the Grundgesetz is viewed as a funda·
mental statute designed to establish the order of the political life during the transitional
period pending reunification of Germany and the adoption at that time of a permanent
constitution for the German people. See the Preamble to the Basic Law.
For the German text of the Basic Law, see GRUNDGESE'I'Z FUR DIE BUNDESREPUBLIK.
DEUTSCHLAND included in F0RSTH0FF, OFFENTLICHES R.EcHT- SAMMLUNG srAATS· UND VERWALTUNGSRECHTI.ICHER GESEIZE 1 et seq. (1956). The author when quoting the Basic Law
in this article relies on the approved English translation of the text as effective on March
15, 1955, entitled "Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany.'' This English
version, published by the Deutscher Bundestag, was edited by the Linguistics Section of
the Foreign Office of the Federal Republic of Germany on the basis of a translation made
by the Legal Staffs of the Allied High Commission. Because of reliance on this 1955
text, later amendments of the Basic Law, except those amending Part X, dealing with
questions of finance, will be disregarded.
For the texts of the constitutions of some of the Lander (states), in parallel English
and German versions, see CONSTITUTIONS OF IHE GERMAN LAENDER, prepared by Civil Ad·
ministrative Division, Office of M'tlitary Government (U.S.) (1947).
For extended commentaries on the Basic Law, see KoMMENTAR ZUM BONNER GRUNDGESE'I'Z (BONNER KoMMENTAR), ed. by Dennewitz and Wemicke (1949); HAMANN, DAS
GRUNDGESE'I'Z FUR DIE BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND V. 23.5.1949 (1956); VON MANGOLDT
AND KLEIN, DAS BONNER GRUNDGESE'I'Z, 2d ed. (1955); MAUNZ AND Dfuuc, GRUNDGESE'I'Z
(1959). A briefer treatment is found in MAUNZ, DEUTSCHES STAATSRECHT, 8th ed. (1958).
For an analysis of the Basic Law at the time it was adopted, see Friedrich, "Rebuilding
the German Constitution,'' 43 AM. PoL. SCI. R.Ev. 704 (1949) (Part II); Lenhoff, "The
German (Bonn) Constitution with Comparative Glances at the French and Italian Constitutions," 24 TULANE L. R.Ev. 1 (1949).
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Perhaps at no one time has so much energy been expended on the
preparation of new written constitutions, with emphasis on judicial
review and the protection of basic rights as means of furthering the
aims of a democratic society.2 West Germany's Basic Law acquires
added interest in the light of its antecedents,8 the manipulation
of the constitutional structure during the Hitler regime, and the
attempt in the new Basic Law to raise to its highest and most
secure level the familiar conception of the Rechtsstaat, i.e., the
conception of the state permeated and governed by the rule of law.
Finally, for Americans the Basic Law has added interest, not only
because American influence played some part in the shaping of
the Basic Law but also because of the comparisons· and contrasts it
suggests with the Constitution of the United States.4 It is evident
that the two constitutions share many points in common: both have
a democratic foundation in the institutions of free suffrage and
representative government, both establish a federal structure, both
articulate the principle of separation of powers, both define basic
rights of the individual, and, finally, but by no means least, both
commit the final interpretation of the written document, viewed
as a limitation on the authority of all branches of government, to
the judiciary in the exercise of the power of judicial review. However, even though these two constitutional systems rest on a
common basis of fundamental principles, a comparison of the
institutional framework designed for the implementation of these
principles, particularly in regard to such matters as the structure
of federalism and the instrumentalities and methods of judicial
review, reveals conspicuous differences. The purpose of this
article is to present a descriptive overall picture of the fundamental
2 See Dietze, "Judicial Review in Europe," 55 MICH. L. R.Ev. 539 (1957); Dietze,
"America and Europe-Decline and Emergence of Judicial Review," 44 VA. L. R.Ev. 1233
(1958). See also ZURCHER, CoNSTITUTIONS AND CONSTITUTIONAL TRENDS SINCE WORLD WAR
II, 2d ed. (1955); Bowm AND FRIEDRICH, Snmn,s IN FEDERALISM (1954).
s Although no attempt will be made in this article to relate the features of the Basic
Law to their antecedents- in German constitutional history, it should be emphasized that
a number of fundamental principles and institutions incorporated in the Basic Law are
derived from the earlier constitutional tradition.
For the historical background of the Basic Law and the developments leading to its
drafting and adoption, see Friedrich, "Rebuilding the German Constitution," 43 AM. PoL.
SCI. REv. 461 (1949).
For useful brief treatments of judicial review under the Weimar Constitution, see von
Mehren, "Constitutionalism in Germany-the First Decision of the New Constitutional
Court," 1 AM. J. CoMP. L. 70 at 71-74 (1952); Nagel, "Judicial Review in Germany,"
3 AM. J. COMP. L. 233 (1954).
~ Except where the use of the longer term seems necessary to avoid confusion, the
author uses the term "Constitution" in the text to refer to the Constitution of the United
States.
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features of the system established by the Basic Law and at the
same time point up significant comparisons and contrasts by reference to the Constitution. Eleven years have now elapsed since
the Basic Law went into effect, and significant decisions of the
Federal Constitution~ Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht )/• noted
at the appropriate points, serve to illuminate the working of the
system established by it.
It may be observed at the outset that the Basic Law is a more
thorough and extensive document than the United States Constitution. It consists of eleven parts, including the final part with
its detailed transitional and concluding provisions. Substantially
longer than the Constitution as amended, it elaborates in greater
detail the treatment of certain corresponding items and deals at
length with subjects not embraced by the Constitution. Thus the
basic substantive rights of the individual set forth in Part I are
more comprehensively stated than in the first eight amendments
to the Constitution and in corresponding provisions of state constitutions. The distribution of authority between the federal
government (Federation) and the ten states (Lander), made explicit in a detailed recital of exclusive and concurrent powers and
in the formulation of the role of the Lander in the enforcement of
the Federation's laws, receives more detailed treatment than that
accorded by the Constitution, although it should be observed that
the concept of federalism embodied in some of these features differs
materially from the American pattern. Finally, the Basic Law
treats in detail some matters which under the Constitution are
left to be worked out by Congress in the exercise of its discretion.
Attention is called, for instance, to those features of Part X of the
Basic Law that are concerned with budgetary matters. Whereas
the drafters of the Constitution limited themselves to constitutional
essentials and often employed general phrases capable of wide and
varied interpretation that left much to legislative discretion and
judicial interpretation, the drafters of the Basic Law evidenced by
their product a determined effort to deal more thoroughly and
explicitly with the matters coming within the range of the constitution, and in achieving this result they framed a relatively less
~ Decisions of the Federal Constitutional Court (Entscheidungen des Bundesuerfassungsgerichts) are reported in bound volumes. The abbreviation "BVerfGE" is used in
referring to these reports.
No attempt is made within the bounds of this article to deal with the numerous
decisions by the other federal courts and by the courts of the Lander on constitutional
questions.
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elastic document. Indeed, the Basic Law, taking account of the
range of matters and the detail included in it, is in many respects
reminiscent of the lengthier American state constitutions.

I.

BASIC PRINCIPLES

Turning to the substance of the Basic Law, attention is called
at the outset to the statements of basic principles that serve as
foundations to define the nature and objectives of the politically
organized society governed by it. The key provisions are stated
in Article 20 as follows:
"(1) The Federal Republic of Germany is a democratic
and social federal state.
" (2) All state authority emanates from the people. It is
exercised by the people by means 0£ elections and voting and
by separate legislative, executive and judicial organs.
" (3) Legislation is subject to the constitutional order; the
executive and the judiciary are bound by the law."
The foregoing provisions are supplemented by the statement
in the first paragraph of Article 28 that the "constitutional order
in the Lander must conform to the principles of republican,
democratic and social government based on the rule of law, within
the meaning of this Basic Law." Reference should also be made
at this point to the provisions of Article I:
"(1) The dignity of man is inviolable. To respect and
protect it is the duty of all state authority.
" (2) The German people therefore acknowledges invio~
lable and inalienable human rights as the basis of every community, of peace and of justice in the world.
" (3) The following basic rights bind the legislature, the
executive and the judiciary as directly enforceable law."
Tak.en together, these provisions state the basic premises of the
German constitutional system. It establishes a democratic state
that rests on the authority of the people. The form of government
is republican in that the people's authority is made effective by
means of elections, voting, and the institutions of representative
government. It is a federal state that recognizes a distribution of
authority between the Federation and the Lander. It is a social
state in that it recognizes the positive function and authority of
the government to promote the common weal, as well as its duty
to respect and protect the dignity of man which becomes the
ultimate value and furnishes the foundation of the acknowledged
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"inviolable and inalienable human rights as the basis of every
community, of peace and of justice in the world." Finally, this
constitutional order rests on "the rule of law," whereby all governmental authority, operating within the framework of the separation
of powers, is subject to legal restraints and obligations in order to
achieve the fundamental objectives of the constitutional order. 6
The object to be achieved then is a constitutional democracy
capable of serving the needs of the modem welfare state. Although resting on the will of the people made manifest by the
election of representatives to a parliamentary law-making body,
it is not an unlimited democracy since the Basic Law as a limitation on the legislative as well as the executive and judicial powers,
and the source of directly enforceable rights, all ultimately vindicated by an independent judiciary exercising the power of judicial
review, serves to limit the majority will. The subjection of all
authority to the rule of law, with the important position thereby
accorded to the judiciary as a means of nullifying unauthorized
governmental action as well as action violating basic rights and
other specific limitations, elevates the idea of the Rechtsstaat to its
highest level. Indeed, in view of the authority that may be
exercised by the judiciary, and notably by the Federal Constitutional Court, as pointed out later, the fear has been expressed that
the new German constitutional order may be transformed from
a Rechtsstaat (one governed by the rule of law) to a Justizstaat
(one governed by the judiciary).7
In adopting, on the one hand, the conception of the dignity of
man and his right to the free development of his personality, made
6 Decisions of the Federal Constitutional Court emphasize the importance of these
general principles as bases for constitutional interpretation. See, e.g., the opinion in the
famous "Southwest" case, l BVerfGE 14 (1951), where the Court held invalid the federal
statute which extended the terms of two state legislatures (Landtage) until the completion
of territorial reorganization was effected, on the ground that this intervention in the
legislative process of the Lander violated basic concepts of democracy and federalism.
See von Mehren, "Constitutionalism in Germany-the First Decision of the New Constitutional Court," l AM. J. COMP. L. 70 (1952); Leibholz, "The Federal Constitutional
Court in Germany and the 'Southwest' Case," 46 AM. POL. Ser. REv. 723 (1952).
See also the decision in 9 BVerfGE 268 (1959), where the Court relied on the mle
of law idea in holding invalid in its application to permanent civil service officers (Beamte),
that part of a Land law which provided that in the case of a dispute between the administration and these officers concerning appointment, promotion, and other personal matters,
the final decision would be made by an independent commission instead of by the administration. The Court thought that it was incompatible with the rule of law to have these
questions affecting civil service personnel of this class decided by a commission that was
not responsible to the administration.
7 See Rupp, "Government Under Law in Germany," 9 .ANNALES DE LA FACULTE DE DROIT
D'IsrANBUL 101 at Ill (1959). This paper by Judge Hans Rupp of the Federal Constitutional Court was originally presented by him before the Colloquium on "The Rule of
Law in the West," held at Chicago in September 1957.
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concrete by the detailed catalogue of basic rights, and, on the other
hand, the conception of the social state with its responsibility for
promoting the common weal, the Basic Law attempts a synthesis
of the individual freedom that serves as a restraint on power and
the individual's claim upon the state to advance and promote his
well being.8
The political order established by the Constitution of the
United States also rests on the will of the people made manifest in
the right to elect representatives under a republican form of government. The founding fathers were not interested in establishing a democratic order in the sense of uncontrolled popular will,
and indeed, the word "democracy" does not appear in the Constitution. But with the growth of democratic ideas and institutions, the political order is recognized as a constitutional democracy, although it is a limited democracy in that the judiciary may
intervene to invalidate unauthorized or prohibited legislative acts
and to protect constitutionally-recognized rights. The term "rule
of law" (as equivalent to Rechtsstaat) does not appear in the Constitution and indeed is not generally as well favored in American
usage as "government under law" or "supremacy of law." But
the idea is implicit in the fundamental structure and operation of
our system.
To some it may appear that a fundamental difference in basic
orientation between the United States Constitution ,and the Basic
Law is that the Constitution was formulated with an eye principally
to limitations on power irt the interests of human freedom. The
structure of the federal system, with its delegation of limited power
to the federal government, the separation of powers within the
federal government, and the prohibitions on power together with
the recognition of basic rights, all evidence a mistrust of power
and the attempt to keep it within limits. In short, this view
accepts the idea of a government of limited and divided functions,
epitomized in Jefferson's famous statement that that government
governs best which governs least, and emphasizes the negative
aspects of the Constitution as a restraint on power in the interests of
s Judge Rupp in his article, id. at 102-103, after referring to the opinion expressed
by some German writers that the concept of a social welfare state subject to the rule of
law (sozialer Rechtsstaat) is a contradiction in terms, goes on to say, "But the Federal
Constitutional Court in several decisions has taken the view that a 'sozialer Rechtsstaat'
is not a contradiction in itself, but that the 'Sozialstaatsprinzip' carries an obligation to
the legislator and at the same time should guide the executive and the judiciary to such
an interpretation of individual liberty which aims at the common good of all." Judge
Rupp here cites the decisions in 3 BVerfGE 377, 381 (1954); 4 BVerfGE 96, 102 (1954);
5 BVerfGE 85, 198 (1956).
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freedom. By comparison the Basic Law in establishing a democratic and social order places more emphasis on the positive
function of government in promoting the purposes of the social
welfare state. There is merit in this comparison, but it is easily
overemphasized. The Preamble to the Constitution states great
and positive purposes of the government created by it-"to establish a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic
Tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the general
Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty...." Certainly it is
true that with the growing demands upon the government to
promote the well-being of its citizens, the constitutional order,
given an assist by flexible judicial interpretation responsive to the
felt needs of the times, has been accommodated to the increased
functions of the welfare state, notwithstanding the distribution
and dispersal of power and the system of checks and balances
established by the fundamental law. Indeed, the Supreme Courtg
has been concerned with a re-appraisal of constitutional values in
terms of their relevancy to contemporary understanding of the
nature and purpose of a democratic society.10
Attention will now be given to specific features of the Basic
Law designed to implement the concept of a democratic, social
order operating within the framework of the rule of law.
II.

POLITICAL FREEDOM

The Basic Law, recognizing that all state authority emanates
from the people, by means of elections,11 establishes the Bundestag
as the primary law-making authority of the Federation. It consists
of representatives elected in "universal, direct, free, equal and
secret elections."12 The Basic Law incorporates the same provision
respecting the representative bodies that govern the Lander, the
counties and communes.13 Anyone who has attained the age of
twenty-one years is entitled to vote for representatives in the
9 The term "Supreme Court" will be used in the text to refer to the Supreme Court
of the United States.
10 In recent years the Supreme Court has accorded less judicial protection to economic
liberty and property rights but, on the other hand, has used its power of judicial review
more vigorously to protect freedom of expression, the procedural rights of the accused,
and freedom from racial discrimination. This shift in emphasis finds its explanation in
judicial accommodation of constitutional interpretation to the Court's understanding of
the values basic to a democratic society. See K.AUPER, FRONTIERS OF CoNSTITUTIONAL LIBERTY
18-54 (1956).
11 Art. 20, §(2).
12 Art. 38, §(1).
13 Art. 28, §(1).
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Bundestag and anyone who has attained the age of twenty-five is
eligible for election.14 Qualifications for voting for representatives
in the legislatures of the Lander are determined by the laws of the
respective Lander. This pattern for the determination of voting
rights and qualifications differs in some respects from that followed
in the American system. The Constitution creates the right to
vote for congressional representatives and senators.15 On the other
hand, the right to vote in state and local matters is derived from the
respective state constitutions. The Constitution without defining
qualifications states that persons qualified by state law to vote for
the most numerous branch of the state legislature are thereby
qualified to vote for representatives and senators.16 Thus qualification under state law becomes the standard for voting for both
federal and state legislative officers. However, the express prohibitions of the Fifteenth and Nineteenth Amendments which deny
the power to define voting qualifications by reference to race, color,
or sex, in addition to the general prohibition against discrimination stated in the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, restrict the states in defining qualifications.17,
The Basic Law recognizes that political parties are indispensable to the functioning of a democratic society resting on the will
of the people.18 Indeed, they are considered quasi-organs of the
state.19 Article 21 states that political parties may be freely
formed, that their internal organization must conform to democratic principles, and that they must publicly account for the
sources of their funds. 20
14 Art.

38, §(2).
States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941).
,r I. (representatives); Amendment XVII (senators).
l'I' Consistent with these limitations, the states are free to determine age limits for
voting and may further define voting qualifications by reference to such factors as citizenship, literacy, and the payment of poll taxes. See Breedlove v. Suttles, 302 U.S. 277
(1937) (payment of poll tax requirement); Lassiter v. Northampton County Board of
Elections, 360 U.S. 45 (1959) (literacy test).
Although the Constitution prohibits racial discrimination in the enjoyment of the
voting right, some of the states by various devices have effectively denied Negroes the
right to vote. Congress, which has the power to enforce the provisions of the Fourteenth
and Fifteenth Amendments, has recently enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1960, which
includes new remedial provisions designed to secure the right to vote free from racial
discrimination.
18 Art. 21, §(I).
19 Thus under Art. 93, §(1), No. 1 of the Basic Law, dealing with the jurisdiction
of the Federal Constitutional Court in cases brought before it and between organs of the
state (Organstreit), a political party has standing to contest the validity of an election
law alleged to violate its constitutional rights. 1 BYerfGE 208 (1952); 4 BYerfGE 27
(1954); 6 BYerfGE 84 (1957).
20 See the discussion in the text, pp. 1124-1125 infra, of Art. 21, § (2), of the Basic Law
which provides that parties which, by reason of their aims or the behavior of their
15 See United
16 Art. I, §2,
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The concept of political parties playing a vital role in the
election of federal officers was unknown to the Fathers who drafted
the Constitution of the United States. The electoral college system for the election of President was premised on a theory of
election that did not take political parties into account.21 The
system of political parties has grown up as an extra-constitutional
institution. Freedom of political association and activity is recognized as implicit in the freedoms guaranteed in the First Amendment and is thereby accorded judicial protection.22 Organized
under state law, political parties are subject to state regulation in
a number of matters and also to federal regulation in respect to
accounting for funds, expenditures, etc.23 As a practical matter,
therefore, political parties have come to assume vital political and
legal significance under the American system even though they do
not have the constitutional status accorded to parties under the
Basic Law.
The Basic Law states that the deputies to the German Bundestag "are representatives of the whole people, are not bound by
orders and instructions and are subject only to their own conadherents, seek to impair or destroy the free democratic order or to endanger the existence of the Federal Republic of Germany are unconstitutional, and that the question of
a party's unconstitutionality shall be decided by the Federal Constitutional Court.
21 Art. II, §1 of the Constitution, as amended by the Twelfth Amendment, provides
that each state shall appoint electors in a number equal to the state's total number of
senators and representatives in Congress who shall then cast the state's votes for President and Vice-President. The theory here was that the electors would exercise their
judgment in voting for the men best qualified for these offices. With the rise of political
parties, a basic theory of the electoral college was abandoned, and under today's practice,
the electors, chosen by their respective parties, serve the mechanical function of casting
the state's vote in the electoral college in support of the Presidential and Vice-Presidential candidates who received the highest vote in the state's popular election. The
electoral college system is still important in that it results in the casting of the state's
vote as a unit, regardless of the size of the vote of the defeated party. On the status of
electors, see Ray v. Blair, 343 U.S. 214 (1952).
22 See the discussion in United Public Workers of America v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75
(1947).
23 Congress has acted to outlaw the Communist Party by means of the Communist
Control Act of 1954. 68 Stat. 775 (1954), 50 U.S.C. (1958) §§841-888. See comment, 53
MICH. L. R.Ev. 1153 (1955). Moreover, conspiracy to organize a party in order to advocate
overthrow of the government by force is punishable under federal legislation. See Dennis
v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951). Prior to the enactment of the Communist Control
Act of 1954, some states by legislation had denied the Communist Party a place on the
ballot. See Gerende v. Board of Supervisors of Elections of Baltimore, 341 U.S. 56 (1951);
comment, 34 VA. L R.Ev. 450 (1948).
This legislative treatment of the Communist Party under American law may be compared with the express provision of the Basic Law [Art. 21, § (2)], which states that
political parties which seek to impair or destroy the free democratic order or that endanger
the existence of the Federal Republic are unconstitutional. See note 20 supra, and the
discussion in the text, pp. 1124-1125 infra.
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science."24 The representative character of the law-making organ
and its freedom from popular pressure in discharging its functions
in an area of exclusive federal competence were emphasized by the
decision of the Federal Constitutional Court25 holding invalid the
laws of two Lander which had authorized popular advisory referenda to be held on the question of arming the military forces
with atomic weapons after the Bundestag had voted favorably on
this proposal. The federal government had brought the suit before the Federal Constitutional Court to enjoin the Lander from
proceeding to hold these referenda. In upholding the federal
government's action and granting the requested relief, the Federal
Constitutional Court held that the purpose of the proposed referenda in voicing popular opinion on the subject would be to
subject the Bundestag and the federal government to unauthorized
pressures in discharging their responsibilities in an area of exclusive federal responsibility. By undertaking these referenda on
their own responsibility, the Lander were attempting to replace
the collective will of the Federation by the wills of the separate
Lander. The Lander had made the argument that in any event
it was proper for a Land to conduct a referendum as a means of
advising the Land's representatives in the Bundesrat26 on the position to take on this question. The Court's answer to this was that
under the Basic Law the members of the Bundesrat represented
the administrations of their respective Lander~ and it was therefore
the function of these administrations and not of the people of the
Lander to advise their representatives on how to vote on a given
issue.
The requirement of Article 38 of the Basic Law that depu,ties
be elected in "equal" elections has raised problems with respect
to attempts to limit the rights of smalL splinter parties. Although
West Germany uses an electoral system which relies in part on the
.24 Art. 38, § (1 ).
25 8 BVerfGE 104

(1958). See also 8 BVerfGE 122 (1958), where the Court directed
the administration of a Land to take appropriate steps to prevent a municipality from
conducting a local advisory referendum on this same question. The proceeding and relief
took this form since the Federal Constitutional Court has no direct jurisdiction over
municipalities. See note 197 infra.
26 The Bundesrat is the organ that gives the Lander a special representation and
voice in the legislation and administration of the Federation. See the discussion in the
text, pp 1153-1156 infra. It 'should not be confused with the Bundestag which is the primary
legislative body of the Federation.
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proportional representation principle,27 it has attempted by legislation to prevent too great a diffusion of parties by requiring that
a party display a minimum voting strength at an election in order
to share in the proportionate distribution of seats. In dealing
with this question the Federal Constitutional Court, apparently
mindful of the practical considerations involved, has upheld the
power of the federal, state and local legislative bodies to impose a
limitation of this kind, thereby denying the absoluteness of the
constitutional restriction and subjecting it to the general standard
of reasonableness. 28 Laws requiring such a minimum voting
strength generally fix the standard at five percent, and the Court's
opinions indicate that it would probably view as unreasonable any
attempt to set the minimum at a higher level. It should be emphasized, moreover, that the question before the Federal Constitutional Court related to the proportional distribution of seats
after an election, and that the complete exclusion of a party from
a ballot because of failure to display minimum voting strength at
a prior election was not at issue.29
Although the system of proportional representation is not
followed in the United States except in a few instances of municipal
elections, some related questions respecting equality of parties and
equality of voting rights have been raised before the Supreme
Court under the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Thus it was argued that a state law requiring a certain number of signatures on a petition before a party could be
placed on the ballot and further requiring that the signatures be
distributed throughout the state, including areas where signatures
27 The electoral system of West Germany combines the principle of the single-member
district, followed in the United States in the election of representatives to the lower
house of Congress, with a system of proportional representation. Each voter casts two
votes in the elections for representatives in the Bundestag: one for the candidate whom
he favors in his local constituency, the other for the party of his choice at the national
level. The second vote determines the basis for the proportionate representation of the
parties with respect to one-half of the membership of the Bundestag. Under this unusual
system political development in the post-war period reveals a trend toward a two-party
system. See Dietze, "The Federal Republic of Germany: An Evaluation After Ten Years,"
22 J- PoL. 112 at 115-118 (1960).
28 See l BVerfGE 208 (1952) (Land elections); 6 BVerfGE 84 (1957); 6 BVerfGE 99
(1957) (federal elections); 6 BVerfGE 104 (1957) (municipal elections). In justifying this
kind of limitation, the Court emphasized the problems presented by splinter parties in
jeopardizing the effective functioning of a legislative body as well as the establishment
and work of the executive department under a parliamentary system of government. Professor Cole states that these decisions involve a considerable amount of "judicial freewheeling" on the part of the Court. See his article, "The West German Federal Constitutional Court: An Evaluation after Six Years," 20 J. PoL. 278 at 294 (1958).
29 See notes 20 and 23 supra.
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for this party were difficult to procure, denied equality in voting
right. The Supreme Court refused to intervene in this case on
the ground apparently that this was a "political question" and not
to be resolved by judicial decision. 30 It is fair to suppose that if in
a given case the Supreme Court does assume to pass on the validity
of legislation that denies a given party a place on the ballot because of its limited size, it too
approach the question in terms
of the reasonableness and fairness of the classification.
Equality of the voting privilege under the Basic Law received
emphasis in another interesting decision of the Federal Constitutional Court holding invalid the provision of the federal income
tax law which authorized a deduction for contributions to political
parties.31 In its. thinking the Court gave weight to the consideration that a given political party may represent in a special way the
interests of the wealthier classes, and that to allow the supporters
of this party to deduct their political contributions gives an unequal advantage to these persons and to their party. In reliance
on the type of formal logic often employed by courts in dealing
with problems of equality under the law, the Court might have
said that the law dealt equally with all taxpayers in permitting
each to take deductions for political contributions. The Court's
reliance instead on functional considerations drawn from the
realities of political life lends particular interests to this decision.

will

III.

A.

BASIC RIGHTS

Underlying Values and Principles

The foundation for the specific rights catalogued in Part I of
the Basic Law is found in the first two sections of Article 1 which
state that the dignity of man is inviolable, that it is the duty of all
state authority to respect and protect it, and that the "German people, therefore, acknowledges inviolable and inalienable human
rights as a basis of every community, of peace and of justice in the
world." The reference here to inviolable and inalienable human
rights suggests the language of the American Declaration of Independence,32 and suggests also the theory of "fundamental rights"
so MacDougall v. Green, 335 U.S. 281 (1948). It should be noted, however, that some
language used in the per curiam opinion in this case suggests that the Court disposed
of the case on the merits on the theory that it was not arbitrary for the legislature to
promote a balance of voting strength as between urban and rural areas.
318 BVerfGE 51 (1958).
32 "We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they
are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are
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which the Supreme Court has relied upon in the interpretation of
the due process clause.as The word "acknowledges" as it appears in
the Basic Law deserves emphasis. The Basic Law does not create
these inviolable and inalienable rights. Rather it declares and recognizes the natural rights of the person and furnishes positive sanction for them. The assumptions underlying Article 1 of the
Basic Law assume further significance in the light of the idea
expressed by German courts that there are some conceptions of
right and justice which transcend the Basic Law and are superior
to it and that, therefore, specific provisions of the Basic Law may
be found to violate these supra-constitutional norms.s 4

B.

Rights as Restraints Upon Both the Federal and
State Governments

The specific rights which are stated in the Basic Law and
which bind the legislature, the executive, and the judiciary,
serve as limitations not only on the Federation but operate as
restraints also upon the exercise of governmental power by the
Lander. This is an important facet of federalism under the Basic
Law that distinguishes it from the federal structure under the
Constitution. The Bill of Rights limits only the federal government. To be sure, the body of the Constitution states some limitations on the states as well as on the federal government3cs and,
more importantly, the broad construction of the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment has served as an effective
vehicle whereby the Supreme Court has protected the so-called
"fundamental rights" against state violation.36 But there is no
complete correlation between the rights specified in the Bill of
Rights as limitations on the federal government and those derived
Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness. That to secure these rights, Governments
are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed."
33 See the opinions in Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937); Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947). See also Corwin, "The 'Higher Law' Background of American
Constitutional Law," 42 HAR.v. L. REv. 149, 365 (1928-1929).
34 See the discussion in the text, pp. 1178-1180 infra.
SIS See Art. I, §§9 and 10.
36 For discussions of the fundamental rights theory, see Justice Cardozo's opinion in
Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937), and the several opinions in Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947). See also Corwin, "The 'Higher Law' Background of American
Constitutional Law," 42 HARv. L. REv. 149, 365 (1928-1929). For an interpretation by a
foreign observer and student of the historical development of the due process clause in
American constitutional history and its present meaning, see DEPPELER, DUE PROCESS OF
LA.w-EIN K.Al'ITEL AMERIKANISCHER VERFASSUNGSGFSCHICHTE (1957).
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by implication from the Fourteenth Amendment as limitations on
the states.87
In this connection it may be noted that rights in addition to
those protected under the Basic Law are guaranteed to persons as
a matter of Land law under the separate constitutions of the
several Lander, just as residents of each of the American states
may claim rights as a matter of state law under state constitutions
apart from the rights protected on the national level under the
Constitution.

C.

Rights as Restraints Upon Governmental Action

The third section of Article 1 of the Basic Law states that the
specific rights thereafter enumerated bind the legislature, the
executive and the judiciary as directly enforceable law. This
language suggests the interesting and important question whether
the specific rights enumerated in Part I are-to use familiar: American legal vocabulary-protected rights, i.e., rights which are constitutionally protected only against action of the three branches
of the government, or whether they are absolute or sumptuary
rights in the sense that all persons are required to respect them.
Under the Constitution of the United States the rights stated in
the body of the Constitution, in the Bill of Rights, and the Fourteenth Amendment are rights protected against governmental interference. The Supreme Court has made clear that the rights
here recognized do not limit freedom of private action.88 The
duties that one individual owes another are governed by statutory
and common law.
Although the language of the third section of Article 1 of the
Basic Law suggests that the basic rights thereafter enumerated are
limitations only on governmental action, some of the specific
87 Thus the following procedural guarantees included in the Bill of Rights as restric•
tions on the federal government are not included in the due process concept: grand jury
indictment, Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884); trial by jury, Maxwell v. Dow,
176 U.S. 581 (1900); freedom from double jeopardy, Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319
(1937); the privilege against self-incrimination, Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947).
On the other hand, the following substantive freedoms, expressly protected against congressional abridgement under the First Amendment, are recognized as fundamental liberties under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment: freedom of speech,
Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925); freedom of press, Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S.
697 (1931); freedom of assembly, De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937); freedom of
religion, Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
as See the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883), holding that since the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is a restriction only on the states, Congress
in the exercise of its power to enforce this limitation could not constitutionally prohibit
discrimination by private persons. See also Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
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rights are stated in a way which makes clear that they are absolute
or universal in the sense that third persons must respect them too,
with the result that these rights become part of the body of private
law. The provisions that men and women have equal rights,89
that everyone has "the right freely to express and to disseminate
his opinon by speech, writing and pictures . . . , " 40 and the provision guaranteeing the right to form associations to safeguard and
improve working and economic conditions,41 may be cited as
illustrations. On the other hand, some of the specific rights assume significance only as restraints on governmental action. The
provisions that no one may be compelled against his conscience
to render war service as an armed combatant,42 that there shall
be no censorship,43 and that all Germans have the right to assemble peacefully without prior notification or permission,44 fall
into this category.
The case is not so clear, however, with respect to some of the
other rights specified in the Basic Law. Attention is called particularly to the provision of Article 3, section (1), that "[a]ll persons
are equal before the law." While this language suggests a limitation only on the action of the three branches of the government,
the thought has been expressed by some German writers that the
right here formulated is effective against third persons as well as
against all forms of governmental action.45 This view, however,
does not appear to have gained general acceptance.
In any event it is clear that the question whether the basic
rights are absorbed into the private law as a matter of constitutional
imperative cannot be resolved on the basis of any broad generalities. Attention must be paid to the wording used in defining a
specific right and the context in which it appears.
But even in the case where constitutionally-sanctioned rights
are limitations only upon governmental action, questions may
still be raised with respect to the impact of these rights upon
private action. In the first place, the very fact that the constitution recognizes and protects these rights may prove to be an
influential policy factor in the shaping of the private law, so that
39 Art. 3, § (2).
40 Art. 5, § (1).
41 Art. 9, § (3).
42 Art. 4, § (3).
43 Art. 5, § (I).
44Art. 8, § (1).
45 See ENNECCERUS•Nll'PERDEY, .ALI.GEMEINER TEIL DES BiiRGERLICHEN REc:Hrs, 15th ed.,
93 et seq. (1959).
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these rights may be enforced against private persons even though
this result is not directly required by the constitution. Secondly,
the enforcement of private rights by branches of the government
may so identify the government with private action that the
constitutional restriction for the protection of right becomes
directly applicable. The Basic Law states that the basic rights
enumerated therein bind the legislature, the executive and the
judiciary. Similarly, the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment operates as a restraint upon all three branches
of the government. The application of this limitation to legislative and executive action raises no special problems. But when
are rights violated by judicial action? The question has become
acute in the United States with respect to the judicial enforcement
of private contract and property rights. Starting from the· premise
that courts are agents of the state, the Supreme Court has held
that although private contracts raise no question of violation of
constitutional rights, their enforcement by judicial order identifies
the state with the policy underlying the contract and hence presents the requisite "state action" element.46 The full implications
of this decision still remain to be explored.47
The statement in the Basic Law that the specific rights bind
the judiciary as directly enforceable law raises the corresponding
question whether judicial enforcement of private rights may result in unlawful impairment of basic rights. Clearly this is the
case where judicial enforcement of private right conflicts with an
opposing right specificially protected by the Basic Law. Thus
the Federal Constitutional Court declared invalid a judicial decree
enjoining utterances that invited the boycott of a movie, where
the decree was based on protection of the property owners' interests,
since the freedom of expression was protected under the Basic
Law's free speech guarantee.48 In short, a court may not act to
protect a private right at the expense of a competing constitutionally-recognized right. But this is not the same as saying that
all judicial enforcement of private rights so identifies the state
with the policy underlying the assertion of private right as to
make it the equivalent of governmental action. If, for instance, it
is assumed that the provision of the Basic Law that all men are
46 Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. I
47 Cf. with the Shelley case the

(1948).
decision in Black v. Cutter Laboratories, 351 U.S.
292 (1956), holding that no constitutional issue was raised by a state supreme court's
interpretation of a private contract where it was alleged that the contract as sanctioned
by the court's interpretation resulted in impairment of First Amendment freedoms.
48 7 BVerfGE 198 (1958).
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equal before the law is a limitation only on the three branches of
the government, does it follow that a court in protecting the
private rights of a proprietor who discriminates on the basis of
race, religion or ancestry, is thereby denying equality before the
law? Or is the court in a case like this doing no more than enforcing private property rights in an equal way? It remains to be
seen whether the Federal Constitutional Court will in a case of
this kind take the approach followed by the United States Supreme
Court in the restrictive covenant case.49

D.

Citizenship and the Rights Peculiar to It

The Basic Law does not define the basis of German citizenship. By contrast the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution
provides that everyone born or naturalized in the United States
and subject to the jurisdiction thereof is a citizen of the United
States and of the state wherein he resides. The Basic Law does
deal with the loss of citizenship. It states that no one may be deprived of his German citizenship. But it also recognizes that loss
of citizenship may arise pursuant to a law, subject, however, to the
limitation that involuntary expatriation may arise only if the person does not thereby become stateless.50 The absolute prohibition
upon deprivation of citizenship is aimed against expatriation by
means of direct legislative act, administrative decree or judicial
decision. The fundamental idea here, having in mind the experience during the Hitler regime, is that expatriation shall not be used
deliberately as a punitive device for imposing sanctions or disabilities upon persons or classes of persons. On the other hand, a
citizen's own actions may automatically result in expatriation pursuant to a law which defines the conditions giving rise to loss of
citizenship, but even here the law may not force an involuntary
expatriation if the result is that the person thereby becomes stateless. Thus, to take an example from American law, voting in a
foreign election could not be made the basis of an involuntary
expatriation since no new citizenship is acquired thereby. But it is
permissible to provide by law that a German woman shall lose
her citizenship if she marries a foreign national and by virtue of
the marriage acquires her husband's nationality.51
49 See
50 Art.
51 For

the Court's discussion of the general problem in 7 BVerfGE 198 (1958).
16, § (1 ).
discussion, see HAMANN, DAS GRUNDGESETZ 160 (1956).
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The Constitution does not expressly deal with the subject of
expatriation. The power of Congress to enact legislation stating
conditions resulting in the loss of citizenship, on other than a
strictly voluntary basis, has been the subject of recent important
decisions by the Supreme Court. These decisions, it may be noted
parenthetically, have left a number of questions unanswered.
By divided vote the Court has held that Congress may exercise
power of expatriation, even though it results in statelessness, as
an implied means of effectuating other substantive powers. More
specifically, the Court has held that Congress, in the exercise of its
powers over foreign affairs, may attach loss of citizenship as a
consequence of a citizen's voting in an election in a foreign
country.52 On the other hand, loss of citizensp.ip may not be used
as a punitive device where under the circumstances it appears to
be cruel and unusual punishment.113
Although most of the specific rights enumerated in the Basic
Law are rights enjoyed by all within the jurisdiction of the country,
certain ones are specified to be rights peculiar to German citizens.
Thus the right to assemble peacefully and unarmed without prior
notification or permission,54 the right to form associations and
societies,55 and the right freely to choose a trade or profession,116
are defined as rights peculiar to German citizens. Likewise all
Germans enjoy freedom of movement throughout the federal
territory,57 and no German may be extradited to a foreign country.58 Aliens, therefore, cannot claim these privileges as a matter
of constitutional right.
Under the United States Constitution the basic rights protected against governmental invasion may be asserted by both
citizens and aliens. The protections of the Bill of Rights and of
the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment extend to all persons. The distinctive privileges of
citizenship are those peculiar to the relationship between the
citizen and the government and arising from the nature of the

a

52 Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44 (1958). Earlier the Court had upheld legislation
which provided for suspension of an American woman's citizenship while she remained
married to a foreign national, where as the result of the marriage she had acquired the
husband's nationality. Mackenzie v. Hare, 239 U.S. 299 (1915).
lS3 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
54Art. 8, § (1).
55 Art. 9, § (1).
56 Art. 12, § (1).
57 Art. 11, § (1).
58 Art. 16, § (2).
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federal system.59 These include the right to vote for federal officers
and to run for federal office,60 to assemble for the purpose of discussing matters within the domain of federal authority and petitioning the federal government for redress of grievances,61 and the
right to travel freely throughout the United States. 62
Although, as stated above, aliens may claim the protection of
the Bill of Rights and of the Fourteenth Amendment under the
Constitution of the United States, their status as aliens does subject them to some disabilities to which citizens are not subject.
Congress, which has paramount control over aliens, may impose
some special restrictions upon them, 63 and even though aliens
come within the reach of the equal protection clause the states
may within narrow limits discriminate against aliens in the enjoyment of some privileges, where the classification by reference to
alienage is deemed reasonable and appropriate. 64
59 Crandall v. Nevada, 6 Wall. (73 U.S.) 35 (1868); Slaughterhouse Cases, 16 Wall.
(83 U.S.) 36 (1873). See also Justice Stone's dissenting opinion in Colgate v. Harvey, 296
U.S. 404 at 436 (1935), and his concurring opinion in Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 at 518
(1939).
60 United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941).
61 United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1876).
62 Crandall v. Nevada, 6 Wall. (73 U.S.) 35 (1868); Edwards v. California, 314 U.S.
160 (1941). In the Edwards case the Court held invalid a California statute designed
to keep indigent persons from establishing residence in the state. A part of the Court
found the statute invalid on the theory that it was an unwarranted restraint on the
freedom of interstate commnce, but other members of the Court premised the holding
on the ground that the statute resulted in abridgment of the citizen's right to travel.
The Basic Law recognizes that the German citizen's right to travel may be restricted by
law in order to deal with the situation where communities may be subjected to special
burdens in supporting persons without means of support, to protect youth against
neglect, to combat the danger of epidemics or to prevent crime. Art. 11, § (2).
The right to travel suggests the further question whether a citizen has a right to
travel abroad. This question becomes pertinent in connection with administrative limitations on the issuance of passports to citizens. The Supreme Court has held that a citizen's
right to travel abroad is a liberty protected under the due process clause and that it
cannot be abridged except pursuant to statutory authorization. See Kent and Briehl v.
Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958); Dayton v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 144 (1958). Cf. the holding of the
Federal Constitutional Court that the administrative denial of a passport to a German
citizen on the ground that he would make use of it to the detriment of the Federal
Republic did not violate the freedom to travel throughout the federal territory as guaranteed by Article 11, 6 BYerfGE 32 (1957).
63 See the discussion in Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952), where the
Court upheld the validity of legislation requiring the deportation of aliens who were
members of an organization advocating overthrow of the government by force.
64 Thus a state may provide that contractors engaged in public works shall employ
only citizens, Heim v. McCall, 239 U.S. 175 (1915), and it may deny aliens the right to
engage in certain occupations with harmful tendencies, Clarke v. Deckebach, 274 U.S. 392
(1927). But in general the states may not discriminate against aliens in the licensing
of legitimate occupations, nor may they require private employers to discriminate against
aliens. See Takahashi v. Fish &: Game Commission, 334 U.S. 410 (1948); Truax v. Raich,
239 U.S. 33 (1915).
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The status of aliens suggests the further question as to. the
status of corporations in the enjoyment of basic constitutional
rights. The Basic Law states the general rule that the basic rights
enumerated by it apply also to domestic juristic persons to the
extent that the nature of such rights permits.65 This position of
corporations finds a parallel under the United States Constitution.
Thus, despite some controversy over the subject, corporations are
recognized as persons within the meaning of the due process and
equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. 66 Likewise they may claim the protection of provisions of the Bill of
Rights, although some of the rights enumerated there, like some
of the fundamental rights protected under the Fourteenth Amendment, are by their nature relevant only to natural persons.67

E.

Limitations on Basic Rights

Some of the basic rights set forth in Articles 2 to 18 of the
Basic Law are stated in an absolute form. For instance, Article 4
states that freedom of faith and of conscience, and freedom of
religious or ideological beliefs are inviolable. Others are stated
to be subject to the provisions of general laws. Thus the rights
associated with freedom of expression under Article 5 are "limited
by the provisions of the general laws, the provisions· of law for the
protection of youth and by the right to ·inviolability of personal
honor." But Article 19 provides that insofar as under the Basic
Law a basic right may be restricted by or pursuant to a law, the
law must apply generally and not solely to an individual case.
Furthermore, the law must name the basic right, indicating the
article, and in no case may a basic right be infringed upon in its
essential content.
By comparison it may be pointed out that in general it is recognized under the Constitution of the United States that the substantive freedoms protected against the federal and state governments
are not absolute in character and that they may be limited by appropriate exercises of the legislative power in the public interest.
The principle that the fundamental rights protected under the
65 Art. 19, § (3).
66 See Justice Jackson's

separate opinion on this question in Wheeling Steel Corp.
v. Glander, 337 U.S. 562 at 574 (1949). See also comment, 48 MICH. L. R.Ev. 983 (1950).
67 Despite earlier suggestions that corporations could not claim the benefit of the
"liberty" clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, later cases accept by implication the
standing of a corporation to assert freedom of the press as a fundamental right protected
under this amendment. See, e.g., Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952).
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due process clause are subject to a reasonable exercise of the
police power on behalf of the public health, safety, morals and
general welfare is a familiar one.68 But the Supreme Court reserves the final authority to determine the reasonableness of the
legislation, and in exercising this power it resorts to the pragmatic
process of balancing the respective public and private interests at
stake.69 Even in the interpretation of the First Amendment with its
categorical prohibition on the power of Congress to pass laws
abridging freedom of expression, the Supreme Court, notwithstanding strong dissent on this question, has continued to hold
that these rights may be restricted by Congress by legislation appropriate to its delegated powers,70 although the nature of this
freedom leads the Court in these cases to make more searching
scrutiny into the legislative justification for the abridgment of the
right than it does in the cases dealing with the implied funda68See, for instance, Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934), holding valid a state
law regulating milk prices as against the contention that it violated the economic liberty
secured by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; West Coast Hotel Co.
v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937), upholding a state law fixing minimum wages for women
and minors as against the same contention; Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272
U.S. 365 (1926), holding that a municipal zoning law did not result in an unconstitutional
deprivation of property rights; Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952), holding that
a state race libel law did not unconstitutionally impair the freedom of the press protected
under the Fourteenth Amendment; Roth v. United States, Alberts v. California, 354 U.S.
476 (1957), holding that the federal and state governments may punish the transportation
and sale of obscene literature.
69For a recent illustrative case, see Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960), holding
that a municipality had not proved an adequate public interest that warranted a require•
ment that a non-profit organization disclose its membership list at the expense of the
fundamental right of freedom of association.
70 See American Communications Assn., CIO v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950), upholding
congressional legislation requiring officers of labor unions to file non-Communist affidavits
as a condition to the unions' continued enjoyment of privileges under national labor
legislation; Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951), holding valid federal legislation
punishing conspiracy to advocate overthrow of government by force or to organize a
party advocating the same; Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959), holding that
Congress may lawfully authorize a committee investigation of Communist activities and
that a witness may not claim the privilege by virtue of the First Amendment to refuse
to answer questions relating to Communist Party affiliation.
Justices Black and Douglas have taken the position that in view of the wording
and policy of the First Amendment, any law which is found to abridge freedom of speech,
press, assembly or religion is unconstitutional, and that it is improper for the Court to
balance allegedly public interests against these freedoms in upholding restrictive legislation. See their dissenting opinions in the cases cited in the preceding paragraph. They
take the position also that the First Amendment, interpreted to prohibit all laws abridging freedom of expression in its various forms, is made applicable to the states by the
Fourteenth Amendment, and so they reject the balancing process also in dealing with
state and local laws that restrict these freedoms. See their dissenting opinions in Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952); Roth v. United States, Alberts v. California, 354
U.S. 476 (1957).
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mental rights under the due process clause.71 The approach made
by the Supreme Court in determining the reasonableness of legislation impinging upon private right by weighing and balancing
the competing interests at stake may be useful to the Federal
Constitutional Court in deciding when a law which restricts one
of the basic rights, which is recognized under the Basic Law to be
subject to restriction by or pursuant to a law, goes too far in that
it infringes upon the essential content of this right.

F.

General Right: Free Development of Personality

A broad underlying type of right is recognized in section (1),
Article 2, of the Basic Law which states that everyone has the
right to the free development of his personality insofar as he
does not violate the rights of others or offend against the constitutional order --0r the moral code. Here is a general provision
which admits of wide and elastic interpretation. The central
emphasis here is upon the individual's freedom of self-expression
in the full development of his faculties. It derives its inspiration
from the concept of the dignity of man as a supreme value in a
democratic society. The purpose of the social order is to promote
his well-being. But this same section of the Basic Law recognizes
also that man is a social creature, that individual freedom is
meaningful only in the context of a social order that maintains
the conditions of liberty, and that the freedom of the individual
is not to be identified with unrestrained license. The individual's
basic freedom to express himself by word and conduct in furtherance of the development of his personality is therefore subject to
the stated conditions that he not violate the rights of others or offend against the constitutional order or offend the moral code.
The content of any specific liberties derived by interpretation
from this basic freedom must therefore be determined in the light
71 The Court has frequently stated that the First Amendment freedoms are "preferred freedoms," since they are indispensable to the functioning of a democratic society
and should, therefore, receive added judicial protection. Note the following statement
taken from Justice Rutledge's opinion in Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 at 529-530 (1945):
"The case confronts us again with the duty our system places on this Court to say
where the individual's freedom ends and the State's power begins. Choice on that border,
now as always delicate, is perhaps more so where the usual presumption supporting legislation is balanced by the preferred place given in our scheme to the great, the indispensable democratic freedoms secured by the First Amendment. ••• That priority gives
these liberties a sanctity and a sanction not permitting dubious intrusions." Emphasis added.
For discussion of the "preferred freedoms" concept and its practical implications in
terms of judicial techniques in dealing with legislation restricting freedom of expression,
see McKay, "The Preference for Freedom," 34 N.Y. UNIV. L. REv. 1182 (1959). See also
KAUPER, FRO~ OF CONSTITUTIONAL LIBERTY 55.99 (1956).
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of these limitations. But these are the only limitations that govern
in this situation since the right to the free development of personality is not made subject to restriction by law. The interpretation of this section requires a judicial balancing of this basic
freedom and the rights derived from it against the social interests
stated as limitations.
The concept of the right to the free development of personality
suggests by way of parallel the broad interpretation that has been
given by the United States Supreme Court to the due process
clause as a vehicle for the protection of the so-called fundamental
rights, and which has served as a powerful vehicle for judicial
review of legislative, as well as executive and judicial, activities.72
Thus the Court said some years ago that "the liberty" mentioned
in the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment "means
not only the right of the citizen to be free from the mere physical
restraint of his person, as by incarceration, but the term is deemed
to embrace the right of the citizen to be free in the enjoyment of
all his faculties; to be free to use them in all lawful ways; to live
and work where he will; to earn his livelihood by any lawful
calling; to pursue any livelihood or avocation and for that purpose to enter into all contracts which may be proper, necessary
and essential to his carrying out to a successful conclusion the
purposes above mentioned.'' 73
Although the "free development of personality" concept stated
in the Basic Law suggests a possible breadth of interpretation that
may parallel the Supreme Court's construction of the due process
clause, an important consideration militates against this result. A
number of specific rights which are essential to the individual's
development of his faculties are dealt with, separately in the Basic
Law. For instance, freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, freedom to form associations and societies, freedom of movement, and
freedom to choose a trade or profession, to mention some of the
specific rights which have been characterized as "concretizations
of" the basic right to the free development of personality,74 arc
given express recognition in the Basic Law. Hence, the content
of these rights and any limitations that may be imposed upon
them are governed not by the first section of Article 2 but by the
articles that apply specifically to them.
72 For discussions of the "fundamental rights" interpretation of the due process clause,
see Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937), and the several opinions in Adamson v.
California, 3!12 U.S. 46 (1947).
73Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 at 589 (1897).
745ee I BYerfGE 264 at 274 (1952); 4 BYerfGE 52 at 57 (1954).
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Even though its reach and usefulness is limited by the separate
enumeration of a number of specific rights in the Basic Law, the
"free development of personality" section still admits of elastic
interpretation as a source of specific liberties not otherwise detailed in the Basic Law, and it is not surprising that this section
has been invoked in many cases. Although the Federal Constitutional Court has not yet squarely held a statute invalid as violating
this section,75 the lower courts have given it frequent application.
Phases of economic liberty have been held to be protected by it,
including freedom of contract, freedom of competition and freedom of advertising.76 This emphasis on facets of economic liberty
as derivations from the broad right to the free development of
personality presents an interesting contrast to the reduced emphasis
by the United States Supreme Court in recent years on economic
liberty as a fundamental right protected under the due process
clause.77
G.

Specific Rights

Attention will now be given to specific rights protected under
the Basic Law.78

The Right to Life and Inviolability of the Person; Freedom
of the Individual. The second section of Article 2 of the Basic
Law declares that everyone has the right to life and to inviolability
of his person and that the freedom of the individual is inviolable.
These rights may only be encroached upon pursuant to a law.
Although it may appear inaccurate to speak of these rights as
specific rights in view of their general nature, it seems clear that
the purpose is not to duplicate the "free development of personality" idea set forth in the first section of this article but rather
to stress the elementary idea, paralleled by the basic procedural
significance of the due process clause in the United States Con75 See the discussion in 4 BVerfGE 7 at 15 (1954).
76 See HAMANN, DAS GRUNDGESEI'Z 81 (1956).
77 See Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934), upholding legislation regulating the
price of milk; West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937), upholding legislation
fixing minimum wages for women and children. For a significant statement on the decline
of economic liberty as a substantive right protected under the due process clause, see
Justice Black's opinion in Lincoln Federal Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron &: Metal
Co., 335 U.S. 525 (1949). See also on the subject, KAUP.ER, FRONTIERS OF CoNSTITIJTIONAL
LIBERTY 33-54 (1956).
78 The restrictions on deprivation and loss of citizenship under Art. 16 of the Basic
Law have already been discussed, p. 1107 supra, and the freedom of movement, guaranteed under Art. 11, is referred to in note 62 supra. Consideration of these matters is,
therefore, excluded from the discussion that follows in the text.
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stitution, namely, that no person shall be deprived of life or
liberty except pursuant to law and in accordance with the procedures established by law. Articles IO I, I 03 and 104 of the Basic
Law detailing protections for persons charged with crime and
placing limitations on the actions of the police serve in a practical
way to implement the freedoms specified in the second section of
Article 2.79
Although the provisions of Article 2, section (2), are directed
primarily against illegal deprivations of life or liberty, i.e., deprivations not authorized by a law, the freedoms here mentioned appear to be the source of substantive rights as well in the sense
that no law encroaching upon them may infringe upon their
essential content as stated in Article 19. Indeed, the right to life
acquires added significance from the Basic Law itself since it
expressly abolishes capital punishment.80 The individual's right
to inviolability of his person suggests important substantive rights
with respect to freedom from impairment of physical faculties.
The Supreme Court of the United States, for instance, has faced
the question whether legislation directing sexual sterilization of
persons in certain categories violates the fundamental liberty of
the person protected under the due process clause. Although the
Court has sustained legislation authorizing the sterilization of
mental defectives where the record in the specific case before the
Court clearly showed hereditary weakness,81 it has also indicated
that it will closely scrutinize any extension of the sterilization treatment to other classes of persons.82

Equal Protection of the Laws. Article 3 of the Basic Law
states, first of all, the general proposition that all persons are equal
before the law. This parallels the Fourteenth Amendment's provision that no state shall deny to any person the equal protection
of the laws, a limitation which the Supreme Court has said is also
implicit in the notion of due process of law in the Fifth Amendment as a restriction on the federal govemment.83 The general
79 See

the discussion in the text, pp. 1134-1136 infra.
so Art. 102. The Constitution of the United States does not prohibit capital punishment, although the Eighth Amendment does prohibit "cruel and unusual punishment."
Capital punishment has been abolished in a number of states either by statute or by
constitutional amendment.
81 Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
82 See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942), where the Court held invalid a
state statute requiring the sterilization of certain classes of habitual criminals.
83 See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954), holding that legislation which required
racial segregation in the public schools of the District of Columbia, an area under federal
control, was invalid under the Fifth Amendment.
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equality section has already been frequently invoked before the
Federal Constitutional Court, just as in American constitutional
litigation it is a frequently-invoked article in connection with a
claim that a statute is preferential or discriminatory in its treatment of persons or classes. The Supreme Court in the interpretation of the equal protection clause has taken the general position
that this limitation does not prohibit legislation that establishes
classifications so long as they are reasonable.84 Likewise, the Federal
Constitutional Court has said that the matter of classification is a
legislative matter and that it will not be disturbed as a denial of
equality unless it is arbitrary or capricious in the sense that there
is no rational ground for classification.85 As a result the general
84 The following oft-quoted statement, taken from the opinion in Lindsley v. Natural
Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61 at 78-79 (1911), characterizes the Supreme Court's general approach to equal protection problems:
"The rules by which this contention must be tested, as is shown by repeated decisions
of this court, are these: I. The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
does not take from the State the power to classify in the adoption of police laws, but
admits of the exercise of a wide scope of discretion in that regard, and avoids what is
done only when it is without any reasonable basis and therefore is purely arbitrary.
2. A classification having some reasonable basis does not offend against that clause merely
because it is not made with mathematical nicety or because in practice it results in some
inequality. 3. When the classification in such a law is called in question, if any state
of facts reasonably can be conceived that would sustain it, the existence of that state of
facts at the time the law was enacted must be assumed. 4. One who assails the classification in such a law must carry the burden of showing that it does not rest upon any
reasonable basis, but is essentially arbitrary. • . ."
As a result of this judicial tolerance of legislative classification, the Supreme Court,
despite the frequent claims made upon the basis of the equal protection clause, is not
likely to invalidate classifications established by tax laws and by laws regulating business
enterprise and economic and proprietary matters, as distinguished from classifications that
discriminate on the basis of race, color or religion. In one of the few exceptional cases
arising in recent years, the Supreme Court invalidated a statute which subjected companies issuing travelers' checks to a system of regulation but expressly exempted the
American Express Co. This was found to be a conspicuous case of unlawful preference.
Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957). For cases illustrating the Court's readiness to rationalize and justify legislative classification, see Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948), sustaining a state statute requiring the licensing of bartenders but prohibiting the licensing
of a female unless she was the wife or daughter of the male owner of a licensed liquor
establishment.
85 In his paper entitled "The Role of Supreme Courts in Insuring Equality Under
the Law," delivered before the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., September 10, 1959, Judge Hans Kutscher of the Federal
Constitutional Court, after stating that the Court had adopted the views expressed by
Professor Gerhard Leibholz (now a judge of the Federal Constitutional Court) in his book
[Dm GLEICHHEIT VOR DEM GESETZ (1st ed., 1925; 2d ed., 1959) ], continued as follows:
" ••• According to the Federal Constitutional Court the principle of equality prohibits arbitrary action by the legislature, that is, it prohibits arbitrary differential treatment of that which is essentially equal. It is up to the legislature to decide what factual
situations shall be considered essentially equal or unequal. It is not up to the Federal
Constitutional Court to decide whether a statute provides the most effective or the most
reasonable or the most equitable or the wisest solution of a problem. The court can
declare a statute unconstitutional only if the legislature exceeds the limits of its discretionary power, that is if no plausible reason for differential treatment can be found in
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equality provision of Article 3 has not resulted in invalidation of
any major legislation.86
More effective as limitations on the legislative power are the
specific provisions of Article 3. Section (2) states that men and
women have equal rights. The importance of this provision, which
may be attributed at least in large part to the economic contributions made by women during and immediately after World War
II and their increased participation in all phases of national life,
is attested by the recent decision of the Federal Constitutional
Court which held invalid the provision of the federal family law
which gave the husband-father the ultimate power of decision in
matters concerning control of children. The Court held that
pursuant to several provisions of the Basic Law, including section
(2) of Article 3, the wife was entitled to an equal voice in these
matters.87 The full implications of this decision in terms of control
of the family remain to be developed.
The specific assurance of equal rights for women found in
the Basic Law has no parallel in the United States Constitution.
At most the equal protection clause serves as a vehicle for determining the validity of legislation that discriminates between the
sexes, and early decisions of the Supreme Court do not support
the idea that the equal protection clause requires equal legal
which cas'e the statute must be considered arbitrary. You will realize that the court has
followed more or less the same trend as the United States Supreme CourL"
For cases, see I BVerfGE 208 (1952); 2 BVerfGE 266 (1953); 3 BVerfGE 162 (1953); 4
BVerjGE 144 (1955); 7 BVerjGE 305 (1958).
86 In his paper referred to in the preceding footnote, Judge Kutscher states that
despite the frequency with which the general equality clause has been invoked before it,
the Federal Constitutional Court has invalidated provisions of only three or four relatively
unimportant statutes on the basis of this limitation.
8710 BVerjGE 59 (1959). The Court rested its decision on §§ (1) and (2) of Article
6, which state that marriage and family enjoy the special protection of the state and that
the care and upbringing of children are the natural right of the parents, in conjunction
with §(2) of ArL 3, stating that men and women have equal rights, and §(3) of ArL 3
which provides, inter alia, that no one may be prejudiced or favored because of his sex.
Attention may also be called in this connection to the Court's earlier decision holding invalid the provision of the federal income tax law requiring husbands and wives
to pool their incomes in determining the applicable tax rate. 6 BVerjGE 55 (1957).
Although one of the arguments before the Court was that this provision violated the
equal rights of women and was, therefore, invalid under Art. 3, the Court's decision
rested on the ground that the statute by subjecting married persons to a tax disadvantage
violated the provision of Art. 6, §(1), that marriage and family enjoy the special protection of the state. This decision may be compared with the United States Supreme
Court's decision in Hoeper v. Tax Commission, 284 U.S. 206 (1931), holding invalid
under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment the provision of a state income tax law which required the family to be treated as a unit in determining taxable
income and the applicable rate.
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rights between the sexes.88 Indeed, it required an amendment to
the Constitution to assure equal voting rights for women.89 It is
probably true, however, that with the growing recognition of the
equal status of women as a matter of political, social and economic
development, a development mirrored also in the trends evident
in statutory and case law,90 the Supreme Court is likely at present
to scrutinize more closely legal restrictions discriminating against
women.91
The third section of Article 3 of the Basic Law states another
rule of equal protection in that no one may be prejudiced or
favored because of his sex, his parentage, his race, his language, his
homeland and origin, his faith, or his religious or political inclinations. In short, the Basic Law in this section declares these factors
irrational per se as a basis for classification. Except for the Fifteenth Amendment which expressly prohibits discrimination in
voting rights because of race, color, or previous condition of servitude, the Constitution does not explicitly invalidate discrimination
based on the factors mentioned in Article 3 of the Basic Law, and
any comparable results must be based on the equal protection
clause. The whole recent development in interpretation of the
equal protection clause to prohibit discrimination against Negroes,92 including prohibitions on legislation which requires racial
segregation,93 makes clear that freedom from classification based
on race or color is a fundamental right under the equal protection
clause.94 Again, it may be said that the effect of the decisions is to
88 See Minor v. Happersett, 21 Wall. (88 U.S.) 162 (1875), holding that a state law
which limited the right to vote to males was not unconstitutional.
89 The Nineteenth Amendment adopted in 1920.
90 See the Supreme Court's review in Hoeper v. Tax Commission, 284 U.S. 206 (1931),
of the changes in the law of Wisconsin that had led to the "emancipation" of women
and decline of the unitary theory in respect to the husband-wife relationship.
91 See, for instance, the dissenting opinion in Goesaert v_ Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 at 467
(1948), where the majority sustained a statute requiring the licensing of all bartenders
but prohibiting the issuance of a license to a female unless she was the wife or daughter
of the male owner of a licensed liquor establishment.
92 See, e.g., Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944), holding that Negroes cannot
be excluded from party primary elections; Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948), holding
that covenants designed to exclude Negroes from use of residential property may not be
enforced. Also in a series of decisions the Court has invalidated discrimination in fact
against Negroes in the choice of persons for jury service. See, e.g., Cassell v. Texas, 339
U.S. 282 (1950).
93 Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), holding invalid legislation
requiring racial segregation in public schools. The Court here rejected and overruled the
"equal but separate" doctrine first enunciated in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
94 The Court has also in recent years invalidated state legislation discriminating
against persons of Japanese ancestry. See Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948);
Takahashi v. Fish & Game Commission, 334 U.S. 410 (1948). On discrimination against
aliens, see the discussion in the text, pp. 1108-1109 supra, and the sources cited in notes 63
and 64.
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recogmze that classification by race is inherently irrational and
arbitrary. It seems clear also that any discrimination based on
religious or political grounds would also be regarded as unconstitutional, in view of the express recognition of religious freedom
and in view of the recognition given to political opinions as a
phase of the free expression of ideas protected under the First
Amendment.95

Freedom of Belief and Religion. Article 4 of the Basic Law
declares that freedom of faith and of conscience and of religious
and ideological creeds is inviolable. Moreover, the undisturbed
practice of religion is guaranteed. Finally, this article states that
no one may be compelled against his conscience to render war
service as an armed combatant. These provisions, at least in part,
suggest for comparison the general idea of freedom of thought implied in the First Amendment to the Constitution and also regarded
as a fundamental right protected under the Fourteenth Amendment,96 as well as the First Amendment's guarantee of the free
exercise of religion, also a right recognized as fundamental under
the due process clause.97 The Basic Law in its language transcends
the language of our First Amendment with respect to religious
freedom by placing all forms of ideological belief in this category,
although again this is not a substantial distinction.98 What is
significant about Article 4, by way of contrast with our system, is
that it rests on a constitutional footing the right of a conscientious
objector not to be compelled to render war service as an armed
combatant. The Supreme Court's decisions indicate that no one
may invoke freedom of conscience or freedom of religion as a
basis for refusal to render military service.99 It may be mentioned,
however, that the right of a conscientious objector to refuse to
serve as an armed combatant or even to serve in the army on a
non-combatant basis is now recognized by federal legislation.
95 But the Communist Party and its members may be subjected to discriminatory
treatment in view of the factors which distinguish this party from other political associations. See American Communications Assn., CIO v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950); Harisiades
v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952); Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959).
96 In West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943), where
the Court held that a school board could not constitutionally impose penalties on a
parent and child because of the child's refusal, based on religious grounds, to take part
in a flag salute exercise, Justice Jackson, who wrote the majority opinion, said (at 642):
" ••. If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high
or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other
matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein. If
there are any circumstances which permit an exception, they do not now occur to us."
97Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
98 See West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, referred to in note 96 supra.
99 Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366 (1918).
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Although the Basic Law assures freedom of religion, nothing
contained in Article 4 specifically recognizes the general principle
of separation of church and state.100 The Supreme Court has held
that the provisions of the First Amendment to the Constitution
of the United States, stating that Congress shall pass no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof, in effect prescribe a general principle of separation of
church and state, and that this means, in addition to requiring
that the free practice of religion be undisturbed, that the state
cannot prefer one religion over another or, indeed, give any aid to
religion even on a non-preferential basis.101
Not only does the Basic Law not require separation of church
and state as known in American constitutional law, but German
practices repudiate the notion that the state cannot use its power
and facilities to aid religion. Thus in the German Lander a speical church tax is collected by the government and distributed to
the churches for their financial support.102 Such a practice in the
United States would be a clear violation of the constitutional
conception of church-state relations.103

Freedom of Expression, Assembly, Petition and Association.
Article 5 of the Basic Law which deals more generally with the
freedoms of expression secures to everyone the right freely to ex100 The relations between church and state are stated more definitively in the constitutions of some of the Liinder. Note, for instance, the following statement found in
Art. 29 of the Constitution for Wuerttemberg-Baden:
"The importance of the churches and of the recognized religious and ideological
societies in the safeguarding and strengthening of the religious and moral foundations of
human life is recognized. They organize and administer their affairs independently within the law which is binding upon all and may, in so doing, develop freely. They fill their
offices without the concurrence of the state or Gemeinde. The institutions and activities
of the churches and societies recognized under this Article of the Constitution may not
be misused for purposes of party politics. The civic rights and religious and moral
duties of those in the service of the churches and religious societies in public life
remain unaffected hereby.
"Requirements for the recognition of a religious or ideological society are prescribed by law."
101 Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947). On the general subject, see
PFEFFER, CHURCH, STATE AND Flu:EDOM (1953); KAUPER, FRONTIERS OF CoNSTITUTIONAL
LIBERTY 100-144 (1956). On the question of religious instruction in the public schools,
see the discussion in the text, pp. 1126-1127 infra, and the cases cited in note 129.
102 In theory the tax is levied by the churches, and the government's function is to
serve as an agency in collecting and distributing the tax. See in this connection Art. 31
of the Constitution for Wuerttemberg-Baden which states that those recognized religious
societies which are public law corporations have the right to levy taxes on the basis of
the official tax lists. The church tax is voluntary in the sense that a taxpayer by terminating his church membership thereby relieves himself from payment of the tax.
103 "No tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any religious
activities or institutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever form they may adopt
to teach or practice religion." Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 at 16 (1947).
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press and disseminate his opinion by speech, writing and pictures
and freely to inform himself from generally accessible sources.
Freedom of the press, and freedom of reporting by radio and
motion pictures, are expressly guaranteed, and censorship is prohibited. The First Amendment to the Constitution by way of
comparison states that Congress shall make no law abridging freedom of speech or of the press. Moreover, these First Amendment
freedoms which the Supreme Court has characterized as "preferred
freedoms" 104 are also given protection as fundamental liberties
under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.105
However, the express recognition in the Basic Law that everyone
has the right freely to inform himself from generally accessible
sources as an important conception underlying freedom of expression does not find explicit expression in the First Amendment,
which is directed to the right of the person to express himself. But
an appreciation of the function of free speech as an indispensable
institution for influencing people's minds in the vital areas of
public concern is implicit in the high value the Supreme Court
has placed on the First Amendment freedoms even though the
Court has not formally distilled the right of the people to hear,
learn and know as a right implicit in the free speech guarantee.106
The freedom of reporting by motion pictures, expressly guaranteed
by the Basic Law, comes within the free press guarantee of the
First Amendment.107 The express prohibition of censorship under
the Basic Law finds its parallel in the Supreme Court's decisions
holding that prior restraint is a particularly objectionable restriction on freedom of the press.108
104 See note 71 supra.
Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925) (freedom of speech); Near v. Minnesota,
283 U.S. 697 (1931) (freedom of press).
106 See MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM (1960) for stress on the thesis that free
speech is important because it is relevant to the right of citizens in a democratic society
to be able to inform themselves and make decisions on matters of public concern.
107 Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952).
lOBNear v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931). The emphasis upon freedom from prior
restraint has led the Court to invalidate laws which prohibit the distribution of handbills, religious literature, etc., without the prior approval of a governmental authority
vested with discretionary power in the matter. See, e.g., Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S.
444 (1938).
Although the Supreme Court has not squarely held that all censorship of movies is
invalid, it has in a series of decisions invalidated censorship orders prohibiting the showing of specific films where it appeared that the standard stated in the statute vested the
board with discretionary authority that was too broad or too vague, or that the ground
for decision by the censorship board did not serve as a valid ground for limiting freedom
of the press. Some members of the Court have made clear that they regard all movie
censorship as an invalid form of prior restraint. See Justice Douglas' opinion in Kingsley
International Pictures Corp. v. Regents of the University of the State of New York, 360
U.S. 684 (1959).
105
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The Basic Law declares that art and science, and research and
teaching are free, although freedom of teaching does not absolve
from loyalty to the Constitution.109 In so far as these freedoms are
recognized under the Constitution it is either because they are
regarded as facets of freedom of speech and press, or are otherwise
viewed as fundamental liberties. Thus the Supreme Court has
recognized academic freedom as a fundamental right protected
under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.110
Under Article 8 of the Basic Law all Germans have the right to
assemble peaceably and unarmed without prior notification or
permission. In regard to open-air meetings, however, this right
may be restricted by or pursuant to a law. The right of peaceable
assembly should be coupled with the provision of Article 17
stating that everyone has the right individually or jointly with
others to address written requests or complaints to the competent
authorities and to the representative assemblies. These provisions
are matched by the specific clauses of the First Amendment
securing the right of the people peaceably to assemble and to
petition the government for redress of grievances, a right recognized as fundamental also under the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.111 In a series of decisions interpreting
the due process clause, the Supreme Court has recognized that
religious as well as non-religious groups have a right to use public
places such as parks and streets to conduct their services and hold
meetings, and that any requirement of prior approval by way of
a license is invalid if it vests discretionary power in the licensing
authority,11 2 although a regulation requiring prior notification or
permission is valid if it is designed to do nothing more than
regulate the orderly scheduling of meetings and is not used as a
vehicle for censoring unpopular causes.11 3
The right of all Germans to form associations and societies is
expressly recognized under Article 9 of the Basic Law. While this
general right is not expressly formulated in the Constitution, the
Supreme Court has recognized that the right to form associations
directed to the expression of ideas or to improvement of the status
109 Art. 5, §(3).
110 Sweezy v. New

Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957).
lllDe Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937).
112 See, e.g., Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939); Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290 (1951);
Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 (1951).
113 Poulos v. New Hampshire, 345 U.S. 395 (1953).

1960]

WEST GERMAN AND

U. S.

CONSTITUTIONS

1123

of the group's members is a fundamental facet of liberty protected
under the due process clause.11 4
Mention may be made at this point of the distinction drawn
in the Basic Law between those phases of freedom of expression
which are stated in absolute terms and those with built-in limitations in the sense that they are stated to be subject to restriction
by law. Thus the freedom of faith and conscience and the right
to undisturbed practice of religion under Article 4 of the Basic
Law are put in absolute terms. The same is true of the right of
Germans under Article 8 to assemble peacefully and unarmed
without prior notification or permission. Similarly the right of
Germans under Article 9 to form associations and societies appears
unlimited except for a restriction dealt with below. Also the
freedom of art and science, research and teaching appears to be
absolute, except for the qualification that freedom of teaching
does not absolve from loyalty to the constitution. On the other
hand, the general freedoms of speech and press, enumerated in
the first section of Article 5, are limited under the second section
by "the provisions of the general laws, the provisions of law for
the protection of youth and by the right to inviolability of personal honor." Likewise, under Article 8, the right to assemble
peacefully may be restricted by or pursuant to a law in so far as
this right extends to open-air meetings.
The Basic Law thus recognizes that certain of these freedoms
are subject to restrictions imposed by general laws, protecting appropriate public interests which in the familiar American thinking
and terminology come within the range of the legislative police
power. Article 5 recognizes, for instance, the power to enact legislation punishing the publication of obscene or libelous matters.
As previously pointed out,11 5 Article 19 states that in so far as
the Basic Law recognizes that a right may be restricted by or pursuant to a law, the law must apply generally, must name the basic
right, indicating the article, and may not infringe upon the right
in its essential content.
By comparison, the freedoms of expression categorized in the
First Amendment and protected also under the Fourteenth Amendment against state violation are recognized to be subject to
114NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
115 See the discussion, pp. 1110-1112 supra.
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limitations appropriately enacted in the public interest,11 6 although the Supreme Court has characterized these freedoms as
preferred freedoms and for this reason subjects restraints on them
to a closer scrutiny and employs various techniques that emphasize
the Court's conception of its vital role in protecting the freedoms
it regards as indispensable to the functioning of a democratic
society.117 Indeed, so far as freedom of religion is concerned, the
Court's numerous decisions in favor of this freedom suggest that
not only is it regarded as a preferred freedom, but that it stands
at the pinnacle of the preferred freedoms and is virtually absolute
in character.11 8
Apart from the provisions specifying that certain basic rights
may be restricted pursuant to general law, the Basic Law incorporates other features designed to prevent abuse of rights at the
expense of the free democratic basic order. Although Article 9
guarantees to all Germans the right to form associations and
societies, it directly prohibits associations, the objects or activities
of which conflict with the criminal laws or which are directed
against the constitutional order or the concept of international
understanding. Moreover, Article 18 declares that whoever abuses
freedom of expression of opinion, and in particular freedom of the
press, freedom of teaching, freedom of assembly, freedom of association, secrecy of mail, post, and telecommunications, property,
or the right of asylum in order to attack the free democratic basic
order forfeits these basic rights. The forfeiture and its extent
are pronounced by the Federal Constitutional Court. Finally,
although the right to form political parties is recognized under
116 Thus Congress may make it a criminal offense to advocate overthrow of the
government by force or to conspire to do so [Dennis v. United States, 342 U.S. 494 (1951)],
require the deportation of aliens who belong to an organization advocating violent overthrow [Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952) ], require disclosure by witnesses
of Communist Party affiliation in connection with committee investigation of sub•
versive activities [Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959)], and require union
officers to file non-Communist affidavits as a condition to the union's continued enjoy•
ment of privileges under the national labor legislation [American Communications Assn.,
CIO v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950) ].
Similarly both the federal government and the states may punish the circulation,
distribution and sale of obscene matters [Roth v. United States, Alberts v. California, 354
U.S. 476 (1957) ], and the states may punish the publication of libelous matters, including so-called group libels that incite to racial or religious hatred [Beauharnais v. Illinois,
343 u.s 250 (1952) ].
J.17 See note 71 supra.
118 But overt conduct, even though sanctioned by religious belief, may be prohibited
by legislation that embodies accepted notions of public morality. See Reynolds v. United
States, 98 U.S. 145 (1879), upholding a federal statute prohibiting bigamy in federal
territories as applied to persons who practiced polygamy as a matter of religious conviction.
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Article 21, section (2) of this same article declares unconstitutional
all parties· which, by reason of their aims or the behavior of their
adherents, seek to impair or destroy the free democratic basic
order or to endanger the existence of the Federal Republic~ The
Federal Constitutional Court decides on the question of unconstitutionality. Pursuant to this provision the Federal Constitutional
Court handed down its important decision finding that the Communist Party existed in order to attack the free democratic basic
order and was for this reason unconstitutional.119 This decision
may be compared with the decisions of the United States Supreme
Court upholding congressional legislation imposing disabilities
on persons by reference to Communist Party membership, upholding the constitutionality of the Smith Act in its application
to Communists charged with conspiracy to advocate overthrow of
government by force and to organize a party engaged in such
advocacy, and upholding provisions of federal legislation requiring
the deportation of Communists.120 The important difference between the two constitutional systems in dealing with Communism
as a subversive movement is that whereas under the Basic Law
the Federal Constitutional Court is directly charged with responsibility for dealing with the problem, any restrictions under
American law originate with Congress or the state legislative
bodies. It is the Supreme Court's function to decide whether the
statutory restriction either on its face or in its application violates
the First Amendment freedoms, and the Court's decisions have
made clear that these freedoms may be abridged pursuant to
legislation designed to protect vital interests.

Marriage, Family, and the Rights of Parents and Children.
The Basic Law states that marriage and family enjoy the special
protection of the state, declares that the care and upbringing of
children are the natural rights of the parents and a duty primarily
incumbent upon them but that the state watches over the performance of this duty, and provides that children may be separated
from the family against the will of the persons entitled to bring
them up only pursuant to a law, if those so entitled fail in their
duty or if the children are otherwise threatened with neglect.121
119 5 BVerfGE 85 (1956). For comment on this decision, see McWhinney, "The Ger•
man Federal Constitutional Court and the Communist Party Decision," 32 !No. L.J. 295
(1957). In an earlier decision the Court had similarly held the neo-fascist Socialist Reich
Party unconstitutional, 2 BVerfGE I (1952).
120 See the cases cited in note ll6 supra.
121 Art. 6, §§ (I)· (3).
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The importance of these provisions is highlighted by the decisions
of the Federal Constitutional Court holding unconstitutional the
provision of the family law giving the husband-father the power
of decision over matters concerning the control and education of
the children122 and the provision of the income tax law requiring
the pooling of the separate incomes o~ husband and wife in determining the applicable tax rate.123 The law giving the father the
controlling voice over the children was found to violate the wife's
equal right to participate in these matters, and the income tax
provision was held to discriminate against the family relationship.
Although the United States Constitution does not deal expressly with family matters, it should be noted that the Supreme
Court has recognized the natural right of parents with respect to
the care and education of their children as a fundamental right
protected under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.124
Article 6 of the Basic Law further asserts the rights of mothers
to the protection and care of the community and the duty of the
legislature to provide illegitimate children with the same opportunities for their physical and spiritual development and their
position in society as are enjoyed by legitimate children. Provisions
of this type, oriented toward a program of social welfare legislation,
are not generally found in American constitutions which are concerned with political .and personal freedoms and are instead regarded as a matter appropriate for the usual law-making processes.

Education and Religious Instruction. The Basic Law deals
at length with the important matter of education. Article 7 states
at the outset that the entire educational system is under the supervision of the state. The persons entitled to bring up a child have
the right to decide whether it shall receive religious instruction
which forms part of the ordinary curriculum in the state and municipal schools except in secular schools. Without prejudice to the
state's right of supervision, religious instruction is given in accordance with the tenets of the religious communities, but no
teacher may be obliged against his will to give religious instruction. Although the right to establish private schools is guaranteed,
12210 BVerfGE 59 (1959). See note 87 supra for a statement of the several grounds
on which the Court rested its decision and also the discussion in the text at that point.
123 6 BVerfGE 55 (1957). See the prior reference to this case in note 87 supra.
124 See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925), holding invalid a state
statute which required all children to attend public schools on the ground that this
interfered with the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the education of children
under their control.
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these schools when serving as a substitute for state and municipal
schools require the approval of the state and are subject to the
laws of the Lander, but this approval must be given if certain
conditions stated in the Constitution are satisfied. These provisions suggest interesting points of comparison and contrast with
constitutional aspects of education in the United States. The
Supreme Court has recognized that a parent has a right to determine whether his child shall receive religious instruction. Indeed,
the Court has held that the right to send children to a parochial
school is fundamental and that state legislation that forces all children to attend public schools is unconstitutional as an interference with the freedom of the parents.125 Perhaps the most interesting point of contrast here is the recognition under the Basic
Law that religious instruction forms part of the ordinary curriculum in state and municipal schools (although a child's attendance
at this instruction is subject to the decision of the parents), and
that this religious instruction is given in accordance with the
tenets of religious communities.126 As pointed out earlier,12 7 the
Supreme Court has interpreted the First Amendment to require
separation of church and state and to forbid all forms of state aid
to religion. Pursuant to this interpretation, the Court has made
clear that religious instruction and practices may not be included
as part of the public school program.128 Indeed, the release of
children from their public school classes for one hour during the
week to receive religious instruction from teachers supplied by
the churches is unconstitutional if the instruction takes place
on the school premises.129 It must be remembered, however, in
this connection that there is no general provision in the Basic Law
which requires separation of church and state or which otherwise
prohibits the government from giving aid to religion.130 The
Basic Law, therefore, is much more flexible in regard to these
matters, although it does explicitly recognize religious and intellectual freedom.

Privacy of Home. Article 13 of the Basic Law states that the
home is inviolable and that searches may be ordered only by a
125lbid.
126 Art 7, §(3).
127 See the discussion in the text, p. 1120 supra.
128 Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. I (1947).
129 McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203 (1948). But a released time
program is valid if conducted off the school premises. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306
(1952).
130 See note 100 supra.
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judge or, in tp.e event of danger in delay, by other organs as provided by law and may be carried out only in the form prescribed
by law. Otherwise, this immunity may be encroached upon or
restricted only to avert a common danger or a mortal danger to
individuals, or, pursuant to a law, to prevent imminent danger
to public security and order, especially to alleviate the housing
shortage, to combat the danger of epidemics or to protect endangered juveniles. In general, this presents a counterpart of the
Fourth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States
which states a freedom from unreasonable search and seizure, a
freedom which has also been recognized as fundamental under
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.131 The
provision in Article 13, authorizing searches in certain situations
without regard to the usual formal authorization, suggests the
problem recently before the Supreme Court in the case1 32 where
it held that a municipal ordinance could impose a fine upon a
person for refusing to open his home for inspection by a health
officer when the officer had reason to suspect a condition that was
dangerous to public health.

Freedom To Choose and Pursue Occupation. The Basic Law
secures to all Germans the right freely to choose their trade or
profession, their place of work and their place of training.133 In
tum it provides that the practice of trades and professions may
be regulated by law. The Basic Law here recognizes both the
specific right to choose one's trade or profession and the specific
right to practice or pursue the same. These rights fall in the
category of emanations of the right to the free development of
personality and but for their special treatment would be protected
under and governed by section (1) of Article 2. Under Article 12,
section (1), a distinction is drawn between the right to choose one's
trade or profession which appears to be absolute in character, and
the right to practice one's trade or profession which is subject to
131 Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
Wire-tapping is not considered a form of search and seizure that comes under the
Fourth Amendment's restrictions. See Olmstead v. United States, 2:17 U.S. 438 (1928).
Similarly it does not appear that wire-tapping comes within the search provisions of Article
13 of the Basic Law. Article 10 of the Basic Law, however, states that secrecy of the
mail and secrecy of posts and telecommunications are inviolable and that restrictions may
be ordered only pursuant to a law. In the United States these matters are dealt with
by federal legislation in the absence of corresponding constitutional limitations. See
Dobry, "Wire-tapping and Eavesdropping: A Comparative Survey," 1 J. INTI.. COMM.
JUR. 319 (1957).
182 Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360 (1959).
133 Art. 12, § (I).
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the reservation that it may be regulated by law. Because of the
close interrelationship, however, between the choice and practice
of a trade or profession, the Federal Constitutional Court has
recognized that the choice of trade or profession may be restricted
by law but only if the public interests served by the restriction
cannot be achieved by regulations governing the practice. The
right to choose and enter a trade or profession stands on the
higher level.
Three interesting cases decided by the Court give a good picture of the practical significance of these rights and the theory
followed in interpreting and applying them. In the well-known
Apotheke case134 the Court had before it a Bavarian statute which
provided for the licensing of apothecaries and which empowered
the licensing authority to take into account as a condition of
granting the license the question whether there were not already
enough apothecaries serving the area so that further competition,
therefore, was undesirable, both from the viewpoint of protecting
those already in the business and protecting the applicant from
embarking upon a losing venture. In this case the applicant had
been denied a license by reference to these economic considerations. The Court held that the part of the statute authorizing
denial of a license on this ground was unconstitutional under
section (I) of Article 12. This clearly was a restriction on the right
to choose a profession. Recognizing that some restrictions could
be imposed on this right, the Court distinguished between subjective and objective qualifications. The legislature may properly
impose subjective qualifications, relating to such matters as professional competence, training, character and fitness, since the applicant has a chance to meet these qualifications and thereby help
determine the result. But objective qualifications or conditions
which are beyond the applicant's power to influence, such as the
economic considerations relied upon in denying the license in
this case, cannot be sustained, consistent with a person's constitutional right to choose a profession, unless justified by weighty and
compelling public considerations and unless the possibility of
achieving the desired results by means of subjective qualifications
are first exhausted. In the case before it the Court found no justification for denial of the license.
134 7

BYerfGE 377 (1958). See Hamann, "Die Freiheit der Berufswahl," 11

JurusnsCHE WoCHENSCHRIFT 1801 (1958).
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Thereafter the Court held invalid the provision of a milk
control law which authorized the licensing authority to refuse to
license a person who would not daily market a prescribed minimum amount of milk.135 Again this was held to be an unlawful
restriction on the right to choose a trade. The Court rejected the
argument that this was a health measure on the theory that smaller
establishments would be less likely to observe hygienic standards
and that a large number of small establishments selling milk
would make inspection more difficult. Health and inspection
measures could properly be enforced in regulating the business,
but establishing a daily minimum quota of milk to be sold· was
not essential to achieve these purposes.
Notwithstanding its decisions in the two cases discussed above,
the Federal Constitutional Court sustained the law which gives a
monopoly to the apothecaries or pharmacists in respect to the sale
of most ready-packaged, non-prescriptive drugs.136 Although it
was argued that this created a monopolistic privilege at the expense
of other businesses which claimed the constitutional right, pursuant to Article 12, to sell these drugs, the Court in advancing
grounds to sustain this legislation emphasized not only the importance of having drugs dispensed by those who have special
technical knowledge but laid stress also on the interesting argument that as an economic matter pharmacists could not afford to
carry on their important function of filling prescriptions unless
they could count on the profits from the sale of ready-packaged
non-prescriptive drugs.137 The Court's reliance on functional
economic considerations to justify this legislation is noteworthy
in view of its rejection in the earlier Apotheke case of the economic
arguments advanced in support of the regulation there declared
invalid.
The role assumed by the Court, as evidenced in all three cases,
in determining the criteria to be employed in passing on the
validity of legislation impinging upon the freedom to choose
and pursue a trade or profession and in effect deciding whether
the restrictions were reasonably required, furnishes an interesting
commentary on the functioning of judicial review in the protection
of these phases of economic liberty.
135 9 BVerfGE 39 (1958).
1369 BVerfGE 73 (1959).
137 The Court treated the

regulation in this case as a regulation of the practice of
their professions by both the apothecaries and the operators of other types of stores
that were excluded from the sale ef ready-packaged non-prescriptive drugs. Hence, the
legislation was not seen as imposing a restriction on the freedom to choose a profession.
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Although important phases of economic liberty are protected
both under the specific provisions of Article 12 and by derivation
from the general right to the free development of personality
under Article 2, neither the Basic Law nor the decisions interpreting it furnish a basis for postulating a general concept of freedom of private enterprise. In short the Basic Law does not
provide a constitutional sanction for a laissez-faire theory of economics. Indeed, the Federal Constitutional Court has said that
the Basic Law is neutral on this matter, and that the legislature
is free to develop its own conception of the proper type of economic
order provided that its legislation does not violate rights protected
by the Basic Law.138
By way of comparison, it may be noted that although the
Supreme Court at one time interpreted the due process clause to
incorporate a broad concept of economic liberty, consistent with
the ideas of free enterprise and a laissez-faire economics, this
interpretation has been substantially devitalized in recent years
by decisions upholding legislation imposing various types of economic controls, with the result that while economic liberty still
has recognition as a fundamental right, it is subject to a broad
exercise of the police power limited only by a loose standard of
reasonableness.139 The individual's right to choose and pursue
his trade or occupation continues, however, to be regarded as an
important liberty, and arbitrary exclusion of an individual from a
profession is subject to attack as a denial of due process of law.140
In connection with the right to choose and practice one's
trade or profession, and as a phase of the broader concept of economic liberty, mention may be made also at this point of the
express recognition in the Basic Law of the right to form labor
unions.141 Agreements which seek to hinder this right are null
and void. In the United States the right of collective bargaining
and the duty of employers not to discriminate against employees
because of union affiliation is recognized by the national labor
138 See
130 See
140 See

the opinion in 7 BVerfGE 377 (1958).
the references cited in note 77 supra.
Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 353 U.S. 252 (1957), holding that the
refusal of bar examiners to certify an applicant for admission to the bar was a denial
of due process of law since the record did not support a finding that the applicant had
failed to establish his good moral character or had failed to show that he did not advocate overthrow of the government by force. See also Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474
(1959), where the Court stated (p. 492) that the right to hold specific private employment
and to follow a chosen profession free from unreasonable governmental interference
comes within the "liberty" and "property" concepts of the due process clause.
141 Art. 9, §(3).
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legislation. In upholding this legislation the Supreme Court
stated that the right of collective bargaining must now be recognized as a fundamental right.142

Freedom From Involuntary Servitude. Article 12 of the Basic
Law which states that no one may be compelled to perform a
particular work, except within the framework of a traditional
compulsory public service which applies generally and equally
to all, and that forced labor may be imposed only in the event
that a person is deprived of his freedom by the sentence of a court,
parallels the Thirteenth Amendment, which, while prohibiting
involuntary servitude, expressly recognizes that forced labor may
be permitted as punishment for crime and which has been construed to permit types of compulsory public service needed in
the public interest.143
Property Rights. The Basic Law guarantees property and the
rights of inheritance, and states that their contents and limits are
determined by the laws.144 This article further declares that
property imposes duties and that its use should also serve the
public weal. Expropriation is permitted only in the public weal,
and the compensation in case of expropriation shall be determined
upon just consideration of the public interest and of the interests
of the persons affected.145 In case of dispute regarding the amount
of compensation, recourse may be had to the ordinary courts.
The results reached under the United States Constitution in
respect to property rights bear close resemblance to the express
provisions of the Basic Law. The right to own, possess and enjoy
the use of property is recognized as a fundamental right in the
interpretation of the due process clause.146 Private property may
be taken by the government for a public use but only upon the
142 NLRB v. Jones &: Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 at 33 (1937).
143 See Butler v. Perry, 240 U.S. 328 (1916). Likewise, legislation prohibiting strikes
under circumstances where vital public interests would be affected does not violate the
involuntary servitude prohibition. See International Union, UAW-AFL, Local 232 v.
Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 336 U.S. 245 (1949).
144 Art. 14, § (1).
145 Art. 14, § (3). This section requires that a statute which authorizes a taking
of property provide the means of compensation. If it fails to do so, it is unconstitutional.
It is not the function of the judiciary to order a means of compensation in such a case.
See 4 BVerfGE 219 (1955). On the general subject, see Schubert, "Compensation Under New
German Legislation on Expropriation," 9 AM. J. COMP. L. 84 (1960).
146See, e.g., Chicago, B. &: Q. R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897); Pennsylvania
Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922). But the right of an owner to dispose of his
property by will has not been regarded as a fundamental or natural right. Magoun v.
Illinois Trust&: Savings Bank, 170 U.S. 283 (1898).
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payment of just compensation.147 Whether property is taken,
whether it is taken for a public use, and what constitutes just
compensation are questions for judicial interpretation.148 But
property rights are not absolute, and the use of property may be
subjected to reasonable restrictions imposed by the legislature in
the public interest in the exercise of the police power.149 The
line between permissible restrictions on the use of property and
restrictions which are invalid either because they are arbitrary
or because they amount to an attempt to take property without
payment of compensation is not easily drawn, and any court
forced into a decision on a question of this kind is inevitably required to employ an empiric process that weighs and balances such
factors as the degree of impairment of private right, the breadth
and nature of the public interest served, and the reciprocity of
benefits accruing to private owners.urn
Article 15 of the Basic Law states that land, natural resources
and means of production may, for the purpose of socialization, be
transferred to public ownership or other forms of publicly controlled economy by a law which provides for the kind and extent of
the compensation. This programmatic provision makes clear that a
socialization program would not be incompatible with the con147 This restriction is expressly stated in the Fifth Amendment as a limitation on the
federal government. The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment has been
interpreted to impose the same restriction upon the states. Chicago, B. 8e Q. R. Co. v.
Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897).
Attention should also be called to the provision of Art. I, §10 of the Constitution,
prohibiting the states from passing laws impairing the obligation of contracts. This
serves as an added protection against retrospective legislative impairment of one class
of vested rights. No corresponding provision appears in the Basic Law.
148 On the "taking" question, see United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946),
holding that the flight of government aircraft over a private farm in such a manner as
to interfere with the owner's effective use of his land constituted a compensable taking.
The term "public use" as a limitation on the eminent domain power is no longer
strictly construed by the Supreme Court. Property is taken for a public use if it is
taken for a use that serves the public interest and general welfare. See Berman v. Parker,
348 U. S. 26 (1954), upholding the use of the eminent domain power in connection with
a project for the redevelopment of a part of the District of Columbia. The Court further
indicated in this case that the question whether a public purpose would be served by the
exercise of the eminent domain power was a matter primarily for determination by
Congress and that the Court had a very narrow function to perform in review of this
question.
On the judicial function in determining "just compensation," see Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312 (1893).
149See, e.g., Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U. S. 394 (1915) (the use of property
in a manner injurious to the health and safety of the public may be prohibited); Village
of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U. S. 365 (1926) (use of land may be limited by
comprehensive zoning laws that define permissible use classifications).
lliO Helpful discussions are found in the opinions in the Village of Euclid case, note
149 supra, and the Pennsylvania Coal Co. case, note 146 supra.
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stitutional order established by the Basic Law and further supports
the idea that the Basic Law is neutral in respect to the nature of
the economic system within the constitutional order. At an earlier
period in American constitutional history the Supreme Court
employed the due process clause as a means of protecting the
private enterprise system, and as part of this conception placed
limitations on the use of public funds to engage in proprietary
enterprise by finding that the due process clause prohibited the
use of public funds for other than a public purpose, which was
defined to exclude enterprises normally conducted by private persons and corporations.151 These interpretations of the due process clause appear to have little or no vitality at present,1 52 although
limitations found in state constitutions continue to serve as restrictions on the powers of state legislatures to embark upon programs of proprietary enterprise.153 So far as Congress is concerned,
taking into account its broad power to regulate and promote commerce154 and its equally broad power to spend for the general
welfare,155 it is doubtful whether the Constitution imposes any
substantial barriers to a program of governmental socialization
of industries basic to the national economy, provided, of course,
that compensation is paid in the case of expropriation of private
property for this purpose.

Limitations on Criminal Liability. Before concluding this
review of rights protected under the Basic Law, reference may be
made to the rights of those charged with crime. These rights
occupy an important position in the United States Constitution,156
151 See Citizen's Savings & Loan Assn. v. Topeka, 20 Wall. (87 U.S.) 655 (1875).
152 See Green v. Frazier, 253 U. S. 233 (1920), where the Court upheld the power

of
a state to operate a bank, warehouse, grain elevator, flour mill and home building project.
153 State constitutions commonly provide that public funds may be expended only
for "a public purpose," and it is the function of the state courts in interpretation of this
limitation to determine what is properly a "public purpose."
154 U.S. CONST., Art. I, §8, ,r 3. Thus, incident to its power to regulate commerce,
Congress may authorize federal proprietary enterprise at the expense of private enter•
prise, as in the case of federal hydroelectric projects on navigable waters. The Tennessee
Valley Authority program is a prime example. See Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288
(1936); Tennessee Electric Power Co. v. TVA, 306 U.S. 118 (1939).
155 U.S. CONST., Art. I, §8, ,r 1. See United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936); Steward
Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937). The breadth and general character of the
federal spending power scarcely admit of limitation by judicial interpretation.
156 The Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the Constitution detail a number of procedural limitations applicable in the case of federal prosecutions: indictment by grand
jury, the right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury, freedom from double
jeopardy, the privilege against self-incrimination, the right of the accused to be confronted with the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the assistance of counsel for his defense. The Fourth
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as well as in the various state constitutions, and bulk large in the
Supreme Court's interpretation of the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.1117 Although some rights of this kind
are recognized under the Basic Law, they are included in Articles
101, 103 and 104 in Part IX, dealing with the administration of
justice and are not categorized as basic rights under Part I.
In brief these provisions prohibit extraordinary courts, prohibit a person's removal from the jurisdiction of his lawful judge,
secure the accused's right to a hearing in accordance with the law,
prohibit ex post facto laws and double jeopardy, place restraints
on police action in restricting the individual's freedom by requiring the restriction to be based on law and with due regard to the
forms prescribed therein, prohibit the mental and physical illtreatment of detained persons, strictly limit the period in which
police may hold a person in custody before bringing him before
a judge for a preliminary hearing, and require prompt notice to
be given to a relative of the person detained, or a person enjoying
his confidence, of any judicial decision ordering or extending a
deprivation of liberty. Many of these restrictions have their
parallels in American constitutional limitations,1 118 although some
Amendment, previously discussed in the text, protects against unreasonable search and
seizure, and the Eighth Amendment prohibits excessive bail, excessive fines and cruel
and unusual punishment.
Article I, §§ 9 and 10, prohibits both the federal government and the states from
passing bills of attainder and ex post facto laws.
1117 Since the express provisions of the Bill of Rights, referred to in note 156 supra,
apply only to federal prosecutions, the limitations derived from the Constitution on state
criminal procedure, except in respect to the bill of attainder and ex post facto prohibitions, result from the Supreme Court's interpretation of the due process clause which has
been construed to protect those rights which are basic according to the Court's conception of fundamental fairness and justice. Not all the procedural rights specifically
catalogued in the Bill of Rights as limitations on the federal government are regarded
as fundamental. See the cases cited in note 37 supra.
158 The right to hearing in accordance with the law accords with the central idea
of the due process clause, namely, that a person shall not be deprived of life, liberty or
property without due process of law, which reduced to its essentials means that a person
may not be punished except after notice and a fair hearing in accordance with the procedures established by law. See Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884).
The body of the Constitution expressly prohibits both the federal government and
the states from passing ex post facto laws. Art. I, §§ 9 and 10.
The Sixth Amendment, applicable to the federal government, states that no person
shall be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb. This
provision is commonly found in state constitutions as well. But the due process clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment, as a federal restriction on the states, does not require
the states to observe the double jeopardy limitation in the same sense in which it applies
to the federal government. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U. S. 319 (1937).
The federal statute requiring persons arrested by federal officers to be brought
promptly before a federal magistrate has recently received a strict construction from the
Supreme Court which has declared the rule that confessions obtained during a period of
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of the details are not governed by constitutional provisions but
instead are spelled out in the federal and state laws defining
criminal procedure.159 The common American constitutional
provisions are more concerned with protections of the accused in
the course of the trial, such as the right to jury trial, the right to
counsel, the privilege against self-incrimination, the right to- confront witnesses, and the accused's rights to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor. On the other hand, while
restraints on police conduct assume a major significance in the
Basic Law, the important protections for the accused in the course
of the trial are left for legislative treatment in the Code of Criminal
Procedure. In this connection it should also be noted that any
comparison of American and German criminal trial procedures
must take into account the basic consideration that trial by jury
and grand jury indictment are not a part of the German legal
system.

H.

Conclusions

The recognition of fundamental rights under the Constitution
rests on the classic assumption of constitutional liberalism that the
freedom of the individual must be protected against the power of
the state. The Basic Law, true to its general character as a document which fuses the traditional concept of democratic liberalism
with the evolving concept of the modern public service state,
postulates some social rights that depend for their fulfillment upon
positive action by the state. The provisions respecting the family
and education may be cited in this connection. But most of the
rights guaranteed under the Basic Law are concerned with constitutional freedom of the individual in the classic sense. Comparison with the Constitution reveals recognition of a common
illegal detention are inadmissible at the trial later. See Mallory v. United States, 354
u. s. 449 (1957).
The Supreme Court employs the due process clause as a means of curbing lawless
actions of state police in subjecting prisoners to abusive practices by holding inadmissible
at the trial confessions secured by the police under circumstances which are basically
unfair to the prisoner and which impair the voluntary character of the confession. See,
e.g., Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191 (1957); Spano v. New York, 360 U. S. 315 (1959).
159 Thus the period of time within which police must present an arrested person
for arraignment before a magistrate is often detailed by statute. The federal statute
provides that this shall be done "without unnecessary delay." In Mallory v. United
States, 354 U. S. 449 (1957), this requirement was held violated where the police had
the opportunity to present the prisoner before a magistrate immediately after arrest but
waited until the next morning to do so.
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core of basic rights. Freedom of religion, speech, press and
assembly, the right to equal protection of the laws, the right to
compensation in the case of expropriation of property for a public
use, the right to a fair trial and other protections for the accused
are guaranteed under both constitutions. The Basic Law is much
more comprehensive, however, and also more precise in its statement of basic rights. It recognizes some rights which are left to
implication under the Constitution either in the interpretation of
rights specifically enumerated or in the interpretation of the
fundamental rights protected under the due process clause. The
freedom of art, science, research and teaching, the equal rights of
men and women, the right of parents in regard to the care and
upbringing of children, the right to form associations and societies,
the freedom of movement, the right to choose a trade or profession,
and the rights of property and inheritance all fall into this category.
On the other hand, some of the specific rights catalogued in the
Basic Law, such as the rights of conscientious objectors, are not
recognized either expressly or by implication under the Constitution.
An important difference between the Basic Law and the Constitution relates to church-state matters. Although it guarantees
complete freedom of religious and ideological views and the right
to the undisturbed practice of religion, the Basic Law does not
state a general theory of separation of church and state. The
express provision of the Basic Law authorizing religious instruction in the public schools furnishes an interesting contrast to
American practice as limited by the separation concept.
A notable feature of the Basic Law is that unlike the Constitution it defines more precisely the scope of the various rights
guaranteed by it. Some of the rights may be asserted only by
citizens. Moreover, some rights are recognized to be absolute in
character whereas others are subject to restriction by law, but in
the latter case the law must be general in character, must name
the basic right it is restricting, and in no case may it infringe upon
the right in its basic content. Such built-in limitations are not
found in the Constitution. It is the responsibility of the Supreme
Court to determine the scope of the rights expressly or impliedly
protected under the Constitution, and in general it has followed
the theory that these rights may be limited in the reasonable exercise of the legislative power to protect appropriate public
interests.
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THE FEDERAL PRINCIPLE

The Basic Law provides that the federal territory shall be reorganized by federal law with due regard to regional ties, historical
and cultural connections, economic expediency and social structure, and that such reorganization should create Lander (states)
which, by their size and capacity, are able effectively to fulfill the
function incumbent upon them.16° Further provisions deal with
the procedure to be followed by means of popular initiative and
referendum respecting changes regarding the Land boundaries
established by the reorganization of the Lander after May 8,
1945.161 The procedure regarding any other changes in the territory of the Lander is to be established by a federal law which
requires the consent of the Bundesrat and of the majority of the
members of the Bundestag. But the basic principle that the
Federation shall be divided into Lander cannot be changed by an
amendment of the Basic Law.162 Thus, while the boundaries and
the number of the Lander may be changed, it is not possible, consistent with the Basic Law, to eliminate the Lander altogether in
order to achieve a unitary state. The insistence upon this principle
must be understood in light of the experience under the Hitler
regime when the states as political entities were abolished and the
federal principle as established under the Weimar Constitution
was discarded. The important role of the Lander in the post-war
160 Art. 29, § (I).
161 Article US, included

in the transitional and concluding provisions of the Basic
Law, dealing specially with the reorganization of the territory comprising the Lander
Baden, Wuerttemberg-Baden and Wuerttemberg-Hohenzollern, in the southwestern part
of Germany, authorized reorganization by agreement between the Lander concerned and
provided that if no agreement was reached, the reorganization was to be regulated by a
federal law which had to provide for a referendum. The federal statutes enacted to
deal with this matter gave rise to the first major case (the "Southwest Case'') before
the Federal Constitutional Court and the first decision holding federal legislation unconstitutional. 1 BVerfGE 14 (1951). See von Mehren, "Constitutionalism in Germanythe First Decision of the New Constitutional Court," I AM. J. COMP. L. 70 (1952);
Leibholz, "The Federal Constitutional Court in Germany and the 'Southwest Case,'" 46
AM. PoL. SCI. REv. 723 (1952); Klein, "Bundesverfassungsgericht und Siidweststaatfrage," 77
(Vol. 38, New Series) ARCHIV DES OFFENTLICHEN R.ECHTS 452 (1951-1952). See also note 6
supra.
Actually the decision in the Southwest Case, while holding parts of the federal legislation unconstitutional, sustained its essential features with the result that the referendum
as authorized by the reorganization statute was held on December 9, 1951. The proposed reorganization of the three Lander into a single new Land known as Baden-Wuerttemberg was approved by the necessary majority votes. The Saar was added as a new
Land on January 1, 1957. At present the Federation consists of the following ten Lander
(exclusive of West Berlin which has a special status): Baden-Wuerttemberg, Bavaria,
Bremen, Hamburg, Hesse, Lower Saxony, North Rhine-Westphalia, Rhineland Palatinate,
Saarland, and Schleswig-Holstein.
162 Art. 79, § (3).
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constitutional development is reflected in the key role played by
the Lander's representatives in the drafting and ratification of the
Basic Law.162 a
A.

Distribution of Legislative Power

Article 70 of the Basic Law defines the basic theory respecting
the division of legislative authority as between the Federation and
the Lander. The Lander have the power to legislate in so far as
the Basic Law does not confer legislative power on the Federation.
This finds a parallel in the Tenth Amendment to the Constitution
of the United States which reserves to the states or to the people
the powers not delegated to the United States.
The division of authority between the Federation and the
Lander is determined by the provisions of the Basic Law concerning exclusive and concurrent legislative powers. Article 73 lists
eleven categories of exclusive legislative powers of the Federation163 and with respect to these the Basic Law provides that the
Lander shall have authority to legislate only if, and to the extent
that, a federal law explicitly so authorizes them.164 Article 74 lists
twenty-three categories of concurrent legislative powers,165 and
162• The Basic Law was prepared and drafted by the Parliamentary Council which
consisted of delegates elected by the Landtage (legislatures) of the several Liinder (eleven
at that time). By its terms (Art. 144), the Basic Law became effective for all the Liinder fol•
lowing ratification by the Landtage of the two-thirds of the Liinder. Ten of the eleven
Landtage voted to ratify. Although the Bavarian Landtag voted to reject the Basic Law,
it nevertheless voted in support of a declaration that Bavaria was a part of the Federal
Republic of Germany.
163 The Federation's exclusive legislative powers extend under Art. 73 to (1) foreign
affairs as well as defense, including both military service for males from their completed
age of 18 years and the protection of the civilian population, (2) citizenship in the
Federation, (3) freedom of movement, passports, immigration and emigration, and
extradition, (4) currency, money and coinage, weights and measures, as well as computa•
tion of time, (5) the unity of the customs and commercial territory, commercial and
navigation agreements, the freedom of movement of goods, and the exchanges of goods,
and payments with foreign countries including customs and frontier protection, (6)
federal railroads and air traffic, (7) postal and telecommunication services, (8) the
legal status of the persons employed by the Federation and by federal bodies-corporate
under public law, (9) industrial property rights, copyrights and publication rights, (10)
cooperation of the Federation and the Lander in matters of criminal police and of protection of the Constitution, establishment of a federal office of the criminal police, as well
as international control of crime, and (II) statistics for federal purposes.
164Art. 71.
165 The concurrent legislative powers extend to the following matters:
"I. civil law, criminal law and execution of sentences, the system of judicature, the
procedure of the courts, the legal profession, notaries and legal advice (Rechtsberatung);
2. registration of births, deaths, and marriages;
3. the law of association and assembly;
4. the law relating to residence and establishment of aliens;
5. the protection of German cultural treasures against removal abroad;
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with respect to these the Lander have authority to legislate as long
as, and to the extent that, the Federation does not use its legislative
power.166
In the sphere of concurrent legislative powers, the Federation
has the right to legislate only to the extent that a need for a
federal rule exists because (I) a matter cannot be effectively dealt
with by the legislation of individual Lander; or (2) dealing with
the matter by a Land law might prejudice the interests of other
Lander or of the entire community; or (3) the maintenance of
legal or economic unity, especially the maintenance of uniformity
of living conditions beyond the territory of a Land, necessitates
it.167

The statement in Article 70 that the Lander have the power
to legislate in so far as the Basic Law does not confer legislative
powers on the Federation does not tell the whole story, since the
Lander may legislate by express authority of the Federation in the
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

the affairs of refugees and expellees;
public welfare;
citizenship in the Liinder;
war damage and reparation;
benefits to war-disabled persons and to dependents of those killed in the war,
assistance to former prisoners of war, and care of war graves;
11. the law relating to economic matters (mining, industry, supply of power, crafts,
trades, commerce, banking and stock exchanges, private insurance);
12. - labor law, including the legal organization of enterprises; protection of workers,
employment exchanges and agencies, as well as social insurance, including unemployment insurance;
13. the promotion of scientific research;
14. the law regarding expropriation to the extent that matters enumerated in Articles
73 and 74 are concerned;
15. transfer of land, natural resources and means of production into public ownership or other forms of publicly controlled economy;
16. prevention of the abuse of economic power;
17. promotion of agricultural and forest production, safeguarding of the supply of
food, the import and export of agricultural and forest products, deep sea and
coastal fishing, and preservation of the coasts;
18. dealings in real estate, land law and matters concerning agricultural leases,
housing, settlements and homesteads;
19. measures against epidemic and infectious diseases of humans and animals, admission to medical and other professions and practices in the field of healing,
traffic in drugs, medicines, narcotics, and poisons;
20. protection with regard to traffic in food and stimulants as well as in necessities
of life, in fodder, in agricultural and forest seeds and seedlings, and protection of
trees and plants against diseases and pests;
21. ocean and coastal shipping as well as aids to navigation, inland shipping, meteorological services, sea watenvays and inland waterways used for general traffic;
22. road traffic, motor transport, and construction and maintenance of long distance highways;
23. railroads other than federal railroads, except mountain railroads."
166 Art.
167 Art.

72, § (1).
72, § (2).
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areas of the Federation's exclusive legislative powers, and may
exercise concurrent legislative powers as long as the Federation
does not occupy the field by its own laws. What is really meant
by Article 70 is that the Lander have exclusive powers to legislate
in areas not embraced by the Federation's powers. It is a point
worth emphasis that the Lander derive their authority from a
constitutional distribution of power, that they do not owe their
existence and powers to the Federation, and that within the sphere
of their exclusive jurisdiction they exercise autonomous sovereign
authority.
The Federation's exclusive legislative powers parallel in important respects the expressly granted power of Congress under
the Constitution.168 When account is taken, however, of the concurrent powers also, it is clear that the Federation's powers extend
to many matters not coming within the powers of Congress, although it should be noted that some of the concurrent powers,
such as those relating to regulation of economic matters, including
commerce, labor law, and promotion of agriculture, parallel the
reach of congressional power either as expressly or impliedly
granted.169 Perhaps one way to look at the concurrent powers
under Article 74 is that they deal, at least in large part, with
matters which in the United States fall within the implied powers
of Congress. On the other hand, it is also evident that the Federation, in view of its concurrent authority to deal with civil law,
criminal law, and dealings in real estate and land law, has a much
broader authority than our Congress does, since the matters of
strictly private law do not generally come within the express or
168 Apart from the tax powers discussed later, the important powers expressly
granted to Congress under Article I of the Constitution include the power to regulate
foreign and interstate commerce, establish uniform rules of naturalization and bank•
ruptcy, coin money and regulate the value thereof, fix the standards of weights and measures, establish post offices and post roads, enact laws relating to patents and copyrights,
declare war, and provide for the armed forces. The primary power to regulate foreign
affairs is vested in the President under Art. II. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U. S. 304 (1936). However, Congress has power to legislate in respect to
foreign affairs both because of the reach of its express powers in regard to such matters
as regulation of foreign commerce, and because this power inheres in the national
government. See Perez v. Brownell, 356 U. S. 44 (1958).
169 Under the power to regulate commerce among the several states, Congress has
the authority to regulate labor-management relations in industries affecting commerce
[NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. l (1937) ], fix labor standards for employees engaged in commerce or in production for commerce [United States v. Darby
Lumber Co., 312 U. S. 100 (1941) ], and regulate agricultural production [Wickard v.
Filburn, 317 U. S. 111 (1942) ].

1142

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[ Vol. 58

implied powers of the national government.17° Indeed, it is fair
to say that the combination of exclusive and concurrent powers
under the Basic Law gives to the Federation a totality of legislative power considerably in excess of that granted to Congress, with
the result that the areas that are exclusively left to the Lander
under the Basic Law are very limited in scope. It appears that
education and culture, along with matters relating to local administration, are the only major areas over which the Lander have
an exclusive legislative authority.
The Basic Law recognizes a third category of legislative powers
of the Federation, apart from the categories of exclusive and concurrent powers. Article 75 authorizes the Federation to enact
what for lack of a better term we may tall general framework laws
(Rahmenvorschriften). These have to do with (I) the legal status
of persons in the public service of the Lander, communes and
other bodies-corporate of public law; (2) the general rules of law
concerning the status of the press and motion pictures; (3) hunting, protection of nature and care of the countryside; (4) land
distribution, regional planning, and water conservation; (5) matters relating to registration and identity cards. Here the legislative power of the Federation extends to the enactment of general
rules as distinguished from complete treatment of the subject.
The Lander, in turn, have the authority to implement the general
rules by detailed regulations of their own. In short, this category
embodies the idea that these matters have a national aspect and yet
admit of diversity of treatment in their particularized application.
According to the classic interpretation of the United States
Constitution, originating with Chief Justice Marshall's opinion
in McCulloch v. Maryland,17 1 the Congress may exercise not only
the powers expressly enumerated in Article I of the Constitution
but also the powers implied from those granted. The implied
power doctrine, coupled with the general theory of liberal construction propounded in the McCulloch case, has contributed in
an extraordinary way to extension of congressional legislative
power. This principle of construction has its roots in the con170 Congress has the implied power to enact criminal laws with respect to matters
coming within its legislative jurisdiction, but it lacks jurisdiction to enact general criminal laws.
Not only does the federal government not have legislative authority over matters
of private law, i.e., contracts, torts, and property law, but federal courts in dealing with
questions of private law coming before them must follow the law of the state, whether
statutory or case law, where the federal court sits. Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64
(1938).
1114 Wbeat. (17 U.S.) 316 (1819).
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stitutional language which authorizes Congress to make all laws
which shall be "necessary and proper" for executing its enumerated
powers and all other powers vested by the Constitution in the
federal government.172 The Basic Law contains no "necessary
and proper" clause. In view of the range of the powers delegated
to the Federation, it is understandable that such a clause was not
included. However, despite the absence of a clause of this kind,
the Federal Constitutional Court, without formulating a broad or
liberal theory of implied powers, has accepted two ideas that contribute to a limited implied power doctrine.
The Federation is said to have powers not expressly granted
which relate to functions which by their nature (Natur der Sache)
inhere in the very creation and constitutional organization of the
Federation.1,.3 But the consideration that with respect to a given
subject matter it would be expedient to have a uniform federal
law instead of a diversity of laws of the several Lander is not in
itself enough to show that the subject matter involves functions
that by their nature fall within the competence of the Federation.
In accordance with this principle the Federal Constitutional Court
expressed the opinion that while land planning on a national level
was a function which by its nature gave rise to a legislative power
in the Federation to deal with the subject, the same could not be
said with respect to building law taken as a whole (Baurecht als
Gesamtmaterie) even though specific phases of building law came
within the express delegations of authority to the Federation.174
A second principle of construction that suggests a limited doctrine of implied powers is that an express grant of power to the
Federation to deal with a specific subject matter carries with it the
implied authority to enact regulations which are indispensable to
the full exercise of the express power (Sachzusammenhang), even
though the Federation may thereby extend its authority into fields
of regulation not specifically embraced within its express powers.
This comes the closest to the American "necessary and proper"
idea, but any such analogy should be viewed with caution, since the
emphasis given by the Federal Constitutional Court appears to
stress what is strictly necessary to the implementation of the express
power.175
112 Art. I, §8.
173 See the discussion in the advisory opinion reported in 3
1743 BVerfGE 407 (1954).
175 For discussion, see the advisory opinion in 3 BVerfGE 407

BVerfGE 407 (1954).

(1954). Here the Court
concluded that the power to enact a building law was not necessary to the implementation
of the Federation's legislative powers. See also the opinion in 8 BVerfGE 143, where the
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A further comparison may be made at this point between the
distribution of power under the Basic Law and under the United
States Constitution. The Constitution in delegating power to
Congress does not explicitly define these powers as either exclusive
or concurrent and does not state any general rule respecting the
continuing power of the states in these areas. Any powers given
to Congress may be deemed exclusive by virtue of the provisions
of the Constitution only to the extent that there are express
prohibitions on the power of the states to legislate or to deal with
certain areas, such as the express prohibition on the power of the
states to make treaties or to enter into alliances or confederations,
coin money, emit bills of credit, or make anything but silver and
gold coin a legal tender in payment of debts.176 Likewise, no
state may, without the consent of Congress, lay imposts or duties
on imports or exports, lay any duty or tonnage, keep troops or ships
of war in time of peace, enter into any agreement or compact with
another state, or with a foreign nation, or engage in a war unless
actually invaded or in such imminent danger as will not admit of
delay.177 The federal power to deal with these matters is not in
every case strictly exclusive, since it is recognized that the states
may exercise authority in some of these areas with the consent of
Congress. This does suggest a parallel with the Basic Law since
even the so-called exclusive powers of the Federation are exclusive
only in the sense that the Lander may not exercise legislative
power in these areas without the express approval of the Federation.
Apart, however, from the express denials of certain powers to
the states, whether the denial is absolute or conditioned on approval by Congress, the Constitution states no general rules for
determining whether or not powers granted to Congress are exclusive or whether they admit of a subordinate concurrent power
on the part of the states. These problems have been worked out
by the Supreme Court in its role as umpire of the federal system.
They have arisen most frequently in respect to the regulation of
commerce. The Constitution grants to Congress the power to
Court develops the idea that a legislative power granted the Federation implies a police
power incident to the execution of the power.
For extended and critical discussion of the subject of implied powers, see Kiichenhoff,
"Ausdriickliches, stillschweigendes und ungeschriebenes Recht in der bundesstaatlichen
Kompetenzverteilung," 82 (Vol. 43, New Series) AR.CHIV DES OFFENTLICHEN.RECHTS 413 (1957).
176 Art.
177 Art.

I, §10,
I, §10,

111.
112.
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regulate commerce among the several states. In the absence of an
indication of congressional policy respecting the power of the
states to make their laws applicable to commerce, the Supreme
Court has provided solutions by employing various theories which
in the end permit states at least a limited authority to extend their
police regulations and tax laws to commerce within the limits of
their territorial jurisdiction. In the end it does not make much
difference whether the Court says that the power to regulate
commerce is exclusive but the states may exercise their police
power to affect commerce,178 or whether it says that the states have
a subordinate concurrent power to regulate the local phases of
commerce,179 or that the states may regulate commerce as long as
there is a valid local interest that outweighs the national interests
in the freedom of commerce.180 Whatever the theory, a substantial
amount of state regulation and taxation is permitted, consistent
with the basic freedom to do business on the interstate market. In
this sense, therefore, it can be said that the states do have a concurrent power to regulate commerce subject to the paramount
power of Congress and its expressed or implied policy respecting a
given phase of regulation. On the other hand, some phases of
regulation of commerce have been denied to the states absent
authorization from Congress.181 To this extent it may be said that
the power of Congress over the subject is exclusive in the sense that
this term is used in the Basic Law. What emerges as the central
principle is that Congress has the superior power over the subject
and that by its legislation it may expressly or impliedly deny to the
states the power to deal with the subject182 or expressly authorize
178 Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. (22 U.S.) I (1824).
179 Cooley v. Board of Wardens of Port of Philadelphia, 12
180 Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945).

How. (53 U.S.) 299 (1851).
The opinion in this case
contains an excellent discussion of the subject, and the approach here taken appears to
represent the Court's current position on this problem.
181 Thus the states may not regulate the degree of competition in interstate commerce
[Buck v. Kuykendall, 267 U.S. 307 (1925), H. P. Hood & Sons v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525
(1949)], subject commerce to conflicting requirements [Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, 359
U.S. 520 (1959)], discriminate against interstate commerce [Dean Milk Co. v. City of
Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951)], or tax the privilege of doing interstate business [Spector
Motor Service v. O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602 (1951)].
182 Legislation having this effect may assume either of two forms. Congress by its
own substantive legislation in the exercise of the commerce power may occupy or preempt the field and thereby impliedly displace state power, or the statute may by its
express terms indicate the extent to which state power is displaced. The problem of
displacement by implication has arisen most frequently in recent years in regard to the
power of states to deal with labor matters in view of federal legislation in this area.
See, e.g., Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Board, 353 U.S. I (1957). For an extended discussion
and application of the pre-emption doctrine in its relevancy to internal security legislation, see Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956). Congress, without enacting its own
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the states to extend their authority over a given subject in interstate commerce.183
The express authority of the Federation under the Basic Law
to enact general standard or framework laws with details to be
supplied by the Lander184 has no parallel under the Constitution,
although it does suggest a familiar pattern with respect to the
relationship of state and municipal authority under the several
state constitutions. Congress may adopt local laws in some instances,185 may permit details in some statutes to be determined by
reference to local law,1 86 and may condition the exercise of a
federal right by the observance of state law,187 but at most these
patterns suggest only imperfect analogies to the idea of a general
framework statute as authorized by the Basic Law.

B.

Tax Powers

The distribution of taxing authority is dealt with specially in
Part X of the Basic Law as amended December 23, 1955. The
Federation has exclusive power to legislate on customs and fiscal
monopolies,188 and a concurrent power to legislate on excise and
transaction taxes, taxes on income, property, inheritances and
gifts, and taxes on real estates and businesses.189. But while the
Federation occupies the dominant position in respect to these
major tax powers, so far as the enactment of tax legislation is concerned, the Basic Law stipulates that the receipts from certain taxes
accrue to the benefit of the Lander whereas others are earmarked
substantive legislation, may expressly deny a state the power to subject commerce to
specific burdens or restraints. Thus in 1959 it enacted the Interstate Commerce Tax Act,
expressly providing that no state may levy an income tax on a foreign corporation doing
solely interstate business within the state. 73 Stat. 555 (1959), 15 U.S.C. (Supp. 1959)
§§381-384.
183 Thus Congress has expressly provided that the insurance business shall be subject
to state regulatory and tax laws. See Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408 (1946).
J.84Art. 75.
185 Thus Congress in the Assimilative Crimes Act has adopted state criminal legislation in defining criminal liability in areas under exclusive federal jurisdiction. This
statute was upheld in United States v. Sharpnack, 355 U.S. 286 (1958).
188 Under the federal bankruptcy act certain property exemptions are governed by
state law. 11 U.S.C. (1958) §24. On the validity of this provision, see Hanover Nat. Bank
v. Moyses, 186 U.S. 181 (1902).
187 Thus Congress in the Webb-Kenyon Act prohibited interstate shipments of liquor
intended for use or possession in violation of the laws of the state of destination. This
statute was upheld in Clark Distilling Co. v. Western Maryland Ry. Co., 242 U.S. 311
(1917), as a proper exercise of the congressional power to regulate interstate commerce.
See KALLENBACH, FEDERAL COOPERATION WITH THE STATES UNDER THE COMMERCE CLAUSE

(1942).
188 Art.
189 Art.

105, § (I).
105, § (2).
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for the Federation's benefit.19O The receipts from federal income
and corporation taxes are apportioned on a percentage basis with
about two-thirds going to the Lander.191 In order to equalize
financial capacity of the Lander, taking into account differences in
tax revenues and differences in burdens of expenditures, the Federation may grant special subsidies to some Lander at the expense
of the share of resources that would normally be distributed to
other Lander.192
In summary, the tax provisions of the Basic Law contemplate
a centralization of the important tax powers in the Federation,
but with earmarking of a part of the receipts for Lander purposes.
By contrast, under the United States Constitution, the national
government and the states have independent taxing powers.193
Both Congress and the state legislatures may, for instance, levy
income taxes, death taxes, and numerous forms of excises. As a
practical matter pre-emption may occur if federal tax rates are so
high as to discourage the states from levying a similar type of tax.
Custom and experience have also indicated a line of division in
tax matters. For instance, the federal government does not levy
property taxes,19 4 and in turn this is a principal source of revenue
to the states and their political subdivisions. Moreover, in determining the total fiscal picture account must be taken of the broad
spending power of the federal government, which may use its
spending power as a means of redistributing back to the states
moneys collected through federal taxes, and in doing so it may act
100 Art. 106, §§ (1) and (2).
191 Art. 106, § (3).
192 Art. 107, § (2).
193 Under Art. I, §8 of the Constitution,

Congress has the power to lay and collect taxes,
duties, imposts and excises. Duties, imposts and excises are required to be uniform
throughout the United States. Direct taxes are_required to be apportioned among the
states on the basis of population. Art. I, §9. Under the Sixteenth Amendment (1913)
Congress is expressly authorized to lay and collect taxes on income. The income tax is
now the major source of federal revenues.
The power of the states to levy taxes is derived from their own constitutions. Apart
from limitations imposed by their respective constitutions, the states in exercising their
taxing powers are subject to some limitations derived from the Constitution. The states
may not levy taxes on imports and exports without the consent of Congress, Art. 1, §10.
Because of the grant of power to Congress to regulate commerce, the states may not levy
taxes on the privilege of doing interstate business. See Spector Motor Service v. O'Connor,
340 U.S. 602 (1951). Likewise, according to the doctrine of implied intergovernmental
immunities, the states may not levy taxes directly on the federal government or its instrumentalities except as the immunity is waived by Congress. See McCulloch v. Maryland,
4 Wheat. (17 U.S.) 316 (1819); United States v. Detroit, 355 U.S. 466 (1958).
194 Any federal property tax would have to be apportioned to the states on the basis
of population. See note 193 supra.
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to correct inequalities between the states so far as their own resources are concerned.195

C.

Federal Supremacy

Article VI of the United States Constitution reads in part as
follows: "This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States
which shall be made in pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made,
or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States,
shall be the supreme Law of the Land.... " States may not exercise authority in conflict with the supreme law of the land as
thus defined. By comparison, a limited form of the supremacy
clause is found in Article 31 of the Basic Law which reads as
follows: "Federal law overrides Land law." Implicit here in the
reference to federal law is that it is. law compatible with the Basic
Law. Article 31 can be translated to mean that all federal law, in
so far as it is compatible with the Basic Law, is the supreme law of
the land, notwithstanding any law of the Lander to the contrary.
One difference between Article 31 of the Basic Law and Article VI
of the Constitution is the failure in Article 31 to include a reference
to the supremacy of treaties made under the authority of the
Federation. It is true that Article 25 provides that the general
rules of public international law form part of the federal law, take
precedence over the laws and directly create rights and duties for
the inhabitants of the federal territory. But the phrase "general
rules of public international law" appears to refer only to the
commonly accepted principles and usages of international law and
does not include within its reach the provisions of special international agreements as distinguished from multilateral conventions
that are the source of commonly accepted rules. More in point is
Article 59 of the Basic Law which provides that treaties which
regulate the political relations of the Federation or relate to
matters of federal legislation require the consent or participation,
in the form of a federal law, of the bodies competent in any
specific case for such federal legislation. Under this provision it
follows that if the Bundestag by law consents to or participates in
a treaty that relates to a matter of its legislative competence, this
law, pursuant to Article 31, overrides any Land law to the contrary.
195 Under Art. I, §8 of the Constitution, Congress has an independent substantive
power to spend for the general welfare. United States v. Butler, 2(j'/ U.S. 1 (1936); Steward
Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937).
For discussion of the financial aspects of American federalism and of the system of
federal grants-in-aid to the states, see United States Commission on Intergovernmental
Relations, A REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR TRANSMITIAL TO CONGRESS (1955).
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But suppose a treaty relates to a matter over which the Federation does not have legislative competence? This question came
before the Federal Constitutional Court in the well-known case
involving the Concordat which Hitler had entered into with the
Vatican, pursuant to which Catholic children were entitled to
special privileges in regard to religious education in the German
schools. The question presented before the Court was whether a
post-war law of one of the Lander which did not recognize these
special privileges was invalid as being inconsistent with obligations
under a valid treaty. In a long opinion, the Court, after establishing at great length that the Concordat, although often breached
by Hitler, had not been renounced, that it had continued to have
validity as an international obligation, and was, therefore, still an
obligation of the Federation,196 held that the treaty, nevertheless,
imposed no obligation upon the Lander, since under the Basic
Law the control of education is reserved to the Lander.197 Consequently they may or may not, at their option, elect to comply
with the provisions of the Concordat.
The Concordat decision presents an interesting contrast to the
famous decision of the United States Supreme Court in Missouri v.
196 The second section of Art. 23 of the Basic Law, included in the part which
contains transitory and concluding provisions, is specifically directed to the question
whether treaties entered into by the former Reich continue in force after the establishment of the Federal Republic of Germany. It reads as follows:
"Subject to all rights and objections of the interested parties, the state treaties concluded by the German Reich concerning matters for which, under this Basic Law, Land
legislation is competent, remain in force, if they are and continue to be valid in accordance with general principles of law, until new state treaties are concluded by the agencies
competent under this Basic Law, or until they are in any other way terminated pursuant
to their provisions."
It will be noted that while this ambiguous article contemplates the continued validity
of treaties entered into by the former Reich concerning matters for which, under the
Basic Law, Land law is competent, it provides no express answer to the question whether
the Lander are required to conform to such treaties.
197 6 BVerfGE 309 (1957). In its opinion the Federal Constitutional Court considered
the question whether the Bundestreu principle required the Lander to respect and carry
into effect treaties that were binding on the Federation. The Court has declared that
this principle, which means in effect that each of the Lander must view itself as an
interdependent part of an organic whole and must, therefore, act in a way consistent with
the interests of Federation and of the other Lander, is implied from the nature of the
federal structure as established by the Basic Law. Thus the Court, in reliance on this
principle, has held that a Land was under a duty to take appropriate steps to prevent
a municipality from conducting an advisory referendum on the question whether the
army should be equipped with atomic weapons. (The Court was without jurisdiction
to deal directly with municipal corporations.) 8 BVerfGE 122 at 137-141 (1958). See
note 25 supra, and the discussion in the text at this point. In the Concordat case, however, the Court declared that the Bundestreu principle did not require a Land to give
effect to a federal treaty dealing with a matter over which the Lander had exclusive
legislative jurisdiction. 6 BVerfGE 309 at 361-362 (1957).
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Holland,198 which held that when the federal government entered
into a treaty dealing with an appropriate matter of international
concern, Congress had the implied power to legislate in implementation of the treaty and that its legislation overrode state law, even
though Congress had no independent legislative power to deal
with the subject. The Tenth Amendment was not deemed to be
a bar to this conclusion, since it reserves to the states only the
powers that are not delegated to the federal government, and
Congress under the necessary and proper clause may enact legislation appropriate to the implementation of a valid treaty.
The problem presented in the Concordat case and in Missouri
v. Holland is identical and arises in any federal system. Whether
there are such fundamental differences between the Basic Law and
the Constitution of the United States as to require a difference in
result in the treatment of this problem is debatable. Justification
for the Federal Constitutional Court's decision in the Concordat
case must be found in the Court's conviction that according to the
superior will of the constitution makers control of education is a
matter reserved to the Lander and that the treaty power cannot be
used as a means of impairing the Lander's freedom of action in this
area. Under the Constitution it cannot be said that the states
possess any exclusive powers since they retain only the powers not
granted to the federal government, and the powers of the federal
government are capable of progressively-widened interpretation.
The Federal Constitutional Court's solicitude for state autonomy
in the field of education is understandable, since this is one of the
few important areas reserved to the legislative authority of the
Lander. It should be noted, however, that the decision in the
Concordat case has not gone unchallenged and has been criticized
with respect to its impact on international law and the ability of the
Federation to carry out its treaties.199
D.

Role of States in Administration of Federal Law

Any discussion of the general features of federalism under the
Basic Law would be incomplete without reference to the provisions
found in Part VIII of the Basic Law relating to the execution and
administration of federal laws. Without any attempt at detailed
analysis, it is sufficient to note that the Lander execute the federal
U .s. 416 (1920).
Kaiser, "Die Erfiillung der volkerrechtlichen Vertrage des Bundes durch die
Lander," 18 ZEITSCHRIFT FiiR AUSLANDISCHES OFFENTI.ICHES R.EcHT UND VoLKERRECHT 526
(1957-1958).
198 252
199 See
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laws as a matter of their own concern to the extent that the Basic
Law does not otherwise provide or permit.200 Likewise they may
execute federal laws as agents of the Federation.201 Whether acting as agents of the Federation or acting on their own concern, it
is the business and duty of the Lander to enforce federal laws. The
important difference between acting as agents of the Federation
and acting on their own concern is that when acting as agents they
may expect to be compensated by the Federation for supplying
this service. As it works out in practice, the federal laws are for
the most part administered by officers and employees of the Lander
with the result that the citizen actually has very little contact with
federal authorities. The Lander in executing the federal laws as
a matter of their own concern provide for the establishment of
authorities and the regulation of administrative procedures in so
far as federal laws do not otherwise provide.202 The federal government may issue general administrative rules and exercise its
supervision to ensure that the Lander execute the federal laws in
accordance with applicable law.203 When the Land authorities
are executing federal laws as agents of the Federation, they are in
addition subject to the instructions of the appropriate highest
federal authorities.204
Although in conformity with these provisions a large share of
the administration of federal law is conducted by officers and employees of the Lander, the Basic Law requires that the foreign
service, the federal finance administration, the federal railroads,
the federal postal service and the administration of the federal
waterways and of shipping be conducted as matters of federal administration with their own subordinate administrative structure.205
This interesting aspect of federalism under the Basic Law,
which points to integration of federal and state administration in
the enforcement of federal laws206 presents a striking contrast to
the duality of administration that is a characteristic feature of
federalism under the Constitution of the United States. As a
200Art. 83.
201 Art. 85,

§ (I).
84, § (I).
203Art. 84.
204 Art. 85, § (3). Where the Liinder execute federal laws as a matter of their own
concern, the federal government may issue individual instructions for particular cases
but only if authorized by a federal law requiring the consent of the Bundesrat. Art. 84, § (5).
205 Art. 87, § (I).
.
206 For discussion, see Merkl, "Executive-Legislative Federalism in West Germany,''
53 AM. Pot. SCI. REv. 732 (1959).
202 Art.
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general proposition, federal laws are administered by federal authority, and state administrative machinery is not utilized in
carrying federal laws into effect. Certainly there is no duty on the
part of the states to administer federal laws. It is true that a high
degree of cooperation between federal and state administrative
and enforcement authorities is found in some situations. Thus
in the enforcement of their respective criminal laws, federal and
state officers often work closely together in the detection of crime
that raises questions of violation of both federal and state laws.
Likewise, there is a substantial amount of exchange of information
of common concern to federal and state agencies. Joint inspection
by federal and state officers occurs in some areas, and state officers
may occasionally be vested with authority to serve as federal inspectors or otherwise to help administer federal Iaws.207 But these
situations by no means represent the usual rule or practice, and
certainly within the limits of the constitutional system patterns of
cooperative relations can be more fully explored and developed
than they are at present.208

E.

The Judicial System

The integration of federal and Lander authority in the administration of federal laws, representing a much more highly
developed "cooperative federalism" than exists in the United
States, is paralleled also by the integrated judicial system, established under Part IX of the Basic Law. The total judicial authority of the Federal Republic is vested in the judges and is
exercised by the Federal Constitutional Court, by the higher
federal courts provided for in the Basic Law and by the courts of
the Lander.209 Higher federal courts are required to be and have
been established in the fields of ordinary, administrative, finance,
labor and social jurisdiction.210 It should be emphasized that the
207 See Kauper, "Utilization of State Commissioners in the Administration of the
Federal Motor Carrier Act," 34 MICH. L. R.Ev. 37 (1935); Koenig, "Federal and State
Cooperation Under the Constitution," 36 MICH. L. R.Ev. 752 (1938).
20s The Commission on Intergovernmental Relations appointed by President Eisenhower has urged greater attention to the potentialities of cooperative relationships and
recommends an enlarged use of state personnel and machinery in the administration and
enforcement of federal laws. See chapter 3, "National Responsibilities and Cooperative
Relations," of its REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR '!'RANSMI'ITAL TO CONGRESS 59-89 (1955).
209 Art. 92. The Federal Constitutional Court is discussed pp. 1162-1181 infra. Provision is also made in Art. 92 for the Supreme Federal Court whose function according to
Art. 95 will be to decide cases in which the decision is of fundamental importance for the
uniformity in administration of justice by the higher federal courts, but this court has
not yet been established.
210 Art. 96, § (1).
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only federal courts, apart from the Federal Constitutional Court,
are the so-called "higher federal courts," and these, within their
respective jurisdictions in areas of federal law, are really the high
courts of the judicial system. These courts operating on the
highest level rest on a foundation of lower courts that are courts
of the Lander but which administer federal law as well as the local
law of their respective jurisdictions. These lower court judges
are appointed for life by the Lander authorities and their status is
regulated by special laws of the Lander subject to general rules
enacted by the Federation.211 Within the spheres of their jurisdiction, the lower Lander courts operate as arms of the unitary judicial
system. In short, there is no system of dual courts of the Federation
and of the Lander. Just as administrative authorities of the
Lander are used to enforce federal law, so the Lander courts constitute the lower level of the judicial system in the interpretation,
application and enforcement of federal law. The lower courts
have jurisdiction also over matters arising distinctively under the
laws of their respective Lander. This unified German court system
is radically different from the American pattern which features
sharply differentiated federal and state judicial systems, each with
its own complete layers of trial and appellate courts, and with the
United States Supreme Court having jurisdiction over the highest
courts of the states only with respect to decisions on questions
arising under the Constitution, laws and treaties of the United
States.212
F.

The Role of the Bundesrat in Representing the Lander

A distinctive feature of federalism under the Basic Law is the
institutional role of the Bundesrat,213 designed to serve as an
211Art. 98, §§ (3) and
212 Under Art. III of

(4).
the Constitution the federal judicial power extends to cases
arising under the Constitution, treaties and laws of the United States, as well as to certain
categories of cases depending on the nature of the parties, including cases between citizens
of different states. The jurisdiction of state courts is derived from their respective state
constitutions and most of the cases coming before them deal with matters arising under
state law. But the two judicial systems are not mutually exclusive in terms of jurisdiction.
Thus state courts in dealing with cases before them must often deal with questions of
federal law arising under the Constitution, treaties and laws of the United States. Indeed,
Congress may vest state courts with authority to entertain civil causes of action arising
under federal statutes. See Mondau v. N.Y., N.H. & H. Ry. Co., 223 U.S. 1 (1912). On
the other hand federal courts in exercising their jurisdiction in cases turning on the
nature of the parties are required to give effect to state law in the determination of these
cases. See Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
213 The provisions establishing the Bundesrat and determining its composition and
organization are found in Articles 50-53 of the Basic Law (Part IV).
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agency for giving the Lander a special voice in the determination
of the affairs of the Federation and thereby serving to protect the
place of the Lander in the federal order.
Article 50 states that the Lander participate through the
Bundesrat in the legislation and administration of the Federation.
The Bundesrat consists of members of the Lander governments
which appoint and recall them. 214 The reference here to the
Lander governments means the administrative authorities of the
Lander.2115 Each Land has at least three votes in the Bundesrat
and those with larger populations have more.216 The votes of each
Land may be cast only as a block vote by members present or their
substitutes.217
Without detailing the procedures followed by the Bundesrat
it is sufficient here to note that although the primary legislative
authority of the Federation is vested in the Bundestag, the
Bundesrat plays an important part in the total legislative process
in two different ways. First of all, it must be consulted on all
legislative matters, and, depending on its action or inaction, the
Bundesrat may exercise a limited veto power on the action of the
Bundestag by forcing the latter to reconsider and re-enact a law to
which the Bundesrat objects. If the Bundesrat rejects the law by
a simple majority vote, the Bundestag may re-enact it by a simple
majority vote; if the Bundesrat rejects it by a two-thirds vote, the
Bundestag may then re-enact it only by a two-thirds majority
vote.21s
In respect to a number of specified matters coming within the
legislative competence of the Bundestag but which are of special
concern to the Lander, the Bundesrat' s consent is required in
order for the law to become effective.219 Also, in those spheres of
administration where the Lander authorities administer federal
laws, the power of the Federation to prescribe rules governing the
214Art. 51, § (1).

21rs The accountability of the Bundesrat representatives to the governments of the
Liinder was emphasized by the Federal Constitutional Court in its decision holding unconstitutional the advisory referenda proposed to be held by several Liinder on the
question of arming the military forces with atomic weapons. 8 BVerfGE 104 (1958). In
answer to the argument that the advisory expression of opinion would be helpful to the
Land's representatives in the Bundesrat, the Court stated that these representatives were
to be guided by instructions from the government of the Land. See the discussion in
the text, p. UOO supra.
216 Art. 51, § (2).
211 Art. 51, § (3).
218 The procedures arc spelled out in Art. 77.
219 See, e.g., the provisions of Arts. 105-107 relating to tax matters.
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same is subject to approval by the Bundesrat.220 Moreover, a twothirds concurrence by the Bundesrat is required in case of amendment of the Basic Law.
The formal provisions of the Basic Law respecting the functions of the Bundesrat do not tell the whole story. Actually the
Bundesrat is emerging as a stronger and more influential political
body than was perhaps contemplated by its establishment.221 A
steadily increasing number of federal legislative enactments have
been interpreted to require the consent of the Bundesrat with the
result that the Bundesrat is on its way to becoming an important
second chamber of the legislative branch of the federal government.222
The Bundesrat suggests some comparison with the Senate of
the United States but the comparison should not be pushed too
far. Like the Senate the Bundesrat may be characterized as a
second house of the national legislature. But there is a wide difference in that whereas the Senate has an equal voice with the
House of Representatives in the enactment of federal legislation,
i.e., affirmative votes are required by both the Senate and House
for the enactment of laws, the Bundesrat's affirmative participation
is required only in respect to legislation affecting the special interests of the Lander, and with respect to other, legislation it has a
consultative voice and may even assert what amounts to a veto
power. In a sense, then, the Bundesrat exercises in part functions
performed by the United States Senate and in part a function
served by the President so far as his formal participation in the
legislative process by means of the veto power is concerned. Within the limits of the functions assigned to it, and, as pointed out
above, with its role in the legislative process gradually becoming
more prominent, the Bundesrat represents in a special way the
interests of the Lander and thus is an institution designed to help
preserve the integrity of the federal system. A further comparison
may be made with the Senate of the United States on this point.
It is a matter of history that the provisions of the Constitution
creating the Senate and determining its composition represented a
Arts. 84 and 85.
Neunreither, "Politics and Bureaucracy in the West German Bundesrat," 53
AM. PoL. SCI. R.Ev. 713 (1959); Katzenstein, "Rechtliche Erscheinungsformen der Machtverschiebung zwischen Bunl und Landero seit 1949," 11 Dm 6FFENTLICHE VERWALTUNG
593 (1958).
222 Up to April 1958, no less than 50% of all enacted federal laws had been recognized
to fall in the category of laws requiring the consent of the Bundesrat. NEUNREITIIER, id.
at 718.
220 See

221 See
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compromise between the big and small states entering the Union.
In order to offset the preponderant influence the larger states
would have had by determining representation solely on the basis
of population-the standard used for determining the House of
Representatives-equality of representation and vote in the Senate
was seen as a compensating feature to protect the interests of the
smaller states. It is, therefore, accurate to say that the Senate of
the United States was designed, like the Bundesrat, to serve particularly as the branch of the national legislature which represented
the states' interests in a special way. This was emphasized by
the provision that the senators would be elected by the legislatures of their respective states. This feature, however, was abandoned with the adoption in 1913 of the Seventeenth Amendment which authorizes popular elections of senators. Thus the
combination of a number of factors, including the accountability
of senators to the electors instead of the state legislature or administration, the Senate's general participation in the federal
legislative process, and the increased concern in American political
life with matters of national interest, has served over the years to
alter the role of the Senate as the body peculiarly designed to
represent state interests in the federal legislative process, and
sharply differentiates it from the Bundesrat.223

G.

Conclusions

The Basic Law creates a federal system and distributes power
between the Federation and the Lander. It states a theory similar
to a basic idea of American federalism in that it recognizes that the
Lander have the power to legislate in so far as the Basic Law does
not confer power on the Federation, although the practical significance of this should not be overestimated in view of the large and
important areas in which the Federation may exercise legislative
powers and the correspondingly limited areas of Lander autonomy.
Federal law within the sphere of its competence is supreme as
recognized in Article 31 which provides that federal law overrides
Land law, and which in some respects resembles the supremacy
clause of Article VI of the United States Constitution. The
features of the Basic Law that authorize the Federation to enact
general laws with power in states to implement them with details
and, more strikingly, the employment of state officers and agencies
223 It should be stressed that a Land's representatives in the Bundesrat are appointed
by the Land's administration and are accountable to it.
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to administer federal laws in many areas and the integration of
the entire judicial system under the Basic Law all mark considerable departures from American federalism. Indeed, these various
features suggest that German federalism, when compared with the
American pattern, is a substantially diluted form of federalism, and
that the Lander occupy a significantly less important role in the
Federation than do the states of the American Union. Certainly
there is a much greater centralization of legislative authority, and
the use of the administrative and judicial authority of the Lander
to enforce federal laws, suggests either that the position of the
Lander may be described in terms of constitutional home rule or
that the general federal structure under the Basic Law may be
characterized in terms of centralized power and decentralized admm1stration. But this would be a superficial conclusion. The
retention of legislative power in some significant areas, the use of
state administrative personnel to enforce federal laws, the control
by the Lander of the integrated judiciary at the subordinate levels,
and the distinctive and significant role of the Bundesrat in representing the Lander's interest in the federal legislative and administrative processes, as well as in the important process of constitutional amendment, are all institutional arrangements that
strengthen the position of the Lander and contribute to a genuine
federalism. 223 a Perhaps the net conclusion to be drawn is that it is a
less rigid and more economical type of federalism than its American counterpart and certainly one that more fully utilizes the
principle of cooperative federalism. The federal principle admits
of many diverse applications that take account of historical,
political and geographical factors. To mention only the geographical factor, one must expect substantial differences between a
federal structure accommodated to West Germany's limited and
compact territory and the federal structure designed for the government of the vastly larger domain of the United States.

V.

SEPARATION OF POWERS

The separation of powers theory is postulated as a fundamental
feature of the constitutional system established by the Basic Law.
"All state authority emanates from the people. It is exercised by
223a See

Mason, "Federalism -The Bonn Model," in ZURCHER, CONSTITUTIONS AND
II, 2d ed., 134-153 (1955), for an analysis and
appraisal of what the author describes as the federal and non-federal features of the system
established by the Basic Law.
CONSTITUTIONAL TRENDS SINCE WORLD WAR
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the people by means of elections and voting and by separate
legislative, executive and judicial organs."224 This principle is
implemented by the provisions establishing the organs of government and defining their authority. 225 The Bundestag exercises
the primary legislative function of the Federation.226 The Bundesrat as pointed out earlier in the discussion of federalism is a
special organ whereby the Lander have a voice in the legislative
and administrative processes of the Federation. The Federal
President who is the titular head of state has limited but important
executive functions. 227 His office, however, is not to be compared
to that of the President of the United States who is the nation's
chief executive officer.228 Under the parliamentary-cabinet system of government prescribed by the Basic Law, the Federal
Chancellor and the Federal Ministers constitute the "Federal
Government" as this term is used in the Basic Law.229 (To use the
familiar American terminology, the Federal Chancellor and the
Federal Ministers constitute the "federal administration.") It is
the Chancellor who is the important executive head of the govern2M Art.

20, § (2).
the earlier discussion of the judicial system, pp. 1152-1153 supra, as part of the
analysis of federalism under the Basic Law.
226 See Basic Law, Part III (Articles 38-49).
227 The Federal President is elected for a term of five years without debate by the
Federal Convention which consists of the members of the Bundestag and an equal number
of members elected by the representative assemblies of the Lander, Art. 54. He represents the Federation in its international relations, concludes treaties with foreign states
on behalf of the Federation, and accredits and receives envoys. Art 59, § (1). He
proposes the Federal Chancellor for election by the Bundestag, Art. 63, § (1), dismisses
the Chancellor and appoints a successor as provided in Art. 67, dissolves the Bundestag
under the conditions specified in Art. 63, § (4), appoints and dismisses Federal Ministers
upon the proposal of the Federal Chancellor, Art. 64, § (1), appoints and dismisses the
federal judges and the federal civil servants unless otherwise provided for by law, Art.
60, § (1), and exercises the power of pardon in individual cases on behalf of the Federation, Art. 60, § (2). Laws duly passed and countersigned become effective after they are
signed by the President and promulgated in the Federal Gazette. Art. 82.
The President's authority to represent the Federation in its international relations
appears to be chiefly ceremonial in character, while the substantive power of determining
foreign policy resides in the Chancellor and the cabinet. This question received extended
discussion in 1959 when Chancellor Adenauer announced his intention (later revoked)
of running for the Presidency. See Dietze, "The Federal Republic of Germany: An Evaluation After Ten Years," 22 J. PoL. 112 at 113 (1960).
228 Art. II of the Constitution vests the executive authority in the President and also
names him as commander-in-chief of the Army and Navy. He negotiates and concludes
treaties with the advice and consent of two-thirds of the Senate, appoints ambassadors
and other public ministers and consuls, heads of departments and other officers, and
federal judges with the advice and consent of the Senate, receives ambassadors and other
public ministers, exercises the pardoning power, proposes legislation, has the power to
veto legislation which can thereafter be re-enacted by the Congress only by a two-thirds
vote, has the authority to convene special sessions of Congress, and is vested with the
general duty to take care that the laws be faithfully executed.
229 See Basic Law, Part VI (Articles 62-69).
225 See
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ment and who also because of his political position plays the leading role in the determination of legislative and foreign policy.
The Basic Law makes clear in numerous ways that the administration is not to encroach on the legislative power. Restriction on basic rights, if permitted, may be accomplished only by
and subject to law. Thus the fundamental rights of freedom of
expression may be limited only by the provisions of the general
laws.230 Although the President represents the Federation in its
international relations, concludes treaties with foreign states on
behalf of the Federation, and accredits and receives envoys, all
treaties which regulate the political relations of the Federation or
relate to matters of federal legislation require the consent or
participation, in the form of a federal law, of the bodies competent
in any specific case for such federal legislation.231 This may be
contrasted with the situation in the United States where a treaty,
pursuant to Article VI, is the supreme law of the land and may,
depending on its nature, become the source of domestic law without the necessity of implementing or ratifying legislation by Congress.232
Only in one situation does the Basic Law recognize a power in
the administration to make a law effective without the enactment
by the Bundestag.233 If the Federal Chancellor fails to secure a
vote of confidence on motion put by him and the President fails
to dissolve the Bundestag, the President may, at the request of the
administration and with the consent of the Bundesrat, declare a
state of legislative emergency with respect to a bill if the Bundestag
rejects the bill even though the administration has declared it to
be urgent. Following this declaration, the bill is deemed to have
been passed if the Bundesrat assents to it even though the Bundestag again rejects the bill or adopts it in a version declared to be
unacceptable to the adminstration. But the state of legislative
emergency may not continue for more than six months during the
Chancellor's term of office.234
230 Art.

5, § (2).
59, § (2).
232 For an illustrative case, see Hauenstein v. Lynham, 100 U.S. 483 (1880). See
also the opinion in Edye v. Robertson, 112 U.S. 580 at 598 (1884).
233 See Art. 81.
234 On the question whether the President of the United States has power to deal
with internal emergencies on the basis of his own executive prerogative, see the several
opinions in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952), where the
majority of the Court held invalid the President's seizure of the steel mills as a means
of averting a strike. Although two of the justices comprising the majority rested their
decision on the theory that the President had attempted to exercise a legislative power
231 Art.
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Although the Constitution is silent on the subject, the Supreme
Court has declared the general principle that Congress may not
delegate its legislative power to the executive or to administrative
agencies.235 This result is based both on the general principle of
separation of powers and on the theory that delegated power cannot be redelegated. To be sure the principle has been greatly
diluted by the judicial recognition that liberal grants of the rulemaking power and of discretionary authority to administrative
agencies is necessary in the structure of modern government,236
although even here the Court has insisted that Congress define the
general policy of the legislation and employ standards or norms
that will serve to limit administrative discretion. Carte blanche
delegations of authority without reference to policy objectives or
definable standards have been held unconstitutional.237
The Basic Law is explicit on this point.238 While recognizing
that the administration, a federal minister or the governments of
the Lander may be authorized by law to issue ordinances having
the force of law (Rechtsverordnungen), it provides that the content, purpose and scope of the powers conferred must be set forth
in the law. The legal basis must be stated in the ordinance. Furthermore, if a law provides that a power may be further delegated,
an ordinance having the force of law is necessary in order to
delegate the power. Thus the Basic Law, while permitting a delegation of a subordinate law-making power, states restrictions designed to avoid carte blanche delegations.239
without authorization from Congress, the other four justices included in the majority
group based their decision on the narrower ground that whatever prerogative authority
the President could claim to deal with an internal emergency, it could not be exercised
in a way that conflicted with the declared policy of Congress within the sphere of its
legislative competence.
235 See Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935); Schechter Poultry Corp.
v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
236 See Justice Jackson's opinion in Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 US. 245 (1947).
237 See the cases cited in 235 supra.
238Art. 80, § (1).
239 Some delegations of power have been held invalid by the Federal Constitutional
Court on the ground that they violated the limitations set forth in the Basic Law. See,
e.g., I BVerfGE 14 (1951), holding invalid the broad delegation of authority to the Federal
Minister of the Interior "to issue such decrees having the force of law as are required"
to implement the provisions of the law providing for reorganization of the Lander in
the Southwest territory; 9 BVerfGE 83 (1959), holding invalid a decree of the Defense
Council authorizing the Minister of Interior to make rules respecting the packaging and
sale of ready-packaged drugs, subject to exceptions granted by him. Cf. the decision in
8 BVerfGE 274 (1958), holding valid the delegation of power to the Federal Minister of
Economics and to the Lander governments to fix prices for goods and services except
wages by executive order.
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Transcending the specific provisions of the Basic Law is the
underlying conception of the Rechtsstaat with its emphasis on
legality and the subjection of administrative action to judicial
review to determine its lawfulness.240 This is accented by the
establishment of separate courts, as authorized by the Basic Law,
with jurisdiction over administrative, tax, labor and social matters.241 Indeed, it appears that the German system for judicial
review to determine questions of law and legality in spheres of
public administration is more extensive and penetrating than
review by United States courts of the determinations and acts of
federal executive and administrative agencies. It must be remembered in this connection that in the American system the
regular courts have jurisdiction over all legal questions in the
spheres of both private and public law, as contrasted to the continental system which establishes special courts for review of
matters in the area of public administration.
Whether the law-making power may be exercised only by the
enactment of laws of general application, as distinguished from
special laws dealing with specific situations, is a question that
becomes pertinent in any discussion of the rule of law. The Basic
Law does not state such a general principle, but it does require
the observance of this idea in one situation. Article I 9 provides
that when under the Basic Law a basic right may be restricted
by or pursuant to a law, the law must apply generally and not
solely to an individual case. Furthermore, the law must in this
instance name the basic right, indicating the article. Special laws
aimed at depriving certain persons of their rights are thereby
prohibited. German writers have advanced the argument that
the idea that laws must have a general application is implicit in
the concept of the law-making power and the rule of law,242 but
whether the Federal Constitutional Court will give this argument constitutional sanction remains to be seen.243
240 See Art. 20, § (3), stating that the executive and the judiciary are bound by the
law, the provision of Art. 28, § (1), that the constitutional order in the Liinder must
conform to the principles of republican, democratic and social government based on the
rule of law, and the important provision of Art. 19, § (4), that if any person's right is
violated by public authority, recourse to the court shall be open to him, and if no other
court has jurisdiction, recourse shall be to the ordinary courts.
241 Art. 96, § (1). See also Art. 19, § (4), referred to in note 240 supra.
242 See HAMANN, DAS GRUNDGESE'IZ 49 (1956) with further citations.
243 The decision of the Federal Constitutional Court in sustaining the validity of a
special assessment levied by the Bundestag on German business enterprise (gewerbliche
Wirtschaft) in order to provide funds to aid basic industries, while relevant to the question under discussion, offers no basis for any broad generalizations on the subject. See
4 BVerfGE 7 (1954).
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The Constitution does not expressly limit the Congress to the
enactment of general laws within the spheres of its legislative
competence,244 although a number of state constitutions prohibit
the enactment either of all special laws or special laws dealing with
specified subjects. Congress usually enacts many special laws at
each session. These special laws generally confer benefits on the
persons involved. But special laws passed by Congress imposing
burdens or disabilities or depriving persons of constitutional rights
can be attacked either as bills of attainder,2415 or as a form of discriminatory legislation that violates the due process clause of the
Fifth Amendment. It is conceivable also that certain types of
special acts aimed at specific purposes could be regarded as an
unlawful attempt to interfere with the executive function or to
invade the sphere of judicial authority.246
VI.

THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL COURT

A.

Authority and I urisdiction

The Basic Law not only recognizes the principle of judicial
review but also establishes a special tribunal, the Federal Constitutional Court, to pass on constitutional questions. Indeed,
the Federal Constitutional Court may properly be characterized as
the most important development in post-war German constitutionalism.247 As a special tribunal charged with the important
244 Under Art. I, §8, Congress is authorized to establish a uniform rule of naturalization and uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcies. Similarly, all duties, imposts and
excises are required to be uniform. This has been held to refer to geographical uniformity
and to mean that taxes falling in these categories must apply to all parts of the country
alike. Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41 (1900). So far as the naturalization power is concerned, it has not been supposed that Congress is limited in the exercise of this power
to the enactment of general laws. Congress has in numerous cases conferred citizenship
in specific cases by special laws.
245 Art. I, §9, prohibits bills of attainder by Congress. A bill of attainder is defined
as a legislative act prescribing punishment. See United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303
(1946), holding invalid as a bill of attainder a provision of a federal appropriations act
which declared that certain named persons, then employed by the federal government,
would be ineligible to receive salary payments out of federal appropriations. Congress
was attempting by this means to compel the dismissal of these employees.
246 Thus in United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946), referred to in note 245 supra,
the Court's decision might well have been based on the ground that Congress was attempt·
ing thereby to assert executive authority over the dismissal of federal employees.
247 For excellent discussions of the Federal Constitutional Court, see Cole, "The West
German Federal Constitutional Court: An Evaluation After Six Years," 20 J. PoL. 278
(1958); Rupp, "Judicial Review in the Federal Republic of Germany," 9 AM. J. COMP. L.
29 (1960). See also von Mehren, "Constitutionalism in Germany -The First Decision of
the New Constitutional Court," I AM. J. COMP. L. 70 (1952); Nagel, "Judicial Review in
Germany," 3 AM. J. CoMP. L. 233 (1954); Dietze, "Judicial Review in Europe," 55 MICH.
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task and responsibility of authoritative interpretation of the Basic
Law, it occupies a unique place in the constitutional structure.
The Federal Constitutional Court has been described as standing
at the apex of the judicial pyramid248 and, in distinction from the
other courts, it is recognized by statute as a constitutional organ.249
The Court's jurisdiction is defined by Article 93 of the Basic
Law as follows:
"(I) The Federal Constitutional Court decides:!. on the interpretation of this Basic Law in the event of
disputes concerning the extent of the rights and duties of a
supreme federal organ or of other parties concerned who have
been endowed with independent rights by this Basic Law or
by Rules of Procedure of a supreme federal organ;
2. in case of differences of opinion or doubts on the formal
and material compatibility of federal or Land law with this
Basic Law, or on the compatibility of Land law with other
federal law, at the request of the Federal Government, of a
Land Government or of one-third of the Bundestag members;
3. in case of differences of opinion on the rights and duties
of the Federation and the Lander, particularly in the execution of .f:deral law by the Lander and in the exercise of federal
supervision;
4. on other disputes of public law between the Federation
and the Lander, between different Lander or within a Land,
unless recourse to another court exists;
5. in the other cases provided for in this Basic Law.
"(2) The Federal Constitutional Court shall also act in
such cases as are otherwise assigned to it by federal law."
The Court's jurisdiction as thus defined is very broad and
encompasses authority to deal with all problems that raise questions of interpretation of the Basic Law. Moreover, this grant of
jurisdiction also defines who are proper parties to raise certain
kinds of constitutional questions. Finally, it should be emphasized
that the effect of these provisions is to vest the Court with original
jurisdiction in dealing with the specific categories of disputes and
cases here enumerated.
L. REv. 539 (1957). See also Cole, "Three Constitutional Courts: A Comparison," 53 AM.
POL. SCI. REV. 963 (1959).
For an excellent German text on the Federal Constitutional Court, see GEIGER, GESETZ
UBER. DAS BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHT (1952).
248 Rupp,

DRorr

"Government Under Law in Germany," 9
at 110 (1959).
Federal Constitutional Court, §1 (1).

D'IsrANBUL 101
~i9 Statute on the

ANNAi.ES DE LA

FACULTEE

DE

1164

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[ Vol. 58

The constitutional provisions respecting the Court's jurisdiction have been implemented by the Statute on the Federal
Constitutional Court, (Bundesverfassungsgerichtsgesetzf 50 which
defines the organization of the Court, the methods of raising questions before it, and the procedure to be followed by it.
Pursuant to the Basic Law and the statute, constitutional issues,
depending on the nature of the question and the parties raising
the question, may come before the Court in the following principal
ways:251
I. By a proceeding initiated directly before the Court by a
supreme federal organ, such as the Bundestag, the Bundesrat, the
President, the Federal Government, or a political party, to secure
an interpretation of the Basic Law in the event of a dispute concerning the rights and duties of the parties concerned (Organstreit).252 In other words the Court has jurisdiction to determine
disputes between the executive and legislative departments. 253

2. By a proceeding initiated directly before the Court by
the Federal Government, a Land Government or one-third of the
Bundestag members to determine the validity of Federal or Land
laws (abstrakte N ormenkontrolle).254
250For the text of the statute, see FoRSTHOFF, OFFENTLICHES R.ECHT-SAMMLUNG
UND VERWALTUNGSRECHTLICHER GESETZE 195 et seq. (1956).
251 For an excellent discussion of these various procedures, see Rupp, "Judicial Review
in the Federal Republic of Germany," 9 AM. J. CoMP. L. 29 (1960).
Apart from the general types of proceedings enumerated in the text, the Federal
Constitutional Court is also vested with authority to deal with specific matters in special
types ·of proceedings. Mention may be made, for instance, of its jurisdiction to decide
on the constitutionality of parties under Art. 21 of the Basic Law and its disciplinary
authority over federal judges under Art. 98.
252 For the purpose of this jurisdiction, a faction of the Bundestag, indeed, even
an individual member of the Bundestag, is recognized to have standing to raise the kind
of questions contemplated by Art. 93, § (1) 1fl. See I BVerfGE 351 and 372 (1952); 4
BVerfGE 144 (1955). See also Rupp, "Judicial Review in the Federal Republic of Germany," 9 AM. J. COMP. L. 29 at 43 (1960).
253 See Rupp, "Judicial Review in the Federal Republic of Germany,'' 9 AM. J. CoMP.
L. 29 at 42 (1960).
254 The phrase "abstrakte Normenkontrolle" does not admit of any adequate English
translation. This proceeding is designed to furnish a speedy method for securing an
adjudication by the Court in case of differences of opinions or doubts as to the validity
of federal or Land law. No dispute or controversy is required. On the other hand, the
Court's opinion in a case coming before it in this way should not be confused with an
advisory opinion. The question respecting validity of a statute can be raised before the
Court only after the statute has been enacted. And, more importantly, §31 of the Statute
on the Federal Constitutional Court gives the force of law to the Court's opinion in a
proceeding of this character and makes it binding on all organs of government.
At an earlier time the Federal Constitutional Court was authorized to render advisory
opinions, but this authority was repealed in 1956 by amendment of the Statute on the
F<;deral Constitutional Court.
Relatively few cases have come before the Court in the exercise of its abstrakte
Normenkontrolle jurisdiction. Judge Rupp states that as of June 30, 1959, only eight out
STAATS·
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3. By a proceeding initiated directly before the Courts by
the Federation or by a Land or Lander in case of disputes of public
law between the Federation and the Lander, or between different
Lander, or within a Land.
4. By a complaint proceeding initiated directly before the
Court by an individual who claims that one of his constitutional
rights has been violated by the exercise of governmental authority.
(VerfassungsbeschwerdeJ.255
5. By a proceeding originating in another court, if this court
considers unconstitutional a law, the validity of which is relevant
to its decision, where the matter concerns a violation of the Basic
Law, including a violation of the Basic Law by Land law or the
incompatibility of a Land law with a federal law.256
Before proceeding further with respect to the Constitutional
Court, a comparison may be made at this point between the basic
jurisdiction of the Federal Constitutional Court and of the Supreme Court of the United States. The Supreme Court's jurisdiction is limited by the definition of judicial power under Article
III which provides that the federal judicial power extends to
cases arising under the Constitution, treaties and laws of the
United States (federal question jurisdiction) and to cases turning
on the nature of the parties, such as suits between states, cases
to which the United States is party, suits between citizens of
different states, and cases affecting ambassadors, other public
ministers and consuls.
of a total of 4,203 cases were in this category, but they all related to very important issues.
See his article, "Judicial Review in the Federal Republic of Germany," 9 AM. J. CoMP.
L. 29 at 36, n. 26 (1960).
255 This complaint proceeding, known as V erfassungsbeschwerde, is not directly provided for under Art. 93, § (1). It is authorized by §90 of the Statute on the Federal
Constitutional Court in accordance with the provision of Art. 93, § (2) of the Basic Law.
A thorough treatment is found in PFEIFFER, DIE VERFASSUNGSBESCHWERDE IN DER PRAXIS
(1959). For an excellent English discussion of this complaint procedure, see Barnet,
"Protection of Constitutional Rights in Germany," 45 VA. L. REv. 1139 (1959). Professor Barnet states that of the thousands of petitions considered since 1951 only a small
number have resulted in decisions favorable to the complainant. In the five-year period
from 1951-1956, only seven complaints were held to be both admissible on jurisdictional
grounds and justifiable on the merits. Id. at 1157. Many of the complaints filed have
been frivolous in character. Moreover, a large number have been dismissed on the ground
that the complainant had not previously exhausted other remedies available to him, as
required in the usual case by §90, 1f2 of the Statute on the Federal Constitutional Court.
See also on this matter, Cole, "The West German Federal Constitutional Court: An
Evaluation After Six Years," 20 J. PoL. 278 at 287-289 (1958).
256 This procedure is directly authorized by Art. 100 of the Basic Law. For a helpful
discussion of the mechanics of this procedure, see Rupp, "Judicial Review in the Federal
Republic of Germany," 9 AM. J. COMP. L. 29 at 32-35 (1960).
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The Supreme Court as the highest court in the federal system
in tum possesses original jurisdiction in only a limited category
of cases, namely, cases to which a state is a party and cases affecting public ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls. In all
other cases it has appellate jurisdiction subject to such exceptions
as Congress shall make.257 In view of this limitation, the major
part of the Supreme Court's jurisdiction is appellate in character,
i.e., it reviews cases arising in the lower federal or in the state
courts dealing with federal questions or other types of cases
coming within the scope of the federal judicial power and turning
on the nature of the parties. Moreover, most of the Supreme
Court's appellate jurisdiction is discretionary in the sense that it
is free to decide which cases to review on a writ of certiorari.
This brief description points up at once several basic differences between the jurisdiction of the Federal Constitutional
Court and that of the United States Supreme Court. First, whereas the Supreme Court's jurisdiction is principally appellate in
character, the Federal Constitutional Court's jurisdiction has been
described as being entirely original.258 Secondly, whereas the
Federal Constitutional Court is limited in its jurisdiction to dealing
with constitutional questions (including the compatibility of laws
of a Land with federal laws), the United States Supreme Court
in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction may review all cases
arising in either the federal or state courts dealing with federal
questions, i.e., questions arising under the Constitution, treaties
or laws of the United States as well as cases arising in the lower
courts where jurisdiction is founded on the nature of the parties.
Thus all questions dealing with the interpretation of federal
statutes come within the court's appellate jurisdiction. In short
it has a much wider jurisdiction and is not simply a special tribunal
to pass on constitutional questions. On the other hand, the Supreme Court has a wide discretion in determining which cases to
review whereas the Federal Constitutional Court is required to
hear and determine all cases coming within its jurisdiction.259
257U.S. CoNST.,

Art. III, §2, 1[2.

258See Rupp, "Judicial Review in the Federal Republic of Germany," 9 A:M. J. COMP.
L. 29 at 30 (1960). The first four classes of cases listed above in the text clearly fall
into this category. It is more questionable whether the fifth type of proceeding, involving
a referral to the Federal Constitutional Court of a constitutional issue decided by another
court, should be classified as original jurisdiction. American lawyers would probably
regard this as an exercise of appellate jurisdiction.
259 Although the Federal Constitutional Court has no choice in determining which
cases to hear, it must necessarily devote a substantial effort to the preliminary tasks of
determining whether in a proceeding initiated before it the formal and jurisdictional
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It should be emphasized also that the United States Supreme
Court, like the lower federal courts, may deal with questions only
in the contest of adversary proceedings, i.e., in cases or controversies representing parties with adverse legal interests.260 It must
be remembered that the power of judicial review is not expressly
authorized under the Constitution of the United States, that it is
derived by implication from the grant of judicial power in a setting
of separation of powers under a document viewed as fundamental
law,261 and that according to the classical American theory courts
do not deal with constitutional issues in the abstract but only as
they are relevant to the disposition of controversies that come
before them.262 Thus whether a given constitutional issue ever
reaches the Supreme Court depends on the uncertain and haphazard process of litigation. The case or controversy limitation,
coupled with the requirement that a person have the proper legal
standing or interest263 to raise a constitutional issue, limits much
more closely the opportunity to raise constitutional issues under
this system than that afforded under the Basic Law.
It is true that when the Federal Constitutional Court hears
a complaint from an aggrieved party that a constitutional right has
been violated or deals with a constitutional issue extracted from
an adversary proceeding before another court, the constitutional
review process operates within the framework of an adversary
proceeding. Likewise cases coming before the Court involving
disputes between organs of the government (Organstreit) are adversary proceedings in the sense that there is a concrete controversy
between opposing parties. This is not the case, however, with
respect to the proceedings that come before the Federal Constitutional Court in the exercise of its abstrakte N ormenkontrolle jurisdiction. Thus upon request of a Land government, it has jurisdiction to pass on the question of compatibility of a federal law
with the Basic Law, and upon the request of the Federal Government or of one-third of the Bundestag to pass on the compatibility
of a Land law with the Basic Law or with a federal law. It seems
requirements are satisfied and whether substantial issues are raised. See Cole, "The West
German Federal Constitutional Court: An Evaluation after Six Years," 20 J. PoL. 278 at
288-289 (1958).
260 Art. III, §2 of the Constitution limits the federal judicial power to "cases" or
"controversies" involving federal questions or turning on the nature of the parties.
261 Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch (5 U.S.) 137 (1803).
262 See Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346 (1911).
263 See Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923); Tennessee Electric Power Co. v.
TVA, 306 U.S. 118 (1939).
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clear that no corresponding suits would be entertained in our
federal courts. In the first place, this type of proceeding does not
satisfy the "case or controversy" requirement, since no dispute
between adversary parties is required. It is sufficient that there is
difference of opinion or doubt as to the validity of a federal or
Land law. Secondly, the parties competent to request the Court
to decide the question would not be recognized by American
conceptions to have standing as proper parties in interest to raise
the question. Thus a state has no standing to raise a question
about the validity of a federal statute unless the state shows damage
to its own legal interests,264 and in turn neither Congress nor the
President have standing to question the validity of a state statute.
Whether the problem is stated in terms of the case or controversy
limitation or of the party-in-interest limitation, the same result
would follow. 2611
A similar party-in-interest problem would be raised under
American law with respect to the Federal Constitutional Court's
authority to decide disputes between organs of government. The
Court may at the instance of the Bundestag consider the validity
of an act of the Federal Government. But a controversy between
Congress and the President would not give rise to a justiciable
dispute between these two parties in the federal courts. Thus the
validity of President Truman's seizure of the steel mills, even
though it turned on questions of the separation of powers between
the President and the Congress, was decided in a case initiated by
the steel companies who were the proper parties in interest since
their property rights were affected by the seizure.266
In all cases decided by it dealing with the validity of legislation the Federal Constitutional Court declares the statute valid or
void. (The term statute as used in this context includes the
Rechtsverordnungen, i.e., administrative ordinances having the
force of law.) Its decisions arising in the course of certain types of
proceedings are declared by statute to have the force of law and
must be published in the Federal Gazette.267 The Court annuls
any statute which it finds invalid, and in this case the statute is
2i!4 See, e.g., Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923), holding that a state could
not challenge the validity of a federal statute on the ground that Congress had authorized
the expenditure of federal funds for a purpose not within the constitutional competence
of the federal government.
265 On the question whether the Federal Constitutional Court's opinion in this type
of proceeding should be characterized as an advisory opinion, see note 254 supra.
266 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
267 Statute on the Federal Constitutional Court, §31 (2).
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treated as void ab initio.268 But to avoid the difficulties and confusion that would arise from re-examination of past acts and
determinations founded on the void statute, the statute provides
that such past acts shall stand but are unenforceable. Thus in a
case where a tax statute is declared invalid, the government is not
required to make refunds of taxes already paid, but on the other
hand unpaid tax liability may not be enforced. In the case, however, of a person convicted of crime under a statute declared
invalid, he may on application secure a new trial. 269
According to the classic theory of American constitutional law,
a court in finding a statute invalid does not repeal or annul the
statute but simply refuses to take the statute into account as an
element of the case.270 The statute remains on the books and may
in effect be revived later if the decision finding it invalid is later
overruled or if other elements enter later to validate the statute.
Moreover, since the court is deciding a case or controversy before
it, the decision that the statute is invalid has a formal relevancy
only with respect to the parties before the court, although as a
practical matter the statute becomes unenforceable on the assumption that the court will reach a like result in other cases coming
before it. So far as the effect of adjudication is concerned, the
Supreme Court has said that an unconstitutional statute gives rise
to no rights or obligations and is the same as a statute never
passed.271 But this theoretical view does not govern in practice.
Thus the doctrine of res judicata may be applied to prevent the
re-examination in a collateral proceeding of a prior determination
based on the statute later declared invalid.272 On the other hand,
it is clear that a person held in prison under authority of a
statute later held invalid may secure his release in a proper proceeding.273 In terms of the concrete problems presented by the
question of retroactive application of a finding of unconstitutionality it may be doubted whether the overall results are much
different under the American system of judicial review from that
of the German system, despite the radically different conception
under the German system that the Court operates directly on a
statute much like a legislative body as contrasted to the American
view that the Court acts only to decide the case before it.
268 8 BVerfGE 51 (1958).
269 Statute on the Federal Constitutional Court, §79.
270 See Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch (5 U.S.) 137 (1803).
271 See the statement in Norton v. Shelby County, ll8 U.S. 425 at
272 Chicot County Drainage District v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S.
273 Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371 (1880).

442 (1886).
371 (1940).

1170

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

B.

[ Vol. 58

Composition and Organization

The Basic Law provides that the Federal Constitutional Court
consists of federal judges and other members, and that half of
the members of the Court are elected by the Bundestag and half
by the Bundesrat.214 The Basic Law does not, however, define
the size or otherwise determine the composition of the Court.
These matters are governed by the Statute on the Federal Constitutional Court276 which was enacted under the authority of
Article 94 of the Basic Law which provides that the Court's constitution and procedure will be regulated by a federal law. Pursuant to this statute the Court consists of two divisions (Senate).
Although each Senat originally consisted of twelve members, this
was later reduced to ten members each. The Statute on the
Federal Constitutional Court now definitively provides that each
Senat consists of eight members,276 but the reduction from ten to
eight will not become effective until September I, 1963.277 Three
members of each Senat are chosen from practicing judges of the
higher federal courts.278
The Bundestag, in making its elections, acts through a twelveman electoral committee on which the several political parties are
represented according to their voting strength in the Bundestag.
The Bundesrat in electing members of the Court acts as a plenary
body. In both cases a two-thirds majority vote is required.279
The judges from the higher federal courts appointed to the
Federal Constitutional Court are automatically appointed for life
since this is a continuation of their status as federal judges. By
statute the other members of the Court are appointed for eightyear terms. 280 The Basic Law recognizes that the judges appointed
for life are subject to age retirement requirements as fixed by
law.281
The Basic Law states that the judges are independent and
subject only to the law.282 If a federal judge, in his official capacity
or unofficially, infringes upon the principles of the Basic Law or
274Art. 94, § (1).
276 See note 250 supra.
276 Sec. 2 (2).
277 Art. 2, § (I) of the GESETZ ZUR ANDERUNG DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTSGESETZES,
SAMMLUNG DES BUNDESRECHTS, Part III, p. 123 (1959).
278 Statute on the Federal Constitutional Court, §4 (I).
279 Id., §§6 and 7.
280 Id., §4 (2).
281 Art. 97, § (2).
282 Art. 97, § (I).
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the constitutional order of a Land, the Federal Constitutional
Court may decide by a two-thirds majority, upon the request of
the Bundestag, that the judge be transferred to another office or
placed on the retired list, and in case of an intentional infringement,
his dismissal may be ordered.283
Under the United States Constitution the composition of the
Supreme Court is left to Congress. Although the number of justices
on the Supreme Court has varied, for many years now it has been
fixed by statute at nine. Congress has never authorized or directed
the Supreme Court to sit in divisions, and the Court has never
operated in this way. It deals in plenum with all the cases before
it. Indeed, a question may be raised whether the Constitution
does not contemplate that the Court sit and hear cases as a plenary
body.
The justices of the Supreme Court are appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate,284 and in this
respect no distinction is observed between Supreme Court justices
and other federal judges. Unlike the Basic Law, which requires
that a part of the Federal Constitutional Court consist of persons
drawn from the higher federal courts, the Constitution does not
recognize any special qualifications for those appointed to the
Supreme Court. In the past the appointment as Supreme Court
justices of persons with prior judicial experience, whether on
federal or state courts, has been the exception rather than the
general rule. The recognition of the Court's role in dealing with
questions of broad political significance has led to the appointment in most cases of men who have been prominent in public
life.285 In view of the place of the Federal Constitutional Court
in the constitutional system, its close identification with political
disputes because of the wide scope of its review power and the
easy access to the Court for the judicial solution of disputes, it is
understandable that the persons appointed to the Court, except
those drawn from the federal judiciary, have been prominent in
German political life as well as persons who have been distinguished in the academic world.286
283 Art. 98, § (2).
284 U.S. CONST., Art. III, §2.
285 President Eisenhower in

his recent appointments has followed his announced
policy of appointing to the Supreme Court persons with prior judicial experience, but it
is not to be supposed that this will fix a permanent policy in this matter.
For discussion of the subject, see Frankfurter, "The Supreme Court in the Mirror of
Justices," 105 UNIV. PA. L. R.Ev. 781 (1957).
286 See Cole, "The West German Federal Constitutional Court: An Evaluation After
Six Years," .20 J. PoL. 278 at 286 (1958).

1172

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[ Vol. 58

All of the federal judges in the United States, by virtue of
explicit constitutional provision, are appointed for life and are
subject to removal only by impeachment proceedings before the
Senate of the United States.287 Because of this provision Congress
may not even require the retirement of federal judges at a specified
age, although, of course, it may authorize voluntary retirement.
Finally, it may be noted that whereas the Supreme Court
determines its procedure by its own rule-making power, the procedure of the Federal Constitutional Court has been spelled out
in detail by legislation as authorized by the Basic Law. ·
Judged by formal requirements, it appears that on the whole
the United States Supreme Court occupies a somewhat more independent position than the Federal Constitutional Court. Congress has no voice in the appointments except as the Senate's
approval of the President's appointments is required, the justices
are appointed for life, subject only to impeachment by the Senate,
and the Court has control of the procedures under which it operates. Both courts are vulnerable to legislative manipulation in the
sense that the size of the tribunal is dependent on the legislature.
In one respect the Supreme Court is more vulnerable because of
the control Congress has over its appellate jurisdiction as compared with the direct grant of jurisdiction to the Federal Constitutional Court under the Basic Law. Actually, however, in only
one conspicuous instance has this control been exercised in order
to keep the Court from passing on an important constitutional
issue.288 Similarly, it should be noted that although the fixed term
of office of most of the Federal Constitutional Court members suggests the possibility of replacement of judges in order to secure men
more in sympathy with legislative objectives, experience to date
has demonstrated substantial stability in the composition of the
Federal Constitutional Court as the result of a general practice of
re-electing men whose terms have expired.289
C.

Operation of the Federal Constitutional Court

A few general observations may be noted with respect to the
way in which the Federal Constitutional Court has carried on its
287 U.S. CONST., Art. III, §1. This section further provides that the salaries of judges
may not be reduced during their term of office.
288 See Ex parte McCardle, 7 Wall. (74 U.S.) 506 (1869).
289 Cole, "The West German Federal Constitutional Court: An Evaluation After Six
Years," 20 J. PoL. 278 at 285-286 (1958).
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work, although a thorough examination of the subject is not
feasible within the limitations of this article.
In the presentation of important cases before the Court, stress
is placed on oral argument of counsel, although written briefs are
also submitted. No time limits are placed on the oral arguments,
and in some of the important cases decided by the Court the
arguments have extended over several days. This practice is
reminiscent of the practice in the early days of the Supreme Court
of the United States and contrasts with the Court's present practice which places fairly strict limits on the time allowed for oral
presentation, with the result that correspondingly greater importance attaches to the written briefs.
In accordance with the usual German practice, a decision of
the Federal Constitutional Court is a corporate decision. The
opinion is the opinion of the Court and no individual judge's
name appears as the author of the opinion, unlike an opinion of
the United States Supreme Court which is the opinion of the
justice who was assigned the task of stating the Court's judgment
and delivering an opinion on behalf of the Court. Since the
decisions of the Federal Constitutional Court are corporate opinions, dissenting and separate concurring views are not published,
although a judge may privately record a dissent as part of the
Court's own records. 290 This is in striking contrast to the freedom
of the justices of the United States Supreme Court to express individual views in dissenting or individual concurring opinions, a
freedom reflected in the multiplicity of opinions in recent years.
The German practice has the advantage of stressing the Federal
Constitutional Court's function as an impersonal collegiate body,
and the rendering of a single opinion adds greater weight and
authority to the Court's judgment. On the other hand, the
American practice has much in its favor, despite any impairment
of the Court's prestige that may result from the publicly-recorded
expression of division within the Supreme Court, since the expression of divergent views, as demonstrated by American constitutional history, often points the way to the future development
of the law. In support of the Federal Constitutional Court's practice of rendering the single corporate judgment and opinion, it
should be emphasized that the Court is a very young institution
and has faced the task at the outset of gaining public respect and
290See Nadelmann, "The Judicial Dissent: Publication v. Secrecy," 8 AM. J. Co:MP.
L. 415 (1959).
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confidence. It may well be that once the Federal Constitutional
Court feels it has securely established itself in its important role
as defender of the Basic Law, it will find it desirable to permit the
expression of divergent views.
The Supreme Court of the United States, sensitive to the
significance of judicial review in a democratic system that accords
a central place to the legislative process, has developed a series
of self-restraints designed to minimize the area in which its important review power is effective. Thus it has formulated and applied the category of "political questions" in which it refuses to
intervene,.2 91 has insisted that parties raising constitutional questions have proper standing to do so, has refused to pass on constitutional questions unless necessary to the disposition of the case
before it, interprets statutes if possible to avoid constitutional
questions, asserts respect for the legislative determination, and
presumes the constitutionality of legislation.292 In mentioning
these self-imposed restraints it is well to note that there is nothing
to force the Court to keep within these bounds, that the application of these ideas is not always clear, and that the Court's members
frequently disagree on whether these restraints have been observed.
In view of the power expressly granted it and the scope of
its jurisdiction as constitutionally defined, the Federal Constitutional Court is not in a position to develop similar self-restraints
in the same measure. The Court's express authority and duty to
decide controversies between supreme federal organs with respect
to their competence and rights and duties forces the Court to deal
with some problems which would be recognized as political questions by our Court.293 Again, in dealing with the party-in-interest
problem, the Court is required to recognize standing of parties
291 See Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939).
292See Justice Brandeis' concurring opinion in Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288 at
345-348 (1936), and Justice Rq.tledge's opinion in Rescue Army v. Municipal Court of
City of Los Angeles, 331 U.S. 549 (1947). On the presumption of constitutionality, see
Justice Brandeis' opinion in O'Gorman and Young, Inc. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 282
U.S. 251 at 257 (1931). On the respect to be accorded the legislative determination, see
Justice Stone's dissenting opinion in United States v. Butler, 291 U.S. 1 at 78 (1936); Justice
Frankfurter's concurring opinion in Dennis v. United States, 339 U.S. 162 (1950).
293 Mention may be made, for instance, of the questioi;is raised in respect to the
reorganization of the southwest territory, 1 BVerfGE 14 (1951), the validity of Landersponsored referenda on the question of equipping the armed forces with atomic weapons,
8 BVerfGE 104 (1958), the declaration that the Communist Party was unconstitutional,
5 BVerfGE 85 (1956), and the questions relating to the Federation's participation in the
European Defense Community Treaties, 1 BVerfGE 396 (1952). For comment on the last
cited case which was dismissed by the Court on procedural grounds, see Loewenstein,
"The Bonn Constitution and the European Defense Community Treaties: A Study in
Judicial Frustration," 64 YALE L. J. 805 (1955).
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to raise a question in cases where clearly our Court would reject
the suit for lack of requisite interest. But other facets of the selfrestraint concept are manifest in the Court's action. It will not
deal with a constitutional question unless it becomes necessary
to do so. Thus where questions have been referred to it by other
courts that have found statutes invalid, the Court has avoided the
constitutional issue by finding that the statute could be interpreted
to preclude the constitutional question. 294 It has declared as a
general principle that statutes are to be presumed valid and, where
legislative authority to deal with a problem rests on the determination of certain conditions and findings, the Court has stated
that a determination of this kind is a legislative matter which the
Court cannot disturb. 296 To put the matter summarily, it seems
fair to say that in the interpretation of the general legislative
powers of the Federation as enumerated in the Basic Law, the
Federal Constitutional Court, like the United States Supreme
Court, is likely to resolve the doubts in favor of the validity of the
legislation.
A feature of the opinons of the Federal Constitutional Court
that may strike the American observer is the Court's tendency to
discuss at length issues and questions presented as part of a case
properly before it but which in view of the decision reached by
the Court are not relevant to the final disposition of the case. The
United States Supreme Court has repeatedly said that it will avoid
expressing opinion respecting matters on which decision is not
required. 296 By contrast, and to illustrate a tendency of the
Federal Constitutional Court to go beyond the issues strictly
necessary to the disposition of the case, attention is again called
to the Court's important decision in the Concordat case297 dealing
with the question whether the Lander in regulating instruction
in the public schools were required to respect the provisions of
the Concordat between Hitler and the Vatican respecting religious
instruction for Catholic children. In the end the Court held that
since under the Basic Law education was a matter reserved for
control by the Lander, they were not bound by this treaty. In
view of this disposition of the case, it was unnecessary for the
Court to consider at length as it did the questions relating to the
294 See, e.g., 2 BVerfGE 181 (1953).
295 See Rupp, "Judicial Review in the

Federal Republic of Germany," 9 AM. J. CoMP.

L. 29 at 38 (1960).
296 See, e.g., Peters v. Hobby, 349 U.S. 331 (1955); Kent and Briehl v. Dulles, 357
U.S. 116 (1958).
297 6 B VerfGE 309 (1957).
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continued validity of the Concordat as an international agreement
which the Federation was required to respect in its capacity as
successor to the Hitler regime.
Dealing with issues not essential to the disposition of the case
may result in future difficulties and embarrassment for a court,
and a good case may be made for the United States Supreme
Court's practice of refusing to deal with questions not necessary to
the decision. But it must be kept in mind in this connection that
the Federal Constitutional Court is operating under a new constitution and that perhaps the gratuitous assertion of some ideas and
principles is inevitable in the formative stage of interpretation.
The United States Supreme Court in its earlier days did not follow
a rigorous policy of self-restraint in refusing to pass on questions
unnecessary to the decision of the case. We recall important
opinions by Chief Justice Marshall in some leading cases where
he went beyond the problems of the case to state basic views which
would serve as guides to future interpretation and development.298
Since the Federal Constitutional Court does not operate within
the framework of a legal system that places emphasis upon concrete
holdings as the source of law, the principle of stare decisis assumes no formal doctrinal significance. The Court does make
frequent references to its prior opinions but for the purpose
primarily of extracting general propositions rather than for comparing or distinguishing the facts or holdings in the earlier cases.299
Although freedom from any formal doctrine in respect to adherence to precedent gives the Court a flexibility in its interpretation and further emphasizes its reliance upon propositional law,
the assertion may be hazarded that the Court's practice of writing
opinions dealing at length with the issues before it, coupled with
the desired objective of stability-an objective reflected in the
Basic Law itself, will over the long run give its decisions an
authority not lightly to be disregarded. Certainly the Court by
298 See, e.g., McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. (17 U.S.) 316 (1819), where the Chief
Justice developed a broad doctrine of federal immunity to state taxation even though the
case might have rested on the narrower ground that the Maryland tax was discriminatory;
Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. (28 U.S.) 419 (1827), where he laid the foundation for
the doctrine that the states may not tax commerce even though it would have been sufficient to rest the decision on the ground that the Maryland tax was invalid under the
imports-exports clause.
299 The Federal Constitutional Court has not shown any tendency to cite constitutional decisions arising under other constitutional systems in which judicial review plays
a prominent role and which raise common or related problems of interpretation. Frequent
references to the United States Supreme Court's decisions are found in the opinions of
the Australian, Canadian and Indian courts. See Tripathi, "Foreign Precedents and
Constitutional Law," 57 CoL. L. REv. 319 (1957).
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its decisions and opinions is building up a body of law which in
time will become the authoritative gloss on the written text.
Again the differences in this respect between the Federal Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court are probably more formal
than real. The Supreme Court has stated, and certainly its practices in recent years confirm this, that in the field of constitutional
adjudication the principle of stare decisis has much less validity
than in other areas and that the Court should consider itself
relatively free to overrule earlier decisions when it is perceived
that these decisions rested on an erroneous basis or that new circumstances require fresh consideration of the problem.800
The Federal Constitutional Court's opinions are thoroughly
and carefully written, and in general reveal a judicial process
which relies upon formal conceptual analysis and the formulation
of propositional law. By comparison we may point to the pragmatism evident in the contemporary work of the United States Supreme Court with its conscious explication and appraisal of basic
constitutional values, absorption with the policy and functional
aspects of the problem before it, the employment of the balancing
process in the weighing of competing interests, and reliance on the
empirical approach, inherent in the judicial method of the common
law, as a basis for constructing a body of general principles. Indeed,
in some important areas of constitutional law of current importance,
the Supreme Court's ad hoc method of decision has invited the
criticism that the Court has lost sight of its responsibility for
formulating meaningful and coherent general principles of interpretation.801
In comparing the judicial methods of the two courts, it should
not be forgotten that a major part of the Supreme Court's decisions
arise under broad language like that of the commerce and due
process clauses which afford wide opportunities for judicial maneuvering and furnish a natural setting for judicial subjectivity in
the identification, appraisal and weighing of relevant interests.
The more precisely drafted Basic Law does not leave as much
room for free play in the judicial process. Moreover, the type
of proceeding whereby an important part of the Federal Constitutional Court's cases come before it, namely, on certification of a
800 See Justice Brandeis' opinion in Burnet v. Coronado Oil &: Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393
at 405-411 (1932); Justice Reed's opinion in Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 at 665
(1944); Douglas, "Stare Decisis," 49 CoL. L. R.Ev. 735 (1949).
801 See Wechsler, "Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law," 73 HARv. L.
REv. 1 (1959).
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question of constitutional law extracted from a case before another
court, necessarily forces the Court to formulate objective principles
of interpretation rather than deal empirically with a total case
before it.
But it is easy to overstate formalism and conceptualism in
the decisional processes of the Federal Constitutional Court. Whatever the formal reasoning process may be, and no matter how
precisely the fundamental law is drafted, policy considerations cannot be ignored in the process of constitutional adjudication. To
mention only a single instance, one cannot escape the conviction
that important policy considerations entered into the Federal
Constitutional Court's decision holding invalid Lander statutes
directing the holding of advisory public referenda on the question
of arming the military forces with atomic weapons.302 Likewise
it should be noted that the Court in dealing with statutes regulating
business activities has not hesitated to employ economic data and
fall back upon empirical considerations and data in attempting
to give a meaningful interpretation of constitutional limitations.303
Similarly in the Communist Party case the Court had to draw
upon underlying factual considerations of a political, social and
economic nature in arriving at its characterization of the Party's
nature and objectives.304 Finally, it is fair to say, in view of the
express enumeration of basic rights and the Court's duty to protect
these rights, coupled with the express recognition that many of
these rights are subject to legislative restriction, the Court cannot
avoid the subjectivity implicit in the pragmatic process of balancing the right against the asserted claim of a competing public
interest. As evidenced by the Court's decisions dealing with a
person's right to choose and pursue his calling,305 a consideration
of the validity of legislation impinging upon this right entails a
a large measure of subjective judgment.
Probably the most interesting feature of the Federal Constitutional Court's assertion of its function in protecting basic rights
302 8 BVerfGE 104
303 See 9 BVerfGE

(1958).
39 (1958), 73 (1959). See also the discussion in the text, p. 1130

supra.
304 Professor McWhinney writes that the Court's opinion in this case "demonstrates
that the constitution is not to be regarded as establishing philosophic absolutes, but
standards capable of varying application in varying societal conditions, thus opening the
way to a pragmatic, balancing-of-interests approach that is quite novel to German public
law jurisprudence and clearly owes much to the influence of American legal ideas and
techniques during the Allied occupation period." See his article, "The German Federal
Constitutional Court and the Communist Party Decision," 32 !ND. L. J. 295 at 308 (1957).
305 See the discussion in the text, pp. 1128-1131 supra.
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and one which refutes a strictly objective and positivistic interpretation of a written text has been the suggestion that the Basic Law
itself is subject to extra-constitutional norms, derived from natural
law considerations, and by reference to which express constitutional provisions may be held unconstitutional.306 Such a view
rests on the assumption that certain human rights are superior to
and precede the written constitution, and that no positive law, not
even a constitution, can be permitted to violate them. The
Federal Constitutional Court has not had frequent occasion to
express this idea, and in no case has it rested a decision squarely
on this kind of reasoning. 307 The notion that the constitution
itself is subject to a transcendent natural justice had its inspiration
in the post-war German legal and juridical thinking that reacteµ
strongly against the philosophy of legal positivism identifiable
with the concept of "legality" which furnished a cloak for legitimizing the outrageous invasion of personal rights during the
Hitler regime. 308 A decline in natural justice thinking has become
apparent by this time, however, and it may be doubted whether
it will have substantial significance as a factor in future constitutional interpretation. But the recognition of the idea by the Federal
Constitutional Court is in itself significant. Recourse to natural
justice and natural rights thinking by the United States Supreme
Court in the interpretation of the Constitution and particularly
in the formulation of the "fundamental rights" interpretation of
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment has been a
familiar feature of American constitutional history.309 It is not
surprising to Americans, therefore, to find an expression of this
thinking also in the thinking of the Federal Constitutional Court
in view of the important role committed to it. But the use of the
natural law concept to question the validity of an express constitutional provision goes beyond reliance upon natural rights thinking
by the United States Supreme Court in the process of constitutional interpretation. Certainly it would be regarded as extraordinary and unprecedented if the Supreme Court were ever to
say that a provision of the Constitution, whether included in the
306 See

the Court's opinion in 3 BVerfGE 225 (1953).
Dietze, "Unconstitutional Constitutional Norms? Constitutional Development
in Postwar Germany," 42 VA. L. REv. 1 (1956).
308 See Bodenheimer, "Significant Developments in German Legal Philosophy Since
1945," 3 AM. J. COMP. L. 379 (1954).
soo See Corwin, "The 'Higher Law' Background of American Constitutional Law,"
42 HARv. L. REv. 149, 365 (1928, 1929).
307 See
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body of this document or added by amendment, was itself unconstitutional by reference to extra-constitutional norms.

D.

Conclusions

In view of its broad jurisdiction, derived directly from the Basic
Law, which places upon it the responsibility for umpiring the
federal system, protecting basic rights, and resolving conflicts between the various organs of state, the Federal Constitutional Court
occupies a pivotal role in preserving the integrity of the constitutional order. Like the Supreme Court of the United States,
it is in a strategic position to make a genuine and creative contribution to the furtherance of a democratic society resting on the rule
of law.
The exercise of a broad power of judicial review that includes
an authority to declare legislation invalid and to resolve disputes
between political organs of the state poses delicate and difficult
tasks for a judicial tribunal operating within the framework of
a society dedicated to democratic principles. The Federal Constitutional Court, still an infant institution concerned with establishing itself in public confidence and respect, faces the task of
discharging its duties in a responsible way while at the same time
avoiding the excesses of judicial power that lead to government
by the judiciary at the expense of the governmental organs charged
with the making of laws and the determination of political issues.
The power to review legislation necessarily vests any tribunal
with an authority that transcends the ordinary limits of judicial
power. The Federal Constitutional Court's task in attempting to
pursue a path free from entanglement with political questions and
encroachment upon the proper sphere of legislative discretion in
the determination of basic policy is a formidable one. The United
States Supreme Court, by comparison, is in a much more enviable
position in this respect. Since the Court itself has postulated its
power of review as a power implied in the constitutional structure,
it is free to develop its own self-imposed limitations on the exercise
of this power. Moreover, the requirements that constitutional
questions come before it in the context of genuine adversary proceedings and that only persons with proper standing or interest
be allowed to raise constitutional questions, and the further considerations that the important constitutional issues come before
the Court in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction and that
with respect to the major part of its appellate jurisdiction the
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Court is free to decide what cases to hear and decide, all combine
to insulate the Court in a substantial way from the political overtones of the issues that come before it. The Federal Constitutional
Court, on the other hand, is under obligation to pass on types of
political questions that would not reach the United States Supreme
Court, and because of its original jurisdiction and duty to take
the case its decision in point of time is less readily dissociated from
the political overtones of the controversy. Much more so than in
the case of the United States Supreme Court, the Federal Constitutional Court, by virtue of the role expressly thrust upon it,
may be characterized as a super political-judicial tribunal. 310
It is fair to say, however, that in the discharge of its constitutional obligations, the Federal Constitutional Court has to date
pursued a creditable course. Although it has resolutely discharged
its task of interpreting and defending the Basic Law as evidenced
in part by its decisions holding federal and Lander statutes invalid,311 its work reflects no tendency toward aggrandizement or
abuse of its important powers. It has rendered decisions which
by reference to American concepts would be characterized as
political decisions, but the Basic Law leaves the Court no choice
except to hear and decide these cases. This is the Court's business.
If any major criticism may be expressed in regard to the Court's
work, it is that the Court invites unnecessary difficulty by not
confining itself to issues strictly necessary to the determination of
cases before it.
One further comment may be ventured in this connection.
The Federal Constitutional Court's role and the relative ease of
access to it by organs of the government for the determination of
constitutional issues makes it readily possible to shift to the Court
the responsibility for decisions on important political matters.
The Federal Constitutional Court is vulnerable to the "passing
of the buck." Its position and reputation as a disinterested judicial
tribunal will, therefore, depend not only upon the Court's selfimposed limitations but also in substantial part upon the sense
of self-restraint cultivated by the other organs of government in
respect to the demands made upon the Court.
310 On the comparable function and role of the Italian Constitutional Court, see
Treves, "Judicial Review of Legislation in Italy," 7 J. PUB. L. 345 (1958); Cassandro,
"The Constitutional Court of Italy," 8 AM. J. COMP. L. 1 at 10-12 (1959).
311 Until Sept. I, 1959, the Federal Constitutional Court had declared 16 federal and
18 state statutes unconstitutional. Rupp, "Judicial Review in the Federal Republic of
Germany," 9 AM. J. CoMP. L. 29 at 37, n. 31 (1960).
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THE AMENDING PROCESS

The significance of judicial review under a written constitution is vitally affected by the relative ease or difficulty with which
the constitution is amended. Substantial hurdles are placed in the
path of amending the Constitution of the United States. A twothirds vote of both Houses of Congress is required to propose an
amendment, and the vote of three-fourths of the state is necessary
to ratification.312 But except for the provision that no state may
be deprived of its representation in the Senate there appears to
be no limit to what the amending process may achieve by way of
alteration of basic policies or rights under the Constitution. The
Basic Law states both formal and substantive limitations on the
amending process. In the first place it can be amended only by a
law which expressly amends or supplements the text thereof. 313
This provision becomes meaningful in light of the practice during
the period of the Weimar Constitution of enacting laws by the
majority required for constitutional amendment and which were
considered as amendments to the extent they were inconsistent
with the constitution.314 A law to amend the Basic Law requires
the affirmative vote of two-thirds of the members of the Bundestag
and two-thirds of the votes of the Bundesrat.315 In terms, then,
of the formal limitations, the Basic Law can be amended more
easily than the Constitution of the United States. More interesting
are the substantive limitations. Article 79 declares inadmissible
any amendment of the Basic Law affecting the division of the
Federation into Lander, the participation in principle of the
Lander in legislation, or the basic principles laid down in Articles
1 and 20.316 These limitations sharply distinguish the amending
process under the United States Constitution. Any comparison on
this score should, however, take account of the consideration that
amendment of the Basic Law is a legislative act, whereas amendment of the American Constitution is based upon the will of the
people as reflected in the action taken by the states in voting
whether, to approve or reject a proposed amendment.

v.

312U.S. CONST., Art.
313 Art. 79, §1.
314 See von Mehren, "Constitutionalism

in Germany-The First Decision of the New
Constitutional Court," I AM. J. CoMP. L. 70 at 73 (1952).
315 Art. 79, § (2).
316 See the text of Articles 1 and 20 quoted in the text, p. 1094 supra.
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CONCLUDING WORD

The descriptive survey undertaken in this article documents
the assertion made at the outset that while basic principles and
institutions are shared in common under the Basic Law of Germany and the Constitution of the United States, notable differences are evident particularly in the application of the federal
principle and in the institutional apparatus for exercise of the
power of judicial review. But no mention has been made of what
is the greatest practical difference, and that is that the Basic Law
has been in operation only eleven years whereas the Constitution
has functioned over a period of one hundred and seventy-three
years. The Constitution, as Chief Justice Marshall said, was "intended to endure for ages to come, and, consequently, to be adapted
to the various crises in human affairs."317 With credit due to the
way in which it was drafted and the flexibility of interpretation
in response to new conditions, the time-honored Constitution,
heavily crusted with a large body of interpretation, has weathered
a number of crises, has served its purpose remarkably well and
continues to serve as an effective instrument of government, despite
the difficulties of the amending process and the relatively small
number of amendments that have been adopted. 318 The fledgling
Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany, it must be
remembered, was intended as a transitory constitution for West
Germany pending reunification of Germany and the adoption
at the time of reunion of a permanent constitution. It is for this
reason that it is characterized as a Grundgesetz (Basic Law) and
not as a Verfassung (Constitution). Whether and when reunification will take place are questions for which the future holds the
answers. In the meantime government has functioned effectively
under the Basic Law.319 Over the long run it may become apparent that the Basic Law is too rigid a document, that the demands
made upon the Federal Constitutional Court are too great and
that some modification of its jurisdiction will be required, and
317 McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. (17 U.S.) 316 at 415-416
318 Twenty-two to date. The first twelve amendments were

(1819).
adopted within sixteen
years after the Constitution went into effect. The following ten amendments were adopted
over an eighty-nine year period, beginning with the Thirteenth Amendment in 1865 and
concluding with the Twenty-Second Amendment in 1951.
The Basic Law has been amended nine times since it went into effect in 1949.
319 See Dietze, "The Federal Republic of Germany: An Evaluation After Ten Years,"
22 J. POL. 112 (1960).
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that other changes will be necessary. More important, however,
is the question, not yet put to the test, whether the constitutional
order established by the Basic Law will prove adequate in time of
crisis. To date it has faced no such critical test, thanks to the
prosperous economic conditions and the political stability West
Germany has enjoyed in the post-war period. Any crisis that may
arise to test the strength of the constitutional order under the
Basic Law will even more significantly test the question whether
the constitutional system reflects the political understanding and
habits of the people and commands their loyalty. The Basic Law
provides on the whole a good skeleton structure for the functioning
of a democratic society. But the flesh and blood required to make
it a living organism and to endue it with the toughness that
withstands stress and strain must be supplied at the grass-roots
level by citizens devoted to the basic values that give meaning to
a constitutional democracy and disciplined to the demands that
a self-governing society makes upon them.

